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ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies the response among early modern and postmodern
audiences to the experience of information overload, and suggests that the most appealing
response to living in a communications network that appears both systematic and random
is to use a rhetoric of struggle that is ambiguous in the same way.
The reasons for this appeal are twofold: firstly, the rhetoric of struggle is a way to
cope with the difficulty of situating oneself within a system of circulating information
that operates according to its own arbitrary rules. Mimicking that arbitrariness is a way of
finding aesthetic synchronicity between how one‘s environment articulates itself and how
one articulates within it.
Secondly, this rhetoric stores the potential for an activism of the object: a method
of resistance against any impulse toward order, homogony, totality in a fallen world that,
from the early modern perspective, is not worthy of seeing its contradictions resolved.
While this resistance is not always positive, it is always clarifying, and while
postmoderns may not see the world through a theological prism to the extent that did the
early moderns, we share the same desire for resolution, and the same evil genius to
counter it.
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As brave as true, is that profession than
Which you do use to make; that you know man.
This makes it credible, you have dwelt upon
All worthy books; and now are such an one.
Actions are Authors, and of those in you
Your friends find every day a mart of new.
-John Donne
When you give everyone a voice and give people power, the system usually ends
up in a really good place. So, what we view our role as, is giving people that
power.
-Mark Zuckerberg

we cannot think the world, because somewhere it is thinking us.
-Jean Baudrillard
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Towards a Deconstruction of Early and Post Modern Rhetorical Strategies (or, When
Social Networking is Neither)

Olivia: Where lies your text?
Viola: In Orsino‘s bosom.
Olivia: In his bosom! In what chapter of his bosom?
Viola: To answer by the method, in the first of his heart.
Olivia: O! I have read it: it is heresy.
(Twelfth Night, I.v.105-109)

1. Where Lies our Text?
Shakespeare‘s dialogue tweaks the familiar correspondence in the early modern
period between body and book. Viola introduces Orsino as a ―hybridization between the
human organism and technology‖ (Marcus 23), a clever but already entirely familiar
image, and one that derives from ―two core metaphors: the book of nature and the body
as a network which replicates the order of the world beyond it‖ (Rhodes 187). Nature is a
book, the human body a microcosm of created Nature, thus body, book and world
correspond. ―[P]eople in early print culture often thought of themselves … as writing, or
as half-human, half-book,‖ says Leah Marcus (23).1 Neil Rhodes agrees, and points to
John Donne as a particularly avid user of book metaphors to show how the relationship
between self and world ―is textually mediated‖ (192):
all mankind is of one author, and is one volume; when one man dies, one
chapter is not torn out of the book, but translated into a better language;
and every chapter must be so translated; God employs several translators;
some pieces are translated by age, some by sickness, some by war, some
by justice; but God's hand is in every translation, and his hand shall bind
up all our scattered leaves again for that library where every book shall lie
open to one another. (Meditation XVII 445)
1

See also Adam Max Cohen, who identifies this hybridization as ―Turning Tech, by which I mean the
description of the individual as a machine‖ (17), paying ―special attention to the ambivalence generated in
response to this changed subjectivity‖ (18).
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Shakespeare‘s dialogue imposes an impediment to Donne‘s systematic process of
translation. Orsino‘s body/book is heretical. God‘s hand, Olivia suggests, is not in every
translation, for not every body is, as Donne says elsewhere, ―an Illustration of all Nature;
God‘s recapitulation of all that he had said before…‖ (―Preached at the Funeral of Sir
William Cokayne‖ 526). Orsino‘s words are not God‘s, and not worth recapitulating—for
Olivia they are hardly worth hearing once. Her banter with Viola may not be designed to
comment seriously on the state of Orsino‘s soul, of course, but it can serve as a reminder
that textual metaphors can be the most unstable, unpredictable and unsystematic figures
of speech imaginable—as singularly appropriate, in other words, for representing
disconnection and dispersal as they are for representing correlation.
Though much has been made of the appearance of the book as a fixed product2
that likewise ―organizes and fixes knowledge, closing it up between its covers‖ (Rhodes
191), and though this ―new technology seemed to promise the realization of that ancient
dream of the scholastics of amassing universal knowledge,‖ gathering from the book of
Nature, that ―giant intertext of multiple connections and allusions,‖ an organized and
encyclopedic knowledge (Rhodes & Sawday 9, 13), such optimism was steadily
tempered throughout the early modern period by the perceived glut of unregulated,
unorganized—and perhaps unregulatable, unorganizable—information circulating among
an early modern public. ―[O]nce books had begun to multiply,‖ says Jonathan Sawday,
the ―world began to appear more uncertain, more unknowable, than ever‖ (29). It is
important to note, as does Paul Starr, that new perspectives on the world, along with other
2

See Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man; Walter Ong, Orality
and Literacy: the Technologizing of the Word.
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social changes deriving from technological innovations, are ―related less to a medium‘s
intrinsic properties than to constitutive choices about its design and development‖ (4).
Books, sermons, ballads and pamphlets may have appeared in print and physically bound,
but ―the trajectory utterances follow in their separation from the author‖ becomes
impossible to follow as authorship coincides with ―the development of an open
economy,‖ one which ―requires a dispersal of agency‖ (Halasz 52, 65). The controlled
dissemination of pamphlets and ballads seems particularly unfeasible, for ―what is to be
controlled is not clear: the text? The singing? The printer? The publisher? The seller?‖
(Halasz 55). Tension builds ―between a system in which bite-sized pieces of information
could be manipulated and rearranged, and that sense of ‗the order of things‘ … which
underpinned the world views given a new lease of life by the medium of print‖ (Rhodes
& Sawday 13).3
What early modern authors and audiences faced was the development of a new
social network, and indeed the image of a network is well-suited to encapsulate—to the
extent that it is possible—the period‘s impressions of the relationship between texts,
communities and identities.4 The social network is a concept recognizable to postmodern
subjects, if difficult to define, or even imagine, with precision.5 The OED defines a social

3

Rhodes and Sawday go on to suggest ―a strange resemblance to modern conditions, in which certain
aspects of the computer create a bewildering sense of fragmentation and disorder, while others, working in
conjunction with political, economic and environmental processes, reinstate an awareness of a global
network, a sense of universal interconnectedness …‖ (13). It is not unlike what Manuel Castells describes
as the power of television, in the modern era, to set the stage for all societal communication despite doubts
about what direct impact, if any, television has on its audience (364). Indirectly, the media inside a system
organized around media ―tend to work on consciousness and behavior as real experience works on dreams,
providing the raw material out of which our brain works…. It is a system of feedbacks between distorting
mirrors: the media are the expression of our culture, and our culture works primarily through the materials
provided by the media‖ (Castells 365).
4
See Michael Bristol and Arthur Marotti; Alexandra Halasz.
5
This lack of precision explains in part my preference for illustrating the interactions between media and
audience with the image of a social network, as opposed to a public sphere. The latter‘s connotations are
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network as ―a system of social interactions and relationships;‖ what this system looks like
we may perhaps gather from the definition for network alone: ―any netlike or complex
system or collection of interrelated things.‖ Sawday points out that the concept of a
network was familiar enough to Renaissance writers, ―though such structures were not
considered to be mutual pacts of obligation. Networks might be physical structures, or
they might be webs of words or ideas‖ (35). As communicational networks develop and
fresh information is exchanged, publications begin to ―weave invisible threads of
connection among their readers‖ (Starr 24). Sarah Anne Brown writes of the period‘s
―hypertextual reading environment,‖ ―the way each Renaissance text can be seen as a
single node within an intertextual web, inviting the reader to branch off to any number of
different ‗sites‘—commentaries, engravings, emblems, songs and poems—but without
the need to click on a mouse button‖ (128). We can compare N. Katherine Hayles‘
understanding of the ―field concept‖ and her central image for it, the ―cosmic web;‖ the
most essential feature for both ―is the notion that things are interconnected,‖ even and
especially language, so that ―every statement potentially refers to every other statement,
including itself‖ (9-10). Networks were and are understood as netlike, complex systems,
but theirs is a complexity—and here is the crucial point—that approaches and then
surpasses the level of comprehension. What is systematic about a social network, in other
words, is always threatening to give way to what is unsystematic, for in tracing its
interrelations, losing the thread is inevitable.6

too conventional, and have too much integrity, to reflect the complexity and volatility of the early modern
media environment.
6
Here I come quite close to equating the network with the labyrinth, something I am comfortable doing,
even though, as Sawday points out, Renaissance writers were aware of a distinction between the two
structures (37). He points to the rete mirabile as a ―net‖ that finally took on features of the mysterious,
unrepresentable, unmappable labyrinth. My argument is that even if early modern writers did not use the
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Fredric Jameson has identified such incomprehension as a particularly
postmodern problem. He remarks on ―the incapacity of our minds, at least at present, to
map the great global multinational and decentered communicational network in which we
find ourselves caught as individual subjects‖ (44, my emphasis). He sees in the
postmodern era an ―alarming disjunction point between the body and its built
environment,‖ a disjunction that makes it impossible for ―the individual human body to
locate itself, to organize its immediate surroundings perceptually, and cognitively to map
its position in a mappable external world‖ (44). 7 The ―once-existing centered subject,‖
Jameson suggests, ―has today in the world of organizational bureaucracy dissolved‖ (15).
In its place is a ―high-tech paranoia‖ that tries and fails to ―think the impossible totality of
the contemporary world system‖ (38).
According to Jameson, it is primarily capitalism, in all its complexity, that has
decentered and fragmented the modern subject. The sixteenth and seventeenth-century
writers that will be discussed in the following chapters did not, of course, have modern
selves to lose. Yet their works reflect a similar incapacity to map the communicational
networks that surround them. Such incapacity leads to major difficulties in
communicating across networks, for the navigation required to communicate efficiently
and unambiguously is obscured by the networks‘ rhizomatic organization. Other than the

words ―net‖ or (social) ―network‖ to describe post-Gutenberg culture, being enveloped in or encased by an
obscurely complex system of competing discourses is a concept that took hold—an ever-tightening hold—
of the Renaissance imagination. See Rita Raley‘s ―eEmpires‖ for a description of what she calls the
nonorganic (as opposed to inorganic) structure of the network, ―a complex system that has energy,
movement, and dynamism. It is not biologically alive, but neither is it an inert, inanimate, material
structure: it functions like an organic entity, yet it is not‖ (120).
7
Jonathan Sawday similarly points to the internet as a producer of ―that dizzying feeling of infinite
interconnectedness, and with it the uncomfortable sense of a vortex which it generates…. Even if the actual
‗net‘ or ‗web‘ … often promises much more than it can deliver, the dream is one of instant, infinite,
connection between shifting, transitory, web personalities‖ (32).
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logic of connection and collection, networks follow no territorial logic. What they do
follow, Deleuze and Guattari explain in their discussion of the rhizome, are principles of
multiplicity: ―[t]here is no unity to serve as a pivot…. Puppet strings, as a rhizome or
multiplicity, are tied not to the supposed will of an artist or puppeteer but to a multiplicity
of nerve fibers, which form another puppet in other dimensions connected to the first‖
(Thousand Plateaus 8). The image of the absent puppeteer is useful for a discussion of
early modern networks because, as Sawday suggests, the uncertainty over knowledge
building in the Renaissance period ―is to do with origin: where is the starting point of the
spoken or written text, what was its first point of utterance?‖ (34). In short, information
inside a social network may be easier to come by, but it is harder to trust. Thus
Shakespeare‘s Viola can map with pointed accuracy the location of her master‘s text—a
text Olivia immediately unfixes as a scattering and faithless heresy. Fixed points fail to
remain fixed inside social networks; nodes become threads. Certainly cognitive mapping
is complicated when the environment in which positions are mapped turns out to be itself
unmappable.
Here we ought to call to mind Philip Wegner‘s reminder that cognitive mapping
―needs to be understood as a way of producing narratives, unfolding through time, rather
than static images, or maps …‖ (267).8 Cognitive mapping seems less doomed to illegible
failure when we remember that place in this context ―is not merely a name but something
like a mode of discursive production and also a psychic content … for which exclusion
may be more crucial than presence …‖ (Stallybrass & White 196). D.K. Smith similarly

8

Robert Shields agrees that ―a social theory of the spatial is needed,‖ one that ―would exceed the usual
scope of geography to take in the tendency to use ‗space‘ as a metaphoric device by which social
distinctions are defined‖ (43).
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reminds that ―a map‘s most important function is to show what cannot actually be seen,‖
and that it ―means both less and more than it reveals‖ as a static image (1).9 Cognitive
maps, it turns out, defy stasis as much as do social networks, because, as psychic content,
they are discursively unstable; so often the attempts, among groups and individuals, to
reassuringly place themselves as individuals with coherent identities means
simultaneously displacing those judged incoherent. And these narratives of
placement/displacement are constant. As Bakhtin reminds us in The Dialogic
Imagination, ―[c]onsciousness finds itself inevitably facing the necessity of having to
choose a language,‖ and the process is always ongoing: ―Alongside the centripetal forces,
the centrifugal forces of language carry on their uninterrupted work; alongside verbalideological centralization and unification, the uninterrupted processes of decentralization
and disunification go forward‖ (295, 272). These exchanges are inevitable, according to
Bakhtin, because ―[o]ur speech … is filled with others‘ words, varying degrees of
otherness or varying degrees of ‗our-own-ness,‘ varying degrees of awareness and
detachment‖ (Speech Genres 89). Hence the discursive instability: choosing a language is
not a choice one can make only once. Alan Sinfield adds to this explanation of inevitable
exchange the ―inter-involvement of resistance and control …. Any utterance is bounded
by the other utterances that the language makes possible …. Any position supposes its
intrinsic op-position. All stories comprise within themselves the ghosts of the alternative
stories they are trying to exclude‖ (47). Inside a social network of circulating narratives,
Bakhtin‘s ―varying degrees of otherness,‖ whether in the production, dissemination, or
9

Compare Cohen‘s discussion of the globe as an overdetermined symbol in this era: ―It was routinely
invoked to represent travel, exploration, discovery, the classical past, the potential for empire, learning, the
individual, the stage, the nation, the earth, and the cosmos‖ (59).
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reception of texts, will inevitably expose themselves, though not in any systematic way. It
is only the belief in an ―impossible totality‖ that makes these variations appear organized
and/or organizable, disguising the fact that the network is ―inherently paradoxical,
deriving its deepest meaning from a whole that it can neither contain nor express‖
(Hayles 21).
The remainder of this introduction will discuss two rhetorically strategic
responses to the irregular regularity of the social network. The first, resting on the
assumption of a totality, a center point inside the network around which all material
circulates (a precursor to Jameson‘s ―high-tech paranoia‖), involves a combination of
denial of and hostility towards the chaos that obscures the path to this center. In practice,
this response involves the concentrated and continuous effort, usually among official or
legitimate cultural groups, to mark clear boundaries of separation between themselves
and those judged to be ―Other‖—no matter how often those boundaries fail to hold. The
rhetorical strategy associated with this option is the ―rhetoric of assertion,‖ a rhetoric that
privileges clarity, authority and resolution.10 It is a rhetoric based on what Bakhtin often
refers to as monologism or unitary language: a form of discourse conditioned by the
ideological desire ―to unify and centralize the verbal-ideological world‖ (Dialogic 270).
Bakhtin explains further:
A common unitary language is a system of linguistic norms. But these
norms do not constitute an abstract imperative; they are rather the
generative forces of linguistic life, forces that struggle to overcome the
10

The phrase ―rhetoric of assertion‖ I take from Gary Olson‘s ―Toward a Post-Process Composition:
Abandoning the Rhetoric of Assertion.‖ In composition studies, Olson says, ―[t]he technology of assertion
seems ubiquitous,‖ and ―despite our attempts to introduce alternative genres, to help students become more
dialogic and less monologic, more sophistic and less Aristotelian, more exploratory and less argumentative,
more personal and less academic, the Western, rationalist tradition of assertion and support is so entrenched
in our epistemology and ways of understanding what ‗good‘ writing and ‗thinking‘ are that this tradition,
along with its concomitant assumptions, defies even our most concerted efforts to subvert it‖ (235).
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heteroglossia of language, forces that unite and centralize verbalideological thought, creating within a heteroglot national language the
firm, stable linguistic nucleus of an officially recognized literary language,
or else defending an already formed language from the pressure of
growing heteroglossia. (Dialogic 270-71).
The alternative response is not quite the reverse of the first, but it does involve an entirely
conflicting rhetorical strategy, of struggle as opposed to assertion, and it ultimately rests
on the skepticism of a belief in the network‘s totality or center point. A rhetoric of
struggle embraces multiplicity, illegibility, indifference and contradiction—everything
the rhetoric of assertion attempts to avoid.11 However, though the latter is doomed to
repeatedly fail, the former is by no means guaranteed to succeed. Practitioners of the
rhetoric of struggle may be just as suspicious of the various noises and narratives of the
new social network as the first group, but where the latter—eager in the work of
homogeny—works to directly undermine the multiplicity of the social network by
censuring suspicious minorities, the former is more likely to entertain what Adam Cohen
calls ―a certain perspectival lightness … a certain tolerance for contradiction or at least a
tendency to accept as valid distinct viewpoints that might have seemed mutually
exclusive before‖ (87). This tolerance, often hesitant rather than enthusiastic, is reflected
in the indirect, ambiguous, illegible language of the rhetoric of struggle. In other words, if
print culture helps to install an irreconcilable variety of points of view into early modern
society, the response of this second group to that installation is to privilege (warily,
suspiciously, often more than half-unwillingly) a rhetoric that is itself irreconcilable—
11

The phrase rhetoric of struggle I derive from Diane Davis‘ Breaking Up [at] Totality: a Rhetoric of
Laughter. Davis agrees with Olson that ―[w]riting gets codified, disciplined, domesticated in the typical
composition course; indeed, writing is often sacrificed in the name of ‘composition,‘ in the name of this
‗discipline‘s‘ service-oriented and pre-established requirements‖ (6). In opposition to ―a style of writing
that is allowed (or, really, required) to efface what it exscribes‖ (13-14), Davis proposes a nondisciplinary
rhetoric that creates ―pattern[s] of connection based on coordination rather than subordination‖ (108).
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that is, marked by contradiction, unreliability, obscurity, even silence. To the rhetoric of
struggle, then, we must add another phrase: the evil genius of hyperconformity.
In general, hyperconformity can be defined as the exaggerated adherence to the
expectations or operations of a system in order to undermine it. It is an indirect form of
resistance, according to Baudrillard—who has written extensively on the practice—―an
offensive resistance‖ of the masses to their own investigation by a media network that
continues to expect sincere engagement with the information it circulates despite being so
saturated with material that the possibility of verifying any of it has already disappeared
(Selected Writings 212). Here is a system that invites participation and that ―encourages
critique while neutralizing it by transforming it into sign‖ (Pawlett 85). ―[A]re we really
communicating,‖ Baudrillard asks, ―or isn‘t it rather the problem of our whole society
expanding, transcending, exhausting itself in the fiction of communication?... What was
an act has become an operation…. Language is a form, but communication is a
performance‖ (―Vanishing‖ 15, 17). What Baudrillard calls the evil genius of the masses
is the strategic method of ―producing failure in the truth of the social and in its analysis‖
(Selected Writings 213) by recognizing this performance of communication and
participating in it as performance, as fiction.12 He suggests that the relationship of the
masses to the media network ―is an insoluble ‗double bind‘ …. They are at the same time
told to constitute themselves as autonomous subjects, responsible, free, and conscious,
and to constitute themselves as submissive objects, inert, obedient, and conformist‖
12

This brings to mind Richard Lanham‘s description of homo rhetoricus, or rhetorical man: a stylist and a
rhetorical dramatist who ―has no central self to be true to‖ and who, ―[w]hen he poses, he is being himself.
The more artistic his performance, the more authentically representative it is‖ (Motives 27). Similar to
practitioners of the rhetoric of struggle, Lanham questions the assumption that ―[m]otive, purposive
behavior, is the causality of history‖ (Motives 20). ―What if we posit as referential the rhetorical, playful
range of motive?‖ he asks. ―It is not simply the history of literature which must be rewritten but the
literature of history‖ (Motives 20).
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(Selected Writings 218-219). ―Neither of the two strategies has more objective value than
the other,‖ Baudrillard asserts, though ―subject resistance‖ is almost always considered
the more effective strategy (Selected Writings 218-219). However,
this takes no account of the equal and probably superior impact of all the
practices of the object…. [T]he present argument of the system is to
maximize speech, to maximize the production of meaning, of
participation. And so the strategic resistance is that of refusal of meaning
and the refusal of speech; or of the hyperconformist simulation of the very
mechanisms of the system, which is another form of refusal by
overacceptance…. This strategy does not exclude the other, but it is the
winning one today, because it is the most adapted to the present phase of
the system. (Selected Writings 218-219)
The chapters that follow will suggest that the strategy of refusal by overacceptance may
have been the ―winning one‖ in the early modern period as well, in the sense that extreme
conformity makes a greater impression and calls for more pronounced and careful
attention to rhetorical and communicational networks themselves. The rhetoric of
struggle appears to approve and accept the network‘s charade—that its threads can be
traced to a center—but this very approval exposes the charade for what it is, and exposes
the network itself as a technology not for the production or the organization of a
centralized truth but for the juggling of countless appearances.13 Hyperconformists may
thus render a system ―hostage to its own tautologies‖ (Gain 52), for hyperconformity
heightens perception of the fictive and entirely un-transcendent qualities of

13

William Merrin lists several examples of strategic exposure inside the modern system of consumerism in
the U.K., discussing at length the spectacular period of public mourning after the death of Princess Diana.
In response to declarations by the media that Princess Diana‘s funeral would be ―the biggest event in
history‖ (qtd. in Merrin 65), mourners showed up en masse to participate in a ―made-for-TV model‖ of
grief. Merrin suggests ―[i]t was this media-derived simulacral grief fed back through the echo-chamber of
the media and reproduced again in response that rapidly began to push the system‘s logic into crisis‖ (65).
Temporarily, it seemed possible that the funeral would turn into the biggest event in history, that mourners
would throw themselves so eagerly into their performance of grief that their behavior would become
unpredictable and overwhelming. For Merrin this is one example of ―the radical potential of joining in: of
deliriously immersing oneself in the system‘s own logic until the point of breakdown‖ (Merrin 64).
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communication inside a social network. This is the strategy of dissidence interpreted by
Alan Sinfield as ―refusal of an aspect of the dominant, without prejudging an outcome.
This may sound like a weaker claim [than subversion], but I believe it is actually stronger
insofar as it posits a field necessarily open to continuing contest …‖ (49). Dissidence in
the form of the rhetoric of struggle may not be designed to lead to any particular
subversive quest; instead it may initiate, in general, the energetic (re)embrace of rhetoric
not (only) as a style or a defense-mechanism but as a worldview—that is, ―a belief in the
power of language and discourse to fundamentally structure our thinking, our systems of
representation, and even our perception of the natural world‖ (Leach 208). 14 Evil genius
is not, in fact, evil in the moral or theological sense of the word. Baudrillard calls it the
principle of irreconciliation, ―the way the Good is the principle of reconciliation‖
(―Interview 10‖ 112). It is ―the energy that comes from the non-unification of things—
good being defined as the unification of things in a totalized world‖ (Baudrillard
Passwords 33). Thus evil genius, hyperconformity and the rhetoric of struggle work
against the totalizing impulses of the rhetoric of assertion, but both rhetorics are
apprehensive responses to the same experience of navigating the contradictory terrain of
a social network which presents itself as ordered and disordered at the same time.

14

This is precisely what is seductive about Baudrillard‘s ―fatal strategies,‖ for which seduction means
producing meaning even after coming face to face with pure appearance. Baudrillard suggests we find the
truth of appearances rather than the truth behind appearances. As Michael Smith suggests, ―If fatal theory
has created a totally artificial and simulated space for existence, no longer containing reference points to an
outside reality, we should enter the implosion‖ (39).
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2. Rhetoric of Assertion: You go Your Way and I’ll Talk Mine
Let us first devote our attentions to the more traditional response to the
unsystematic features of the early modern social network: denial, resistance, separation,
assertion. Examples abound in the areas of learning, religion and social stratification. In
the modifications of Humanism, for instance, we can follow a trajectory toward
categorization, compartmentalization and division as a means of reconciling and
regulating an unmethodical flow of information. Humanist educators of the early years of
the Renaissance had inherited methods for organizing the vast copia of knowledge passed
down from the ancients: commonplace books, memory and imitation exercises were
designed to advance students‘ rhetorical skills and develop their characters at the same
time. The two outcomes were linked enthusiastically though imprecisely. Rebecca
Bushnell marks the fluctuations in early humanist pedagogy ―between the extremes of
liberation and control, variety and limits, play and discipline…. [Humanism]‘s own
ambivalence was a symptom of a world of uncertain hierarchies, shifting relations,
conflicting authorities, and contradictory values‖ (19-20). Even the availability of books
could be seen ―as an unmanageable and even harmful excess when one pitted the
importance of control, closure, and profit against the value placed on copiousness‖
(Bushnell 126-27).15 As vague connections between education and morality became
harder to tolerate for some writers and rhetoricians, humanism gradually shifted from
―the practice of an exemplary individual, to … an institutionalized curriculum subject—a
distinctive discipline in the arts‖ (Grafton & Jardine 124). Peter Ramus is the writer often
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See also the work of Mary Crane, who similarly remarks on ―Humanist educators‘ concerns with, on the
one hand, growth and accumulation, and, on the other, limitation and control …‖ (55).
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credited with ―discard[ing] the difficulty and rigour of high scholastic schooling and
thereby attract[ing] those who regarded education as a means to social position rather
than as a preparation for a life of scholarship,‖ thus achieving ―the final secularization of
humanist teaching—the transition from ‗humanism‘ to ‗the humanities‘ (Grafton &
Jardine168). Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine go on to discuss how Ramus‘s approach
―offers [the] possibility of separating oratorical practice from any moral underpinning ….
A committed Ramist finds himself free to pursue the ars disserendi simply as a route to
high government office, without worrying about being vir bonus (a good man)‖ (189). In
his seminal work on Ramism, Walter Ong expands on this transition. He discusses
humanists‘ use of commonplaces, which, before Ramus, ―had been associated with the
process of stocking the imagination with ‗matter‘ …. A mass of abstract truths, hairraising expressions, detached phrases, comparisons, whole sentences, syllogisms,
collections of adjectives—this ‗copie‘ could be exploited at all cognitive levels, sensory
and intellectual simultaneously‖ (Ramus 211). Ramus, however, ―decided that all
commonplaces belonged to dialectic, and that the items in them were always dialectical
or logical ‗arguments‘‖ (Ramus 212). ―There are two universal, general gifts bestowed by
nature upon man, Reason and Speech,‖ writes Ramus:
dialectic is the theory of the former, grammar and rhetoric of the latter.
Dialectic therefore should draw on the general strengths of human reason
in the consideration and the arrangement of the subject matter, while
grammar should analyze purity of speech … for the purpose of writing
correctly. Rhetoric should demonstrate the embellishment of speech first
in tropes and figures, second in dignified delivery‖ (684).
In short, style and delivery are the concerns of rhetoric, while memory, invention and
arrangement belong to Dialectic. Clear separation—of rhetoric from dialectic—is
paramount, and Ong is unforgiving of the change this effected: ―the pre-Ramist
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commonplace tradition could be richly sonorous rather than merely ‗clear,‘ for it was the
echo of a cognitive world experienced as if filled with sound and voices and speaking
persons …. With Ramus, the voice goes out of the world‖ (Ramus 212).16
Whatever merit there might be in Ong‘s reservations, the ―merely clear‖ appealed
to many, in particular Puritans of the later sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.
Perhaps no group better encapsulates the rhetoric of assertion than Protestant reformers
eager to discredit Catholic minorities, for their justifications often centered on language.
Alexandra Walsham notes, for example, Protestant polemicists‘ intimations ―that
textuality was intrinsic to the sanctity of holy writ, that God‘s meaning resided in the
actual letters arranged on the page‖—perfect justification for denigrating Catholocism‘s
―dependence on a set of tenets enshrined in the unstable spoken word‖ (―Reformed‖ 175).
Carla Mazzio has also documented Protestant reformers attempts not only to reject but
also to invalidate what they deemed a mumbling, incomprehensible ecclesiastical speech,
to erase any links between the new faith and the old, despite the increasing unfeasibility
of such efforts to raze and erase. Reform based on invalidation, separation and erasure is
doomed to failure, as the Protestants demonstrated. They might claim a plain, purified
language while denouncing Catholic abuse of it, but doing so meant playing down the
indisputable fact that ―[w]hat could seem utterly ‗plain‘ and ‗common‘ in English … was
16

Neil Rhodes and Jonathan Sawday are less severe, suggesting that ―the Ramist method of simplifying the
arts, dealing with each division of knowledge as a discrete entity operating according to its own set of rules,
was developed precisely to cope with the kind of information overload, familiar to all users of the modern
computer, created by the energies of the Gutenberg revolution‖ (10). See also Juliet Fleming, ―Graffiti,
Grammatology, and the Age of Shakespeare,‖ for a broader discussion of early modern writing and its
―tending toward non-subjectivity—that is, toward a writing that requires no subjective position of
enunciation‖ (324)—no voice—and that ―everywhere embraces its own materiality‖ (327). But Fleming‘s
fascinating insight on Elizabethan ‗graffiti‘ ultimately leads her ―to imagine, in an age to which is ascribed
the inauguration of ‗proper‘ writing, a widespread, and in contemporary terms multiply ‗undisciplined‘
writing practice‖ which in fact ―cannot be taught, reproduced, or sold as a commodity‖ (329).
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often drawn from other languages—as in the case of these two Protestant keywords
themselves, derived from Latin‖ (Mazzio Inarticulate 107).
The Catholic minority could not be easily silenced; nor, as Bryan Reynolds has
written extensively, could the criminal, another group subject to stubborn but inconsistent
attempts to isolate them from official culture.17 A series of legislative acts required the
itinerant to acquire passports and licenses to wander or beg, and imposed strict
punishments for those who failed to comply. 18 Reynolds traces the successful efforts
among members of England‘s lower social strata, despite such measures, to transgress the
social, linguistic and aesthetic boundaries insecurely enforced by judicial agents (64).
The ―dialectic of antagonism‖ between dominant and subordinate classes makes
inevitable such transgressions, for it is merely a ruse ―of the dominant to pretend that
critique can only exist in the language of ‗reason,‘ ‗pure knowledge‘ and ‗seriousness‘
(Stallybrass & White 16, 43). Chroniclers of criminal culture, for example, though they
might initially take on personas as cautionary observers of defiling behavior, seem often
enough in their writings to ―treat the criminals as peers. They revere them for their
expertise in rhetorical activities … (Reynolds 124); their ―criminal praxis emerges in this
discourse as artistically creative and worthy of recognition‖ (Reynolds 120). In addition,
and in defiance of laws designed to regulate travel among the populace, ―criminal
culture‘s chroniclers repeatedly stress the everywhereness of criminal culture‖ (Reynolds
103). But such insinuations had implications for popular writers, whose occupation was
already ―commonly regarded as a base pursuit, in many cases tantamount to a criminal
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For a discussion of efforts among sixteenth-century conservatives to impose ―a congruence between a
person‘s language and his social status‖ (75), see Joseph Williams.
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life itself‖ (Long 239). Pamphleteers themselves showed ambivalence toward their own
medium, for ―the term pamphlet hints at ambivalence;‖ pamphlets were ―small,
insignificant, ephemeral, disposable, untrustworthy, unruly, noisy, deceitful, poorly
printed, addictive, a waste of time …. Other people write pamphlets‖ (Raymond 11, 10).
But what could not be avoided was the indisputable fact that more often than not, as the
sixteenth-century progressed, the most efficient way to respond to a scurrilous pamphlet
meant writing another pamphlet.
Early Modern writers like Robert Greene repeatedly demonstrate the ambiguous
relationship between the pamphleteer and his subject matter. In his rogue pamphlets,
Greene describes his cony-catchers variously as ―base minded caterpillars … damnable
rakehells, a plague as ill as hell‖ and laments that ―such vipers are suffred to breed and
are not cut off with the sword of justice‖ (Notable Discovery 30-31). He calls for justice
again in The Second Part of Conny-Catching, but he also writes that these criminals are
―hated of God,‖ and that justice may indeed be useless, for ―as the Gangrena is a disease
incurable by the censure of the Chirugians, unlesse the member where it is fixt be cut off:
so this untoward generation of looser Libertines, can by no wholesome counsailes, nor
advised perswasions be disswaded from their lothsom kind of life, till by death they be
fatally, and finally cut off from the common-wealth‖ (8-9). By The Third and Last Part
of Conny-Catching, Greene turns from disease imagery and once again hopes for some
authority strong enough to ―bridle the headstrong course of this hellish crew‖ (7). Greene
cannot settle on a fixed description for the criminals whose arts he documents or for the
appropriate official response to them. His condemnatory language is also tempered by the
extreme care he takes to detail the ―varietie of villany‖ these ―great logicians‖ use to
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cheat their victims (Notable Discovery 22). In his first book he includes an impressive list
of vocabulary terms, which he dubs ―words of art, used in the effecting these base
villanies‖ (37). Greene registers time and again a respect for the cony-catchers‘ expertise.
Even as he advertises his cony-catching pamphlets as defenses against the schemes of the
criminal element, he offers within them the unavoidable ‗moral‘ that ―fewe men can live
uprightly, unlesse hee have some pretty way more then the world is witness to, to helpe
him withal‖ (35). Greene thus mystifies the notion of what it is to live uprightly, for he
introduces the possibility that the process by which an honest citizen (or an honest reader)
lives honestly may require certain strategies of dishonesty. 19 Alexandra Halasz touches
on this in remarking on the unique nature of a cony-catching story, in which
not only is the cony caught by the cony-catcher, but the cony-catcher is
caught by the writer of the cony-catching pamphlet, that is to say, the
cony-catcher in turn becomes a cony caught. Not only does the
displacement precipitate a potentially endless series, but, catching a conycatcher is a means of exposure, laying open what would otherwise remain
hidden, promoting a common knowledge. (76)
Readers are made part of this ―endless series,‖ implicated in what Greene identifies at
once as a reprehensible lifestyle, and yet, perhaps, an unavoidable one. Criminal culture
really was everywhere in Early Modern England, as ―everywhere,‖ perhaps, as any other
cultural classification (Protestant or Catholic, Puritan or Anglican, Humanist or Courtier,
Royalist or Parliamentarian, etc.). ―Differentiation,‖ Stallybrass and White argue, ―is
19

See Renaissance Culture and the Everyday, eds. Patricia Fumerton and Simon Hunt; see also Peter
Stallybrass and Allon White, who examine what they call a ―recurrent pattern‖ whereby ―the ‗top‘ attempts
to reject and eliminate the ‗bottom‘ for reasons of prestige and status, only to discover, not only that is it in
some way frequently dependent upon that low-Other …, but also that the top includes that low
symbolically, as a primary eroticized constituent of its own fantasy life‖ (5). See also Tessa Watt, who,
though not specifically concerned with criminal culture or the grotesque, does argue that, while the increase
in available printed materials and in specialized publishers ―could be seen as an agent of ‗polarization‘ …,
[c]heap print in this period was just as likely to be an instrument of social cohesion, as more people were
brought into the reading public, and as stories, images and values permeated the multiple tiers of English
society‖ (5).
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dependent upon disgust …. But disgust always bears the imprint of desire;‖ so Catholics,
criminals and other groups ―expelled as ‗Other,‘ return as the object[s] of nostalgia,
longing and fascination‖ (191).20 In building sanctuaries out of speech, in other words,
there can be only one outcome, one realization: Words are liminal. They make better
doorways than walls, better threads than nodes.

4. Rhetorics of Struggle: On the Road, Off the Map
Figure 1: “The Expulsion” by Hans Holbein (1538)

Figure 2: "Expulsion from the
Garden of Eden" by Masaccio
(1427)

Rhetorics of struggle may be said to accommodate this liminality of language, but
as a strategy the rhetoric of struggle can take us even farther afield, to a place without
walls and doors, where particular sites of liminality can no longer be fixed. This is place,
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Sinfield suggests that ―[m]any uneducated people must have retained a perhaps confused attachment to
Catholic practices, chance, and magic‖ (152).

19

once again, as narrative rather than location. We might use Alastair Fowler‘s exploration
of Edenic architecture to elucidate the experience of deterritorialization that a rhetoric of
struggle impels. Most illustrations of the Biblical Paradise in the Medieval period
included literal walls surrounding Eden, Fowler explains, but because Protestants
―reject[ed] allegorization of the Bible … illustration of the Expulsion could present a
problem. The Expulsion had traditionally been pictured as taking place at an architectural
gateway …. Now the gateway must somehow be played down or explained away‖ (58).
In Hans Holbein‘s representation (Figure 1), the gateway is certainly played down, and
Adam and Eve‘s expulsion is not depicted as a moment of crossing a threshold. Holbein‘s
work promises that Adam and Eve, exiting no gateway, will be chased continually, until
they turn to bones. The existence of the sanctuary of Eden is confirmed by the presence
of the imposing angel, but Eden itself is wholly unmarked as Adam and Eve rush through
a decaying landscape. Any hope for re-invitation into a safe space is missing in Holbein‘s
Expulsion. Not so for earlier works which include a representation of Eden as a walled
garden marked by a distinct threshold (Figure 2). Unambiguous as humankind‘s
expulsion from Paradise is meant to be in these paintings of the Fall, the presence of a
doorway depicts expulsion as a liminal experience—Adam and Eve are as close to
Paradise in, for example, Masaccio‘s work as it is possible to be, without being inside.
The link to Eden is visibly present in the form of an archway. Holbein‘s couple enjoys no
such link. There is no telling how long they have been running. They could be anywhere,
and more to the point, so could Eden.
In their persistent hope to ignore or undermine the links between languages,
Protestant reformers, Puritan Ramists, and even criminal chroniclers could mark out
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temporarily distinct territories for themselves, disconnected from the defiling influence of
their targets. But distinction in this regard is no sanctuary, and in the end it is no better,
and perhaps no different, than the shriveled wasteland of Holbein‘s portrait. The
Expulsion implies that Eden is the only real sanctuary, and that the only truly coherent
narrative is the lost, pre-lapsarian one, out of bounds as a static, invisible image rather
than a developing discourse in a discursively unstable network. Attached to Protestant,
Ramist and social reforms was the anxiety over any theological, philosophical, political
or educational strategy‘s capacity to maintain its coherence: how long can building
boundaries make sense in a culture that seems bent on transgressing and dismantling
them? At what point do the boundaries disappear entirely, and the reforms envisioned as
controlled processes find themselves, and all their objectives, quite off the map?
Indeed, in Holbein‘s Expulsion, we cannot in good faith say that it is Eden that is
off the map; Adam and Eve, after all, are the ones who have strayed, and their
punishment includes fleeing through an alien landscape, unrecognizable in that even
landmarks that seem familiar are not entirely trustworthy. It is Adam and Eve, not the
offended angels, who live off the map, and they must find a way to live on whatever this
new space is.21 In the early modern period, a Baudrillarian understanding of this space as
hyperreal—as more real than real, more false than false (Selected Writings 185)—as one
that moves according to ―the logic of simulacra‖—which ―involves an increased reliance
on systems of functionality that bear no relation to any real other than that connoted by
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―Then the Lord God said: ‗See! The man has become like one of us, knowing what is good and what is
bad! Therefore, he must not be allowed to put out his hand to take fruit from the tree of life also, and thus
eat of it and live forever.‘ The Lord God therefore banished him from the garden of Eden, to till the ground
from which he had been taken‖ (New American Bible, Gen. 3.22-23).
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them‖ (Bishop & Phillips 136)—begins to gain ground.22 The fall is conceived as a
disappearance of the real into abstraction (Bishop & Phillips 136), making the effort to
map, cognitively or otherwise, such a space an exercise, not in futility, but certainly in a
kind of contradiction. Characters from the texts discussed in the following chapters, as
practitioners of the rhetoric of struggle, acknowledge this contradiction and attempt to
articulate what it means. Each chapter celebrates their abstrusely successful efforts to
map spaces where, on reflection, they find they do not, will not, and/or never did want to
be.
If celebration of such ambiguous outcomes seems inappropriate, we must
remember the ambiguous elements of the rhetoric of struggle: hyperconformity, refusal
by overacceptance, the production of failure. Characters who practice rhetorics of
struggle perform double duty, participating, on the one hand, in the transgressing and
redefining of the boundaries between plain and foreign speech, between literacy and nonliteracy, between public and private identity, between official and criminal behavior, and
thus revealing how inevitable is the practice of transgression, how conscious is the
process of choosing language,23 and how caught up is the high with the low. On the other
they are Baudrillard‘s evil geniuses, revealing that all these efforts to transgress and to
choose, and to map one‘s place in the real world as a result of these choices and
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See Donald Kimball Smith, who asserts that the early modern ―geographic context … is one that no
longer orders itself around the still center of Jerusalem, and without God as the center point, the world
makes sense only in relation to itself‖ (170).
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In opposition to Freud, Bakhtin argued for ―a richer, more varied, and more diverse picture of
consciousness,‖ rather than unconsciousness (Morson & Emerson 175). ―The proper way to understand
others is not ‗psychologically‘ but dialogically,‖ which consists of ―the ability to sense the inner dialogues
of others in all their unfinalizability and then participate in that dialogue while respecting its openness,‖
and which requires ―renounce[ing] the desire for ‗essential surplus and seek[ing] instead addressive
surplus. According to Bakhtin, this approach is not only more accurate with respect to human nature, but is
also the only truly ethical one‖ (Morson & Emerson 267).
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transgressions, do not succeed in eliminating any of the uncertainty bred by the
atmosphere of the social network. They pretend, in other words, that it is possible to map
the unmappable, that the system which presents itself to them is in fact systematic, that
living off the map is no different than living on it. But in their overacceptance, they
expose what the system of communication itself is most eager to conceal: that it is not a
system, that there is no getting to the center of it, and that the eagerness ―to get at the
naked truth, the one which haunts all discourse of interpretation, the obscene rage to
uncover the secret, is proportionate to the impossibility of ever achieving this‖
(Baudrillard Ecstasy of Communication 73). The rhetoric of assertion fails to provide
sanctuary for this very reason: because ―[a]n intensification of the drive to render all
objects and events transparent and integrated inevitably produces an intensification of the
barriers against this drive …‖ (Bishop & Phillips 136), and because it is the very idea of
the post-lapsarian world as a not-at-all sacred space, sheltering the fallen and the guilty,
that undermines the very concept of sanctuary and forces early modern audiences ―to
come to terms with a contradictory situation in that [they] both have the system [they]
deserve and—and equally non-negligibly—[they] cannot bear it‖ (Baudrillard, qtd. in
Bishop & Phillips 142).24
Thomas More, William Shakespeare, Edmund Spencer, Elizabeth Cary, Andrew
Marvell, and Margaret Cavendish demonstrate such a coming to terms through characters
who may be identified as navigators of both ―a system of meaning,‖ which they
(over)accept as inherently meaningful, and ―a system of simulation‖ (Baudrillard
Selected Writings 209), which they expose as artificial and hyperreal. These double
24

This is similar again to Castells‘ conclusions about postmodern media, which induce not virtual reality
―but the construction of real virtuality‖ (403).
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identities are at once empowering and humbling, for though there is no escape from the
unsanctified spaces which are gradually uncovered, there are vast opportunities for
energetic and interactive communications inside. Chapter one, for example, presents
Thomas More as a writer who understands the possibility of total investment inside
hyperreal communities. In his History of Richard III, he depicts a social body that
remains derisively incredulous of Richard III even as it fails to deny critically his
fraudulent rise to power. More outlines an ultimately tragic choice between faith in the
obscure and indiscernible and faith in the material. Richard‘s rhetoric defies credibility,
and yet he seduces his audience with the opportunity to substitute his visible and
obviously corrupted form for the inscrutability of the divine. His disbelieving subjects
invest themselves in his kingship even as he repulses them with a struggling rhetoric that
proves truly grotesque.
Chapter two explores Edmund Spenser‘s similar habit in the later books of The
Faerie Queene of inviting a collective investigation into his protagonists‘ most extreme
and often dubious rhetoric—investigation that yields not the rejection of obviously
unreliable statements but an eager and even grateful participation in the establishment of
questionably operational ideologies. Spenser‘s audience, like More‘s English citizenry,
are paradoxically seduced and repulsed by the incredible discourse produced in the world
of The Faerie Queene, a realm that should be understood as its own (counter)network, a
seductive system that invites exploration, encourages a fantasy of connectivity, but
inevitably inspires dispute, dissension, and uncertainty. It is in these later books that
Spenser most deeply invests himself in exploring the seductive appeal of accepting the
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network as the proper representation of how language and culture get articulated, as well
as the specific rhetorical activities that this embrace of a network requires.
Baudrillard‘s theories of hyperconformity and refusal by overacceptance come
into play most overly in Chapter three, which zeroes in on Shakespeare‘s Beatrice and
Benedick of Much Ado About Nothing, who unite only after surrendering to Don Pedro‘s
condescending ploy to bring them together, yet who also participate in shrewdly locating
the deficiencies in their superior‘s position of lonely sovereignty. Don Pedro‘s deafness
to the interactive potential of other voices, his strict rhetoric of assertion, represents a
reductive, lopsided impression of social networking, which other characters—notably
Benedick, Hero, and Dogberry—work to amend. Ultimately Don Pedro is led to abandon
his old-fashioned belief that being alienated in sovereignty is the sole efficient or
operative strategy inside a community that thrives on unrestricted interaction. He must
become part of the masses.
Like Don Pedro, Elizabeth Cary‘s Mariam of The Tragedy of Mariam makes the
mistake of placing her faith in the rhetoric of assertion, but with no one to save her, her
decision dooms her to public execution. Chapter four traces the ways in which the
masterful ―I‖ is marked as the losing strategy in Cary‘s text, easily, albeit tragically,
spurned as other and more ambiguous rhetorics work their wrack upon this closet
drama‘s ―stage.‖ It is Salome, Cary‘s most inscrutable figure, whose fortunes are made
by the play‘s conclusion. Wholly lacking in credibility, Salome demonstrates a
wandering, unsettled rhetoric that proves more effective, and affecting, than a discourse
that is legible, supportable, and clear. Salome appears as a prototype for the scattered
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subject whose discourse appears correspondingly scattered and itinerant, yet incalculably
productive.
Chapter five follows the likewise itinerant speaker of Marvell‘s ―Upon Appleton
House‖ as he guides readers on a tour of a complex post-civil war oblivion designed to
provide sanctuary from the annihilative potential of the public utterance. The grounds of
Appleton House are hyperreal to an extreme not encountered in previous chapters, and
Marvell presents retreat to such a space as a seductively exhausting opportunity to
explore virtuality, indifference and insensibility as acts of concentrated creation. Oblivion
has a content in Marvell‘s poetry that proves as devastatingly complex as any hypervigilant immersion in the reality of the Interregnum.
Finally, Chapter six continues this trend of extreme virtuality in its examination of
Margaret Cavendish‘s The Blazing World. An outspoken narrator, Cavendish initially
situates herself, and her work, in opposition to the Royal Society‘s formulaic procedures
for establishing consensus in philosophical discussion—procedures that consecrate a selfinfolded etiquette among gentlemen as the best path to discovery. Ultimately, however,
Cavendish‘s heroines in The Blazing World hyperconform to these very procedures, and
their commitment results in alarmingly capricious acts of destruction, self-deception and
isolation. Cavendish rewrites the discovery of the workings of Nature as the betrayal of it,
so that what begins as rhizomatic world-making ends as compulsive, fetishistic
annihilation. As in Marvell‘s poetry, we are introduced to a complex oblivion, exile that
poses as engagement—poses so hyper-effectively that we must see it for what it isn‘t in
addition to what it is.
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Each chapter explores how such ambiguous complicity in the favorable reception
of what is observably untrustworthy comes about in an increasingly informed and
participative social body. What precisely is so seductive about the artificial, the liminal,
the hyperreal, and what lessons might these answers provide for a postmodern culture as
enveloped by new and ambiguous forms of communication as were the early moderns, at
sea in what Baudrillard calls ―a completely new species of uncertainty, which results not
from the lack of information but from information itself and even from an excess of
information‖ (Selected Writings 209-210)? The early modern writers introduced above
prove that this ―species of uncertainty‖ is not, in fact, completely new. They felt it too,
and they intimate in their works the existence of a specific aesthetic, even an activism, for
uncertainty.

4. Assertion, Struggle and Pedagogy: Meeting in the Middle in the Postmodern
Classroom
It is the liminality of language that provokes such uncertainty, and triggers
additional questions about access, about ownership and expertise. In The Schoolmaster
Roger Ascham complains of the presumption of his age, in which ―the ripest of tongue be
readiest to write, and many daily in setting out books and ballads make great show of
blossoms and buds, in whom is neither root of learning nor fruit of wisdom at all‖ (147).
What he comes close to recognizing is Bakhtin‘s understanding of language not as ―an
abstract system of normative forms but rather a concrete heteroglot conception of the
world‖ (Dialogic 293). If the latter is true, and if ―[a]ll words have the ‗taste‘ of a
profession, a genre, a tendency, a party, a particular work, a particular person, a
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generation, an age group, the day and hour,‖ if ―[e]ach word tastes of the context and
contexts in which it has lived its socially charged life‖ (Dialogic 293), then to choose
how or what to speak is to choose who or what to be: a presumption that may be as rash
and rude as Ascham accuses, but also necessary for navigating an environment more and
more ―socially charged.‖
We in the twenty-first century may feel the occasional urge, like Ascham, to vent
our frustrations with the increasingly challenging heteroglossia promoted by the
multiplying methods of communication available in the modern world. Presented with
more and more ways to communicate, there is hardly consensus about what using these
various forms of communication means for, or says about, the user: the internet, after all,
may democratize learning, activism, art, music and publishing, but it does so alongside
cyberbullying, identity theft and piracy. 25 In between those aspects of e-communication
easier to either condemn or praise are even less unambiguous activities—sexting,26
25

The latter, it should be noted, is a more complex issue than simple theft. At a TED conference in 2007,
Lawrence Lessig delivered a presentation on user-generated content published on the web: ―these tools of
creativity have become tools of speech. It is a literacy for this generation. This is how our kids speak. It is
how our kids think. It is what your kids are …‖ Lessig identifies so well the potential crisis in
communication between generations that his remarks are worth quoting at length:
We have to recognize [our kids] are different from us. We made mixed tapes; they remix music.
We watched TV; they make TV. It is technology that has made them different, and as we see what
this technology can do we need to recognize you can‘t kill the instinct the technology produces;
we can only criminalize it. We can‘t stop our kids from using it; we can only drive it underground.
We can‘t make our kids passive again; we can only make them … ―pirates.‖ And is that good? We
live in this weird time, it‘s [a] kind of age of prohibitions, where in many areas of our life, we live
life constantly against the law. Ordinary people live life against the law, and that‘s what we are
doing to our kids. They live life knowing they live it against the law.
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In recent months, many states have been forced to revisit child pornography laws as they find themselves
facing the awkward decision of whether to prosecute as sex offenders teens caught posting or distributing
nude or semi-nude pictures of themselves. As a form of communication that is subversively private and
personal at the same time as it is linked to a technology that is organized and extensive, sexting is for some
interpreters so inexplicable that it can only be marked as criminal and aberrant. But if it seems
counterintuitive to punish children for violating a law created to protect children, it seems equally
untenable to celebrate sexting as a viable form of cultural or self-expression—and risk condoning child
pornography. The problem is that sexting is child pornography at the same time as it is, quite often, a
voluntary communicative act, and it is as difficult as it is necessary to examine both definitions. In any
case, it is naïve to presume that registering as sex offenders the 20% of teens who admit to sexting will
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texting, twittering, you-tubing, plagiarizing27—in which it seems possible to locate the
defiant mobility identified earlier by Reynolds and Greene. And it may be possible to
locate a creative praxis in these forms that is equally worthy of recognition. Instead of
being wholly rash or rude, or even criminal, acts, such forms of ―communication‖
exemplify the inevitable process Bakhtin identifies of ―having to choose a language.‖
Equally inevitable is the likelihood that in such a complicated and shifting process,
uncomfortable choices will be made. Undoubtedly, newer methods of rhetorical
interaction bump uncomfortably against the older and less informal, and the chance for
miscommunications is high. If we are to avoid them, we must ask if inviting new forms
of communication and new communicators into more rigorously organized spaces, such
as the classroom or the newsroom, actually helps us to communicate better,28 or if it
simply gives us something to do.29 In addition, we must prepare a greater variety of
responses to those subjects perceived to communicate poorly, irresponsibly and even
dangerously. Rather than excise them from whatever community (or watch as they excise
themselves), it makes more sense to allow such discomforting scenarios to provide the
inspire the remaining, ―innocent‖ 80% to learn from the example of these bad boys and girls (Percentages
taken from a 2008 survey conducted by The National Campaign to Prevent Teen and Unplanned
Pregnancy). Instead, the impulse to generate, share and spread this kind of material needs to be identified
and analyzed before it is condemned absolutely.
27
It is important to acknowledge that plagiarism, for some members of academia, is perfectly
unambiguous. Certainly buying an essay online is one thing, but as Susan Debra Blum, in her recent work
My Word! Plagiarism and College Culture, finds, student plagiarism is often less an issue of personal
ethics and morals than it is a crisis of communication as well as, for some students, a not wholly conscious
act of defiance. Though she includes no faculty interviews, Blum‘s research goes a long way to
demonstrate the extent to which students and members of the academy do not speak the same language or
share the same goals; their definitions of and strategies for success, though scarcely illegible, are widely
―mismatched‖ (179).
28
See Henry Jenkins, who sees participatory culture as an opportunity for consumers to embrace
―grassroots creativity‖ and to invest themselves more deeply in their own political, moral and cultural
environments (136).
29
Skeptical critics of technological innovation such as Baudrillard worry, for instance, that our world ―has
become dominated by systems that signify, in all their objects and events, the abstractions that serve the
idea of their rapid expansion: speed, technology, efficiency, autonomy. Everything that appears to serve a
function becomes a sign of the abstraction functionality‖ (Bishop & Phillips 135).
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opportunity for examining how and by whom certain language acts are designated as
tenable or untenable, transparent or impenetrable, prudent or dangerous, brilliant or
foolish—―good‖ or ―evil.‖
To test certain of these possibilities, in 2009 I began a survey of several World
Literature classes at the University of Arkansas. Specifically, I asked the question, Do
you believe that electronic communication improves or weakens the average person’s
writing abilities?30 Over 70% of the 231 students surveyed claimed that electronic
communication weakens writing abilities. Moreover, within their answers, many of them
articulated their understanding of what writing is and how writing happens:







Weakens, the vocabulary you use in electronic communication is
mostly slang and by using it so much you get used to it and forget
proper grammar and educated vocabulary.
Weakens, because most online communication is meant to be brief,
leaving little room for exacting diction.
I believe it weakens our abilities. In electronic communication
people use abbreviations, myself included … It‘s hard to switch
back to proper writing techniques after you‘ve been on Facebook
for awhile.
I think it weakens it. I can personally say that I become much
more lax with grammar and I use things like lol.
People get lazy and use ―chat lingo.‖

As this sample of responses illustrate, most students surveyed define writing as a purely
technical exercise, an experience bound by rules of grammar, diction, vocabulary and
other ―proper techniques.‖ Here is the rhetoric of assertion reduced to its most basic
features. The complicated relationship of writing to classical rhetoric—the act or art of
persuasion—may be implied in these descriptions of writing as educated, exacting, and
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Worried that this question might have been too leading, in 2010 I repeated the survey with the modified
question, Do you believe that electronic communication affects your writing abilities? How so? This
modification did not appear to change students‘ responses in any significant way; the data that follow
reflect responses from both years.
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proper, but what is missing is any significant exploration of writing as an imaginative
process or of language—especially inside the classroom—as anything but a static,
manipulable tool, or a method to memorize. Joan Leach‘s explanation of rhetoric as
fundamentally contingent, deriving its power from ―its immediacy, its ability to talk
about the particular and the possible, not the universal and the probable‖ (211), seems
reversed in these responses which come so close to reducing writing to proper grammar
and an approved vocabulary. Other survey responses are more telling, for some students
went a step further and overtly dissociated electronic communication from writing:







I don‘t believe it has any effect. Communication online is
completely different from writing for school.
Neither, it makes them different … Online writing might help a
person‘s impromptu skills but does not necessarily help extended
writing abilities.
Neither, they are apples and oranges, at least for me. I believe even
the average person writes one way online (extremely improper)
and very academically sound when necessary.
Personally, I separate my electronic writing from my academic
writing. But I feel that online talking opens up a more personal
feel of communication because you don‘t get caught up in the
grammar of the Queen‘s English.
If one is not in school and is not made to write papers or
paragraphs summarizing things or stating their opinion, then it
could weaken a person‘s writing abilities. But, I think it is more a
way of being creative with your language …

According to these students, electronic writing offers the opportunity to be creative,
impromptu, personal, even improper—unstructured, in other words—while academic
writing traps them, catches them up in, an impersonal, uncreative, unimaginative, too
structured, mechanical—and perhaps even ultimately incommunicative—experience.
The majority of negative responses suggest that many students are quick to
suppose that education, and educators, seek control more than transformation, and that it
is up to students to find a separate language that they themselves can control. To the
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rhetoric of assertion of academia, in other words, students respond with the tentative
sketch of a rhetoric of struggle, but they are trapped in a hazy middle ground in which
they define language, on the one hand, as a socially imposed implement, crafted by
perhaps well-meaning but unreliable and out-of-touch educators, the elements of which
must be learned and used in the classroom environment, though not necessarily anywhere
else, and on the other as a fluid, shifting vernacular, not altogether formless, but whose
stylistic ―rules‖ are temporary and voluntary, allowing the user a freedom of expression
unlikely to be discovered or welcomed in the classroom. The public space of the writing
classroom becomes a place where students communicate in a publicly acceptable but
ultimately remote language, while the equally public spaces conducive to electronic
communication unexpectedly offer a venue for private, personal, creative, immediate, and
somehow more genuine articulation.31 This split may be explained, at least in part, by a
2008 Pew Internet report, ―Writing, Technology and Teens,‖ which finds that teens
routinely ―disassociate e-communication with ‗writing,‘‖ and that ―[e]ven though teens
are heavily embedded in a tech-rich world, they do not believe that communication over
the internet … is writing‖ (i-ii). Here is that hazy middle ground again: even though the
surveys hint at receptivity to the rhetoric of struggle, students more overtly exhibit the
rhetoric of assertion in their insistence on separating academic writing from the discourse
they use elsewhere.
Student responses to another survey question, centering on the use of the social
networking site Facebook, may clarify this curious marking of territory by students
31

Such an optimistic assessment of technological innovation finds the most support in the works of
Marshall McLuhan. See The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man, U of Toronto P, 1962;
Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, New York: McGraw, 1964; The Medium is the Massage:
An Inventory of Effects, NY: Bantam, 1967; The Global Village: Transformations in World Life and Media
in the 21st Century. New York: Oxford UP, 1989.
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suspicious of or uninterested in certain public spaces while ―personally‖ invested in
others. When asked to consider the purpose of or reasoning behind collecting large
numbers of friends on Facebook, the most common response was that Facebook helps the
user keep in touch with friends and family. A respectable number of students attributed
no significance to the amount of friends. Others elaborated in various ways:










(1200) It‘s just nice to have such a large database of friends to
associate with and know what is going on outside the circle of my
own friends.
(like, hundreds) It does not really matter how many friends you
have, but who you have. It is networking; you can find people you
need get notes from, directions, phone numbers, etc.
(500) I want to keep contact with people. You never know when
you might need them.
(over 1000) Facebook is a big part of networking. Having more
friends allows you to meet other people. This can create benefits
later on, especially when applying for a job.
(400) If you have the ability to always have a link to the people
that you know and used to know, why wouldn‘t you use it?
(500ish) No reason to say no.
(800ish) I just like to see what people I know and have met in the
past have been up to, and can use [them] as connections for
different opportunities.
(530) You never know when you need a friend in the area or when
a friend needs you.
(280) I recently deleted over 70 friends …. The friends which I
did keep are people I either find interesting, are friends with,
related to, or might provide me with a good resource or be a good
resource in the future.

Student responders most eager to justify a large number of friends were quick to identify
Facebook‘s dual purpose: it is both a convenient site for maintaining traditionally private,
personal relationships and a space for the potential construction of traditionally less
intimate and worldlier associations.32 There exists a significant interest in the vaguely

32 Here Walter Ong‘s theories on secondary orality come to mind. Ong argues that electronic technology
has inspired a revived interest in a communication based upon the principles of orality, but ―it is essentially
a more deliberate and self-conscious orality, based permanently on the use of writing and print.‖ Ong
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pragmatic process of using Facebook to network with people who might be able to
provide benefits, resources, opportunities, or simply satisfy some immediate but
undefined need.33 Facebook is allowed the potential for shifts in purpose or perspective,
for different categories of utility, for the presence of ―specific audiences at specific
times‖ (Leach 218). The classroom, however, is not allowed the same potential; the
possibilities of connection and rhetorical communication are excised from the writing
classroom when writing is there defined as a series of universal rules to memorize, of
signs to exchange. ―The voice,‖ to quote Ong again, ―goes out of the world.‖
Or at least out of the classroom. We can temper our pessimism when we
remember what the survey responses disclose—that many students clearly are invested in
choosing a language, invested enough to want to attach themselves to certain rhetorical
activities, mostly online, and detach themselves from others. This tug-of-war between the
rhetoric of assertion and an emergent rhetoric of struggle certainly deserves our attention,
because in it are the seeds of a critical aesthetic in addition to a rhetoric. In it is resistance
to ―a world where it is signs and objects … that communicate, rather than people…‖
(Merrin 17), and to a country that, as Baudrillard austerely suggests, ―speaks in a
language … it does not fully understand, like a phonetic language. Or, perhaps more
accurately, it speaks a language that has been learned through reading and watching

explains that ―we are group-minded self-consciously and programmatically. The individual feels that he or
she, as an individual, must be socially sensitive …. [S]econdary orality promotes spontaneity because
through analytic reflection we have decided that spontaneity is a good thing. We plan our happenings
carefully to be sure that they are thoroughly spontaneous‖ (Orality and Literacy 136-137). Student
responses to the Facebook inquiry—particularly their confidence in the mystifying process of
networking—suggest a similarly perplexing attraction to a predetermined spontaneity.
33 Consider the two young Australian girls who, in September 2009, got lost in a storm drain and, instead
of calling Emergency Services directly, updated a Facebook status to alert their friends that they needed
help. Hours later, the girls were rescued. See ―Trapped Girls Call for Help on Facebook,‖ ABC.com, Sept.
7, 2009.
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rather than through conversation‖ (qtd. in Bishop 5). What the surveyed students register
is the painful possibility that writing is too often taught as something that happens not as
an event but as a kind of regularly scheduled programming, so that learning it becomes
more and more an exercise in purely reactionary imitation. Here is a recipe for
disengagement, and it insists on a response among educators to consider a place for
rhetorics of struggle in the classroom. A writing pedagogy that accommodates the
rhetoric of struggle could promise greater challengers and a greater relevance for students
who, though they live in constant contact with the many and questionable discursive
strategies at play in the media circulating across the social network, lack the means both
to identify and to articulate how rhetorics that have no place in the classroom have found
such a home in the world.
It is the discovery of the influence of the rhetoric of struggle that the works
discussed in the following chapters will attempt to trace, marking encounters with the
inarticulate, the contradictory, the illegible, etc. as primarily deterritorializing
experiences. These early modern authors, in other words, experiment with a critical
aesthetic that threatens, legitimately, to disrupt their primary narratives at the same time
as these threats clearly play major parts in the primary narratives—making these writers
perfect teachers of the possible methods by which one might participate in a discursive
mode one also wishes to study. As Deleuze and Guattari remind us, deterritorialization,
―as a process, is inseparable from the stases that interrupt it, or aggravate it, or make it
turn in circles, and reterritorialize it …‖ (Anti-Oedipus 349-50). To discover new land,
they explain, ―in each case we must go back by way of old lands‖ (350), for that is ―what
the completion of the process is: not a promised and a pre-existing land, but a world
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created in the process of its tendency, its coming undone, its deterritorialization‖ (354).
Characters, and as a consequence readers, are delivered in the works that follow into
these deterritorialized landscapes, and they are brought there through investment in
language. It is in this unfamiliar space, wherever it is, that the renewed conversations
must occur, conversations that register an equally renewed investment in choosing a
language—as a matter of conscience (chapter one), as a matter of control (chapter two),
of identity (chapter three), of fate (chapter four), of memory (chapter five), of philosophy
(chapter six)—of anything, in short, that contributes to the content of culture.
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Chapter One
Cheaters, Saints, and Simultaneous Narrative:
Early- and Postmodern Lessons from Thomas More‘s The History of Richard III

Figure 2: Lucas Cranach. Diana and Actaeon, 1540. Hartford, Wadsworth Athenaeum.

1. Honor Codes and Public Conscience
A growing number of colleges and universities have implemented honor codes as a
means of reducing cheating among students and of emphasizing the importance of
honesty and integrity in an academic community. Though academic professionals and
students continue to debate the effectiveness of honor codes, surveys suggest that schools
with codes in place record lower levels of cheating than campuses without such codes.1
Donald McCabe and Linda Trevino laud the honor system as one of the best means of
making ethical appeals to students, involving them in an ongoing commitment to creating
a culture of integrity on their campuses.2 But others wonder ―whether an honor code is

1
2

See Kate Zernike; see also The Center for Academic Integrity.
See ―Honesty and Honor Codes,‖ 37-41; see also Donald McCabe & Gary Pavela.
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not just a primitive tool but a naive one‖ (Zernike 10). Just how meaningful, for the
average college student, is the ritual of signing an academic honesty pledge? Susan Debra
Blum takes on this and other questions in her recent study of plagiarism and college
culture; she suggests that because ―[t]he connection between integrity in general and
academic integrity is not obvious to most students,‖ they struggle to define what
academic integrity actually entails: ―[i]n the sense that it requires ethical behavior, it is
related to other forms of integrity; but insofar as students understand that it means using
only permitted sources in their academic work, it stands alone, like a stone mountain in a
Chinese landscape painting: students have nothing to relate it to‖ (153). After conducting
several student interviews, Blum concludes that in practice honor codes are much less
straightforward than they are on paper: ―[a] code of behavior may be a rough guide for a
new situation, but in practice we frequently invent more rules as we go along‖ (155).
While McCabe and Trevino are by no means incorrect to assert that honor codes may
significantly, and positively, impact student behavior, Blum‘s research suggests that
within the oath-taking procedure itself exists some difficult to articulate obscurity that
likewise obscures the impact honor code defenders wish to ascertain.
It is to the oath itself that we must go to look for clarity, acknowledging first and
foremost the possibility that there are rhetorical hurdles embedded in oath-taking,
especially when that oath is linked to personal integrity and to the construction of a social
conscience. What oaths assume is that it is always possible to take them—that the act of
taking an oath is as clear as the effect of doing so. But this is not always the case. To
explain this unintelligibility, we can consider one of the most famous oaths in British
history: the Oath of Succession of 1534, required of all Henry VIII‘s councilors as a
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gesture of loyalty in general and support in particular of the Act of Succession, which had
disinherited Princess Mary Tudor and conferred the crown to the future children of Henry
and Anne Boleyn instead. In addition, taking the oath meant repudiating the authority of
the Pope and acknowledging the annulment of King Henry‘s marriage to Catherine of
Aragon. Thomas More, Henry‘s former Lord Chancellor, refused to take the oath and was
arrested and eventually executed for treason. In his letters to family members and in his
trial defense, More exposes the complicated—for him agonizing—rhetorical
maneuvering required by the Oath of Succession. From his perspective, to take the oath
meant acknowledging conscience to be a choice—but a choice that had not existed until
the oath appeared. Conscience, in other words, was something the oath made possible.
This article will attempt to explain why such an acknowledgment was so unacceptable to
More, for whom conscience could never be generated by a secular contrivance—or more
precisely, could never be only generated by such means. The Catholic More imagines
conscience as a universal phenomenon, both already made and always in the process of
being made. Simultaneously then, conscience is both already possible and made possible,
over and over again—through pledges, through prayers, through service to higher
powers, both secular and spiritual. Oaths are and must be taken every day, as consciences
are (re)made every day; their relationship is simultaneous and reciprocal. More‘s
resistance to the Oath of Succession is designed to expose this simultaneity for the benefit
of the Oath-enforces. His words attempt treatment for their shortsightedness, and for the
king‘s.
Consider first a letter written from the Tower of London, in which More reminds
his daughter Margaret ―that the matters which move my conscience (without declaration
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whereof I can nothing touch the points) I have sundry times showed you that I will
disclose them to no man‖ (Roper 153-54). It is neither the first nor the last time that More
demonstrates his trust in secrecy and silence as a provisional shelter, if not from
suspicion, then at least from any certain condemnation. He explains in the same letter,
For surely if his Highness might inwardly see my true mind such as God
knoweth it is, it would, I trust, soon assuage his high displeasure. Which
while I can in this world never in such wise shew but that his Grace may
be persuaded to believe the contrary of me, I can no further go, but put all
in the hands of Him, for fear of whose displeasure for the safeguard of my
soul stirred by mine own conscience (without insectation or reproach
laying to any other man‘s) I suffer and endure this trouble. (Roper 154155)
―For to the world,‖ More adds in a later letter, ―wrong may seem right sometime by false
conjecturing, sometimes by false witnesses …‖ (De Silva 100). More‘s right actions,
likewise, may seem wrong for the same reasons. Without a consideration of the difficulty
of his position—he is in the rather impossible situation of being unable to defend his
offence against his king without further offending his king—More‘s conscience may
seem nervously distrustful in its secrecy, veering too far from the indispensable Catholic
tenets he defended in writings such as A Dialogue Concerning Heresy (1529). There
More emphasizes the importance of joining the common faith ―of all Crystes chyrche /
whiche can neuer arre in any substancyall poynt [that] god wolde haue vs bounden to
byleue,‖ rather than take the risk of pridefully following one‘s own, individual wits (153).
But to join the common faith while awaiting trial, More must temporarily withdraw
access to his own conscience. Peter Ackroyd explains the paradox when he reminds us
that ―[c]onscience was not for More simply or necessarily an individual matter‖ (400);
rather, ―the derivation of ‗conscience‘ suggests knowledge-with-others, which for More
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included the communion of the dead as well as the living‖ (363). 3 Here we can begin to
gain a better understanding of More‘s particular perception of conscience as ―knowledgewith-others‖—a bond that, by the grace of God, pre-exists those it bonds, but that, by the
added grace of human beings, is maintained by them. To speak his mind freely while
imprisoned, More requires the unpolluted authority of a Christian, confessional
community, something he believes already exists. But knowing at the same time that he
will get no hearing from Cromwell, Audley, Norfolk, or any of the other interrogators
who question him over his fifteen months spent in the Tower, his steadfast defense is to
follow his own wits, his own conscience, which remains necessarily closed to all ―in this
world‖ who would pry it open. While his interrogators accuse him of stubbornness,
Ackroyd suggests that for More this ―was the most carefully planned consistency‖ (387),
for More‘s continuing sense of conscience as something shared and communal suggests
that its single, solitary exposure would reveal nothing surprising, nothing not already
known.4 He only keeps secrets, in other words, to expose that he has none. Consequently,
the picture More presents to King Henry is rather elaborately layered: he promises that he
has nothing to hide even as he continues to hide everything. He promises ultimate
satisfaction after what he admits the king will initially find to be decidedly unsatisfactory.

3

Stephen Smith and Gerard Wegemer further explain the ―role of conscience‖ as More saw it—―to make
practical judgments in light of principles and laws recognized as true and just. Conscience does not make
those principles or laws; it only applies them in particular cases …. [E]ven the best conscience … can be
mistaken … since human freedom always makes it possible to reject the indications of conscience‖ (xxiii).
4
Known before the polluting effects of Luther‘s heresy found roots in More‘s home country, that is. Such
is More‘s ―radical reform.‖ Martin Fleisher explains More‘s dual concentration on transformation and
recovery—indeed, the transformation of society as More envisioned it would require the recovery of its
sense of itself as a Christian community. More‘s emphasis is on revitalization and recuperation more than
any absolute or unfamiliar alteration. So Fleisher contends when he suggests that ―More‘s ideas of rebirth
and community possess a mundane and social dimension which is essential to them …. Reform, then, is a
spiritual phenomenon that has the utmost bearing on practical life‖ (3).
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He would ask that King Henry see him as the innocent man he will prove to be even as he
appears guilty.
Ackroyd and other biographers/scholars emphasize the dexterity of More‘s legal
mind in the months leading up to his trial,5 but More‘s efforts to display, rather than fully
explain, the difficulty of his position can be viewed not just as legal maneuvers but as
experiments in a particular illustrative technique common to the Medieval and the
Renaissance period—simultaneous narrative. Alastair Fowler defines simultaneous
narrative as ―the combination of different moments in a single picture‖ (36), using Lucas
Cranach‘s Diana and Actaeon (1560)6 as a prime example. The painting represents a
narrative construction of the familiar myth—Acteaon, caught in the act of spying on a
naked Diana, bathing with her nymphs, is punished when the angry goddess transforms
him into a deer; Acteaon is then pursued and torn apart by his own hunting dogs.
Cranach‘s work captures all the significant moments of the narrative simultaneously:
Actaeon, partially transformed and already set upon by his hounds, still watches the
bathing women, some of whom are captured in their moment of initial surprise at being
seen. Diana herself is pictured in the act of splashing and cursing the already cursed
Actaeon—the drops of water arc into his malformed, antlered head while his still human
legs kick feebly.
Fowler explains how, in the early Renaissance, ―illustrations were to be ‗read‘ as
notations alluding to the morally significant stages of a story …. Not that a continuous
sequence would have been inconceivable. But artists and patrons shared an interest in

5

See Derek Wilson; J.A. Guy; Richard Marius also emphasizes More‘s clever ambition, but pays more and
closer attention to the complex and distracting contradictions of More‘s personality.
6
See Figure 1 above.
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didactic contents, which were likely to entail discontinuous moral stages or aspects …‖
(20). In the case of More, his precarious position provides a didactic opportunity to
illustrate himself as the king‘s good servant and, simultaneously, God‘s, and to illustrate
conscience as well as simultaneously secular and sacred. More‘s story cannot be
unraveled quite as cleanly as can the myth of Diana and Actaeon, and yet he sketches
carefully the morally significant stages of his narrative—already condemned by his king,
he is already saved by his God, yet he maintains his loyalty, always and ultimately, to
both, dying the king‘s good servant, and God‘s first.7 These stages are discontinuous—on
the day of his death, More thanks the King for imprisoning him, thus granting him the
time and space to contemplate his own death and his removal from the world.8 Yet he has
spent much of that time praying that King Henry find better council, the kind that would
have prevented him from arresting a dutiful servant like More in the first place. More
shows himself prepared for death, for martyrdom, for heaven, and equally prepared to
serve his King on earth. He rejects nothing, and consequently he insists to be seen as the
faithful servant of both powers, despite their increasing divergence in the years leading
up to his execution. In the picture he presents of himself, More is able to stretch himself,
even split himself, to serve both Pope and King, yet his integrity is sustained;9 the King‘s
―great matter‖ need not be so great after all. Through his particular illustrative

7

―I die the King‘s good servant, and God‘s first‖—More‘s last words, as quoted in the August 4, 1535
edition of The Paris Newsletter. He is often misquoted as dying ―the King‘s good servant, but God‘s first.‖
Wegemer and Smith suggest that the and ―underscores More‘s conviction that integrity is possible in
political and personal life‖ (xv). Wegemer and Smith also point out that More was the first writer to use the
word integrity.
8
See Ackroyd, 403.
9
More‘s polyphonic, integrable identity here is reminiscent of another illustrative technique—
entrelacement—in which a single figure, usually noble or religious, appears multiple times in a single
painting. See Fowler, 53.
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performance, More offers Henry a careful method of interpretation and a freshly vigilant,
if discontinuous, way of seeing.
It is possible to imagine More returning to a Medieval but still familiar method of
discourse in a last ditch effort to reawaken the King to his own moral integrity. This
method, ―rhetorical rather than mimetic‖ (Fowler 45), devised to illustrate a moral
without recourse to any necessarily realistic design, is one More was already wellpracticed in using. In addition to his consistent defenses of his conscience in the final
months of his life, there are other and earlier opportunities whereby his rhetorical strategy
may be connected with the illustrative technique of simultaneous narrative. The approach
dominates key portions of More‘s History of Richard III, another arguably didactic
discourse concerned more with spiritual lessons than historical accuracy, written at a time
when a young King Henry first displayed the wayward impulses that prioritized
individual glory over moral leadership.10
Early in the text, the author blames Richard‘s ambition and extreme desire to
elevate himself for all his most despicable crimes and deceits, yet it becomes clear that
ambition cannot be the scapegoat for the much more convoluted rhetorical intricacies that
accompany, perhaps even produce, Richard‘s rise to power. More‘s History certainly
develops the theme of a personal ambition in awkward and ultimately violent conflict
with social responsibility, yet it is a conflict the boundaries of which More blurs
throughout the work, for Richard‘s ambition is never described as a continuous,
uninterrupted line of attack, and the History itself seems less concerned with Richard‘s
villainy and more concerned with a fallibility already ingrained in society—in full view.

10

It is likely More began the History in 1513. Henry VIII went to war with France in the same year.
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The History may begin as a mirror for magistrates, but it converts into a mirror for all of
society, for More increasingly commits himself to examining the flinching complicity
that first sanctions Richard‘s journey to the Crown and then expels him from society
without admitting any collusion with his guilt. While a continuous narrative is
conceivable, the ultimate impression More leaves is of a series of didactic notations
alluding to both rhetorical and moral positions rather than concrete, historically verifiable
events.

2. Textual Examples of Simultaneous Narrative
To begin, More paints a half complimentary, half damning portrait of Richard‘s
and his allies‘ various audiences. Stephen Greenblatt has already argued that, throughout
the History of Richard III, ―the point is not that anyone is deceived by the charade, but
that everyone is forced either to participate in it or to watch it silently‖ (Renaissance 13).
Commoners and nobles alike are for the most part quite capable of seeing through
Richard‘s rhetorical strategies, and this speaks to the powers of perception and
interpretation More is willing to ascribe both to the nobility and to the commons. More
tells us that ―no mans eares could abide‖ the flattery-suffused speeches about the Lord
Protector given first by Dr. Shaa and Friar Penker (History 59).11 Part of this rejection
stems from Shaa‘s rather awkward delivery—mistiming Richard‘s entrance with a certain
portion of the speech, Shaa simply delivers the same portion again when Richard finally
shows up. A later and less obviously awkward speech to the people given by the Duke of
Buckingham likewise fails to elicit the resounding support expected; instead of crying
11

All quotations taken from The History of King Richard III, The Complete Works of St. Thomas More,
Vol. 2, 1963.
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―king Richarde, king Richard: all was husht and mute, and not one word aunswered
thereunto‖ (History 75). Suggesting that ―parcase they perceyue you not well,‖ Mayor
Cooke steps in and
somewhat louder, he rehersed them the same matter againe in other order
and other wordes, so wel and ornately, & natheles so euidently and plaine,
with voice gesture and countenance so cumly and so conuenient, that
eueryman much meruailed that heard him, and thought that they neuer had
in their liues heard so euill a tale so well tolde. (History 75)
Buckingham is finally forced to ask point blank if his audience desires Richard for its
king:
At these wodes the people began to whisper among themselfe secretly,
[t]hat the voyce was neyther loude nor distincke, but as it were the sounde
of a swarm of bees, tyl at the last in [the nether] ende of the hal, a
bushement of the dukes seruantes and Nashefeldes and other longing to
the protectour … began sodainlye at mennes backes to crye owte as lowde
as their throtes would gyue: king Rycharde kinge Rycharde, and threwe vp
their cappes in token of ioye. And they that stode before, cast back theyr
heddes meruailing thereof, but nothing they sayd. And when the duke and
the Maier saw thys maner, they wysely turned it to theyr purpose. And
said it was a goodly cry and a ioyfull to here, euery man with one voice no
manne sayeng nay. (History 76)
Perspicacious as they are in stubbornly rejecting Richard‘s theatrical selfaggrandizement, the public here rebel against this theater with merely inarticulate
whispers, a defiance slightly menacing in its synchronicity but ultimately unthreatening.
Critics like Greenblatt might argue their insight only makes them hostages to Richard‘s
crime spree; they react to his allies‘ words as if they were loaded weapons aimed at their
heads. Alive to Richard‘s deceit, they are still constrained and contained by the threat of
his authority. But the containment here is not so much an effect of persecution as it is an
already-agreed-upon defense. As Richard‘s propaganda team attempt to sell their
preconceived narrative, the audience synchronizes their non-cooperation to a low hum.
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The bee analogy suggests a hive mind, thinking and working and humming apart from
the bad theater taking place onstage. If the swarm of bees fails here actually to swarm, the
explanation may not be full paralysis but a temporary and softly buzzing suspension—
even, perhaps, an anticipation that awaits its cue from an entirely different stage. The
current consensus, after all, is that these are ―Kynges games, as it were stage playes, and
for the more part plaied vpon scafoldes. In which pore men be but the lokers on. And thei
that wise be, wil medle no farther. For they that sometyme step vp and playe with them,
when they cannot play their partes, they disorder the play & do themself no good‖
(History 81). But Richard‘s public already have their own, separate parts somewhat in
mind, formed/forming in response to Richard‘s entirely legible motives. These are not, in
fact, only King‘s games played upon only one stage; to believe so, More already knew
twenty years before his death, was perilous. The didactic contents of this particular
scene—Buckingham‘s speech to the people—include the propagandistic rhetoric and its
reception, and an equivalent, though not necessarily identical, moral significance may be
attached to both narrative scenes. More‘s audience is given the opportunity to spotlight
the moral failings of both the manipulative Buckingham and the listeners he attempts to
manipulate. It is ―the potential fallibility of human reasoning‖ that is on trial here (Day
par. 5), not just the fallibility of Richard, who appears as the Actaeon in More‘s portrait,
simultaneously positioned in sight of his forbidden desire, discovered in the act of seeing
it, and about to be swarmed as a result. We give our attention to the full backdrop
surrounding Richard‘s treachery, as would More‘s audience. Richard‘s most villainous
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moments are always combined with equally noteworthy incidents involving his ensemble
cast—in this case, a swarming public who fail to swarm.12
This failure still needs explanation, for why would More insert such a strange and
stubborn suspense in his narrative—active minds inside resolutely passive bodies with
mumbling tongues? From whence does this moral failing derive? That Richard,
transparent as he is, is still an imposing and threatening authority provides one
explanation for the passivity of the commons, constrained out of fear into mutinous
silence. But another possibility is that Richard‘s very transparency, his Actaeon-identity,
confuses his viewers as much as it enlightens them. Here we are close to Jean
Baudrillard‘s theories about modern news coverage, which takes us hostage, he claims,
but ―[a] latent incredulity and derision prevent us from being totally in [its] grip …. It
isn‘t critical consciousness that causes us to distance ourselves from it in this way, but the
reflex of no longer wanting to play the game‖ (Intelligence of Evil 84). Similarly, the
incredulity and derision of More‘s textual audience is distinct from any critical
consciousness. Confronted with all the morally significant stages of Richard‘s story at
once, viewers balk at their own place in the portrait not out of fear, but out of a
necessarily deficient comprehension—not knowing how to play the game, not wanting to,
either. For if Richard is Actaeon and the English people are the beasts who must turn on

12

Gillian Day similarly argues that ―the first half of the [History] makes us increasingly aware that Richard
and Buckingham rise on the hypocrisy of otherwise rational and honourable individuals, of establishment
representatives and, finally, of the people themselves. It is hypocrisy which manifests itself either in the
conscious acceptance of fallacious reasoning or in the willing suspension of disbelief. And it is this
hypocrisy which we come to focus on as much as we do Richard's‖ (par. 13). This focus is intentional, part
of More‘s interest in creating a mirror for society. ―The inclusion of a knowing citizen audience,‖ Day
points out, ―creates a sense of instability about the public perception of, and involvement in, history's
events‖ (par. 18). We can perhaps surmise an anxiety on More‘s part about his own knowing society, too
complacent, perhaps, about their own knowledge and what it could lead them to do or, just as worrisomely,
fail to do.
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him as his deforming intent is revealed, where is the god whose curse must catalyze both
transformations? The coherence of the morally significant stages requires the presence of
a moral touchstone—but More leaves it out.
The reader‘s moral focus continues to shift back and forth in order to
accommodate both the justifiable (and predictable) denunciation of Richard and the less
consistent moral appraisal of his supporting cast, those clear-eyed witnesses to the
Protector‘s tyranny, who inexplicably continue to tolerate him. The public More creates
in the History of Richard III are connected by their discerning senses; they are uniformly
capable of sniffing out a bad argument, of spotting a fake. Yet as their sensitivity is
emphasized, their moral acumen is actually weakened, until one can attach to them no
better than an amoral bestiality, instinct without law, and without conscience.
It is none other than Edward IV who first openly exposes these contradictions in
society, in his last speech to his friends and family. Urging peace between his kinsmen,
Edward prays, ―Oure Lorde forbydde, that you loue together the worse, for the selfe
cause that you ought to loue the better. And yet that happeneth. And no where fynde wee
so deadlye debate, as amonge them, whyche by nature and lawe moste oughte to agree
together‖ (History 12). Edward assumes here a similitude between ―nature and law‖ that
is just not borne out by the phenomenon he has just uncovered—the people for whom it is
most crucial that they get along are the very people who hate and distrust each other the
most. More‘s historical personages continue to equate the god-given or instinctive with
the human-made or provisional, and they lock themselves in a difficult and inescapable
bind, moving further from God the more they lay claim to God‘s intimacy. More would
sympathize and even identify with this impulse. He never relinquished the possibility that
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one could serve in both the world of men and the world of God, ―whose governments
were necessarily separate and distinct but, ideally, complementary and mutually
supportive‖ (Wegemer & Smith xxviii). But the difficulty of that proposition is
emphasized here and throughout the History. Nature and Law have become more than
estranged, and the result is a general muddling of ethical behavior and a reduction of a
public body‘s capacity to act meaningfully on its own consensus—in other words, its own
conscience.
An example of this muddled and muddling effort can be found in the middle of
the History, when Richard and the Duke of Buckingham each speak to the council at
length regarding the Queen‘s attempt to safeguard her younger son in the sanctuary of the
church. Their efforts both to exclude the Queen from any respectable company and
mystify the very concept of sanctuary are worth examining for what they reveal about the
widening gap between Nature and Law, the sacred and the secular. Both men begin by
artfully discrediting the queen‘s motives. Richard asserts that her ―haynous deede …
procedinge of great malyce towarde the Kynges counsayllers,‖ was ―by her done to none
other entente, but to brynge all the Lordes in obloquie and murmure of the people‖
(History 25). According to Richard, she is all at once ―obstynate, and so preciselye sette
vppon her owne wyl, that neyther his wise and faithful aduertysemente canne moue her,
nor any mannes reason content her‖ (27). Obstinate and willful, it may also be ―malyce,
frowardenesse, or foly‖ that drives her (27). The Duke of Buckingham, even more
shiftily, argues that it is ―womannishe feare, naye womannishe frowardnesse‖ that is
responsible for the Queen‘s decision, ―for I dare take it vppon my soule, she well
knoweth she needeth no such thyng to feare, either for her sonne or for her selfe‖ (28).
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Shortly, however, Buckingham allows for the possibility that the Queen does fear, and
that ―the more she feareth to delyuer hym, the more oughte wee feare to leaue him in her
handes‖ (29). The Duke goes even further in his disparagement of the Queen, putting her
in the company of the ―rabble of theues, murtherers, and maliciuos heyghnous Traitours‖
that notoriously use the statute of sanctuary to escape the punishments they deserve (30).
Froward and fearful, obstinate and hysterical, scheming one moment and panicking the
next, the Queen‘s motives and ultimately the Queen herself are made monstrously
perplexing.
Here More once again inserts the illustrative technique of simultaneous narrative
into the text, this time into the hands of Richard and Buckingham. Specifically, the two
men use entrelacement, providing several discontinuous identities for the Queen inside
what they also attempt to present as a single narrative, and thereby deceptively exposing
and displaying her every possible motive. She is not first panicked, and then obstinate,
and then fearful, and then froward, in other words: she is all this and more, and all at
once. Entrelacement itself is not inherently deceptive, of course; Fowler reminds us that
―centuries of entrelacement had habituated readers‖ to broken narrative sequences.
However, ―among the new ideas of classical humanism, formal unity enjoyed a high
standing‖ (53). More pits the older technique against the new campaign for an ―unbroken
narrative that would carry in itself the entire moral and emotional content‖ (Fowler 29).
Richard and Buckingham‘s failure to settle on a single or continuous interpretation of the
Queen‘s motives works in their favor, for in asking the council to imagine the Queen as a
willful conniver and as a woman out of her mind with fear and as a thief hoarding stolen
property, they essentially ask too much, and the result of such a muddled imaginative
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effort is a wholesale rejection of the person perplexing enough to require it. By
complicating her identity and multiplying her motivations, refusing a simple or single
unified explanation for her decision, Richard and Buckingham ensure that the Queen is
excised from the collective body that, at this point in the History, still safely enshrines
themselves. It is not any special or exceptional authority of Richard and Buckingham that
works most heinously against the Queen here; rather, the multiple and discontinuous
pictures of her take on their own garbled and surplus authorities—rather than tease them
out, examine each one distinctly, or, better yet, combine them meaningfully, it becomes
much easier to point and say, Guilty, despite the inability to answer the question, Guilty
of what? The Queen is dis-unified, and in the end it hardly matters whether any of the
various motives attached to her are or were ever true; she is little better than a criminal,
for only the guilty take advantage of sanctuary, and there is hardly need to fixate on any
one particular guilt.13
It is not only the Queen, then, that is treacherously amplified in the Duke of
Buckingham‘s discourse. He and Richard both are initially eager to preserve the practice
of sanctuary and express horror at the idea of violating the safe space sanctuary provides.
Buckingham lists the scenarios in which sanctuary is necessary, but he quickly moves on
to the much longer list of scenarios in which it is abused. ―Then looke me nowe how few
saintuarye menne there bee, whome any fauourable necessitie compelled to gooe thither,‖
Buckingham reasons. ―And then see on the tother syde what a sorte there be commonly

13

For a different interpretation of Buckingham‘s strategy, see Day‘s brief discussion of the Duke‘s cunning
establishment of ―the inferiority of the Queen‘s female logic to that of the all-male Coronation Council‖
(par. 6). Ultimately Day concludes that ―it is the fact of the Queen's claim to sanctuary which challenges
the honour of all noblemen present, not her reason for such a claim‖ (par. 6). But it seems likely that the
councilmen‘s intellects or, more specifically, their perceptions and perspectives of unified identity are
being challenged here as much as, or more than, their honor.
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therein, of them whome wylfull vnthriftynesse hathe broughte to nought … as thoughe
Godde and Saincte Peter were the Patrons of vngracious lyuinge‖ (History 30-31).
Buckingham resolves that the only way to rescue sanctuary from the taint of criminality
is to ensure that only the innocent be allowed to use it, but even these people, he soon
concludes, do not really need it. The crux of his argument is that
a Sainctuarye serueth alway to defende the bodie of that manne that
standeth in daunger abrode, not of greate hurte onelye, but also of lawful
hurte. For agaynste vnlawfull harmes, neuer Pope nor Kynge entended to
priueledge anye one place. For that priueledge hath euery place. Knoweth
anye manne anye place wherein it is lawefull one manne to dooe another
wrong? That no manne vnlawfully take hurt, that libertie, the Kynge, the
lawe, and verye nature forbiddeth in euery place, and maketh to that
regarde for euerye manne euerye place a Saintuarye. (31-32)
Buckingham assumes total transparency in separating lawful from unlawful hurts;
bolstered by a judicial system so precise and clear, he can confidently assert that every
place in his well-run England is a Sanctuary—the pope, the king, the law, and very nature
forbid otherwise. Like Edward, Buckingham makes equally sacred the word of God and
the word of man, forgetting that ―laws, like medicines, can be applied only by
individuals,‖ and that ―the justice that results will be proportionate to the prudence,
courage, and temperance of those who apply them‖ (Wegemer & Smith 254). Somehow
Buckingham manages to deliver his conclusions sounding more or less reasonable, rather
than blasphemous, for he has seized on the still unintelligible relationship between
―nature and law‖ such that his listeners may dissect his arguments only at the risk of
openly avowing what they already know—that God-given nature and human-made law
do not overlap the way Edward implied in his final speech, that law has instead gotten
ahead of itself, (re)making nature as much as, even more than, nature (re)makes law.
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Buckingham exemplifies this process throughout his speech, remaking official
sanctuaries, like the one that currently shelters the Queen, into desacralized spaces,
already corrupted because too likely corruptible, and at the same time substituting his
new version of sanctuary, made sacred by little more than his word. ―And he that taketh
one oute of saintuary to dooe hym good,‖ the duke argues, ―I saye plainely that he
breaketh no saintuary‖ (History 33)—sanctuary, remade by Buckingham, breaks itself.
Although his listeners agree with the Duke, they also suggest ―in the auoydyng of all
maner of rumour, that the Lorde Cardinall shoulde fyrst assaye to geat him [the Prince]
with her [the Queen‘s] good will‖ (33). It is a subtle acknowledgment of the slippery
ground on which the duke has placed them; they might agree in committee that his
argument—that every place is a true sanctuary, except the Queen‘s sanctuary, which is
false—is somehow sound, but that hardly makes it indestructible. The Queen herself
dismantles it aptly in her conversation with the Cardinal: ―[I]n what place could I reckon
him [the Prince] sure,‖ she asks, ―if he be not sure in this the sentuarye .... But my sonne
can deserue no sentuary, and therefore he cannot haue it. Forsooth he hath founden a
goodly glose, by whiche that place that may defend a thefe, may not saue an innocent‖
(37-38).14 Elizabeth draws what appears to be needed attention to Buckinham‘s ―goodly
glose‖—he and Richard unmake a sure statute all too conveniently, to satisfy their own
will and, according to the Queen, their malice. Elizabeth resists the gloss, initially; she
defers to laws she deems unbreakable: by ―the law of nature wyll the mother kepe her
childe. Gods law pryuelegeth the sanctuary, & the sanctuary my sonne …‖ (39). The

14

More later asserts his own opinion of such ―goodly gloses‖ in his Treatise on the Passion (1534), where
he warns against the idea that ―euery manne maye boldely frame him self a conscience, with a glose of his
owne making, after his owne fantasye putte vnto goddess worde‖ (112).
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Queen‘s sturdy faith sets up a worthy obstacle to Buckingham‘s shaky rhetoric, but her
vigor is, unfortunately, short-lived. Immediately after Elizabeth announces the divine
privilege of sanctuary and the security of her son inside it, we are told that ―she verely
thought she coulde not kepe him there …‖ (40), and so ―she dempte it beste to deliuer
him,‖ hoping ―it should yet make them the more warely to loke to him, & the more
sircumspectly to se to his surety, if she with her owne handes betoke him to them of
trust‖ (41). Losing her faith in God‘s privilege, Elizabeth hands over her trust, along with
her son, to men of whom the best she can say is that while they ―might bee deceiuid‖ by
Richard, ―so was she well assured they would not be corrupted‖ (41). The Queen replaces
sure and confident faith with the frailest hope. Why do this, especially since she has
already determined that Buckingham‘s attack on sanctuary is nothing more than a
―goodly glose?‖ She spotlights the transparent weaknesses of his argument, weaknesses
already alluded to by the councilors eager to avoid rumor, and yet it works on her—
another indication that transparency may foster consensus but no effective defiance.
Does the Queen abandon her faith here, or is it she who has been abandoned? In
this exploration of simultaneous narrative—compressing time so as to allow for multiple,
concurrent classifications of both the Queen and sanctuary—divinity is once more the
missing element. More‘s historical characters have lost the faith in their own connection
to the divine. As a result, the constancy of faith is replaced by the reluctant legitimizing
of a discontinuous and illegible authority. Richard is the History‘s golden idol, honored
through a collective disgust that proves to be scarily accommodating, as much as any true
reverence. Consider Richard‘s bizarre attempt to blame his birth deformity on Queen
Elizabeth and Jane Shore:
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ye shal al se in what wise that sorceres and that other witch of her counsel
shoris wife with their affynite, haue by their sorcery & witchcraft wasted
my body. And therwith he plucked vp hys doublet sleue to his elbow vpon
hist left arme, where he shewed a werish withered arme and small, as it
was neuer other. And thereupon euery mannes mind sore migaue them,
well perceiuing that this matter was but a quarel. For wel thei wist, that the
quene was to wise to go aboute any such folye. And also if she would, yet
wold she of all folke leste make Shoris wife of counsaile, whom of al
women she most hated, as that concubine whom the king her husband had
most loued. And also no man was ther present, but wel knew that his
harme was euer such since his birth. (History 48)
Once again it is Richard‘s turn to experiment with simultaneous narrative. Deformed
from birth, he presents his withered arm as the tragic result of a recent witches‘ curse. We
must imagine him, Actaeon-like again, simultaneously deformed and deforming. The
confused time-scheme of Richard‘s deformations presents a picture of perverted
timelessness; it audaciously demands that witnesses entertain the possibility of the
Protector‘s immortality, for according to his claims, his body operates not by the rules of
any mortal logic. By this most outrageous speech, Richard assumes more than any earthly
authority; he assumes a mystical, supernatural identity that he can make and remake at
will. He is practically his Word made flesh.15 In More‘s writings on conscience and on
faith, he reiterates the Christian necessity of believing in what cannot always be clearly
seen or proved;16 Richard‘s perverse parody asks for faith despite what can be seen and
disproved, easily. He leads the construction of a new social conscience, a perverted
translation of knowledge-with-others—More‘s worst nightmare.
The only sane response to such a brutal illumination, in the History, is the attempt
to un-see, to hum along in a self-imposed obscurity, while the kings play their games.
15

Here we see an example of the ―linguistic fluidity‖ that Anne Lake Prescott argues More exploited in his
own writings but ―feared in despots such as Henry VIII‖ and Richard III (229).
16
In A Dialogue Concerning Heresies, for example, More writes, ―And so let hym reuerently knowlege his
ignoraunce / lene and cleue to the faith of the chyrche as to an vndoutyd trouthe / leuynge that texte to be
better perceyuyd whan it shall please our lorde with hys light to reuele and disclose it‖ (127-28).
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Such is certainly one of the lessons of the animal fable that abruptly concludes the
History. Bishop Morton, pressed by the Duke of Buckingham to reveal his thoughts on
King Richard, responds with a story about a lion who
had proclaimed that on pain of deth there should none horned beast abide
in that wood, [whereupon] one that had in his forehed a bonch of flesh,
fled awaye a great pace. The fox that saw him run so faste, asked him
whither he made al that hast. And he aunswered, in faith I neither wote nor
reck, so I wer once hence because of this proclamacion made of horned
beastes. What fole quod the fox thou maist abide wel inough, the lyon
ment not by thee, for it is none horn that is in thine head. No mary quod he
that wote I wel ynough. But what & he cal it an horn, wher am I then?
(History 93)
Richard‘s perversions have reduced his subjects to such desperate logic; ruined by their
confrontation with the gross distortions, the horror, of their new political and spiritual
model, nothing is left but the raw, animal instinct for self-preservation, achieved in the
fable by flight, in the rest of the History by a humming aversion. Richard has revealed
himself: he is known now, by all, in the sense that More would say Christians know God.
But such knowledge is bestial, debasing, as the final fable emphasizes. 17 Here, truly, is
instinct without law, conscience without bond, though the History has prepared us for this
final reductive moment—in the hive mind of the commons, in the Queen‘s capitulation,
even in Lord Standley‘s prophetic dream on the night before his arrest and execution. 18

17

More would later warn Thomas Cromwell, ―in counsel given to his Grace, ever tell him what he ought to
do, but never tell him what he is able to do …. For if the lion knew his own strength, hard were it for any
man to rule him‖ (qtd. in Wegemer & Smith 43). In a Latin poem ―To a Courtier,‖ More compares
―hav[ing] the king‘s ear‖ with ―having fun with tamed lions—often it is harmless, but just as often there is
fear of harm. Often he roars in rage for no known reason, and suddenly the fun becomes fatal‖ (qtd. in
Wegemer & Smith 231). ―What is a good king?‖ More asks in another poem. ―He is a watchdog, guardian
of the flock, who by barking keeps the wolves from the sheep. What is the bad king? He is the wolf‖ (qtd.
in Wegemer & Smith 236).
18
―[H]e had so fereful a dreme, in which him thoughte that a bore with his tuskes so raced them both bi the
heddes, that the blood ranne aboute both their shoulders. And forasmuch as the protector gaue the bore for
his cognisaunce, this dreme made so fereful an impression in his hart, that he was throughly determined no
lenger to tary, but had his horse redy, if the lord Hastinges wold go with him to ride so far yet the same
night, that thei shold be out of danger ere dai‖ (History 50).
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Knowledge of the truth has been steadily replaced by an instinct for it. Knowledge no
longer exists as the result of accumulation or as evidence of a sacred bond; as instinct, it
exists only in bare and lonely moments. Finally nature and law overlap, but the result is
not a harmony but a deformity, one that bears only a monstrous, morally expunged
relation to God and human beings. Richard is the new Church; he is both Actaeon and
Diana, deforming himself; he is the sanctuary that shelters the similarly malformed. But
his shelter is simultaneously exposure, for the only sanctuary the History offers is
wilderness, and its sanctuary men are beasts.

3. Warnings for a Sixteenth Century Audience
If we assume for the History a primarily didactic function as a mirror for the
nobility and the rest of society alike, then the lesson clearly includes a warning against
the perversion that may so easily enter into consciousness. 19 Yet More does not provide
coherent instructions for either recognizing or conquering that perversion. What he
presents are simultaneous portraits of various historical figures engaged in tragically
insistent enactments of their own dehumanization and desacralization. More prevents any
easy interpretation; he makes it particularly difficult to use the History as one more piece
of evidence in the condemnation of Richard III as a deformed and aberrant personality,
excised from the sanctuary of a community that remains safely intact despite the evil
machinations of this evil king. More cannot allow us to blame Richard alone, for it is
only with the complicity of his various audiences that Richard is able to proceed with his
(not at all) secret grab for power. By the repeated utilization of simultaneous narrative,
19

Marius agrees that More ―wrote to teach moral lesson—here, the nature of tyranny, the wicked conduct
and self-seeking that kings should avoid if they are to be good‖ (99).
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More broadens his perspective to accommodate much more than Richard‘s malicious
ambition, which in the context of the entire History is hardly as destructive as the careless
obliteration of sanctuary, torn apart as viciously as Actaeon is by his dogs. Sanctuary is
the last defense against Richard‘s plotting—it is all that stands between him and
Elizabeth‘s youngest son—but sanctuary is also the last link to the divinity that is, by the
end of the History, wholly disabled. More‘s History draws the destruction of the very
concept of safe, stable spaces where one can live, not as any confusingly motivated or
monstrous individual, but as a ―Saynctuary manne‖ (History 31). Indeed, there are no
men in More‘s History, none who are not already deformed/deforming into something
else. These tragic transformations have happened, and everyone is at fault, for in
protecting the semblance of a safe, separate, incorruptibly unified social identity, More‘s
historical figures acquiesce in the maneuverings of Richard, and in their own hostagetaking, as if they could wait out the misfortune of Richard, as if they could come away
from his rule unscathed.20 It is this perversion of social identity that More‘s work
condemns, a perversion that arises in part from what Jean Baudrillard explains as a
confusion between evil and misfortune. While misfortune presumes what Baudrillard
views as a humiliating innocence, the intelligence of evil
rests on the rejection of the presumption of innocence …. [W]e are all
presumptive wrongdoers …. For the act we commit, it is right we should
20

More targets everyone, which may explain why he neither completed nor published his History. Scholars
have entertained various other explanations. Marius says that ―too many important people were still around
who had been compromised by their relations with Richard‖ (118). Wilson suggests More became
―increasingly vulnerable as he ascended the ladder of royal favour,‖ and a more pronounced circumspection
inspired him to abandon his work on the manuscript (159). Wilson discusses the ―sensitive issue‖ of Henry
VIII‘s coronation ode, which More had written in 1509, and which contained unambiguous criticism of
Henry VII (160). The ode was published, along with others of More‘s earlier poems, in 1518, and drew
some unwanted attention to the rising councilor. Wilson provides convincing evidence that political
pressure was responsible for the abrupt ending of the History, but it is also possible that More arrived at his
ending organically—if the History is a portrait of the process of dehumanization, a beast fable seems an
entirely appropriate conclusion.
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be dealt with—and indeed punished—accordingly. We are never innocent
of that act in the sense of having nothing to do with it or being victims of
it. But this does not mean we are answerable for it either, as that would
suppose we were answerable for ourselves, that we were invested with
total power over ourselves, which is a subjective illusion …. [W]e are
forever complicit in what we do, even if we are not answerable to anyone.
So we are both irresponsible and without excuses. (Intelligence of Evil
152-54)
More‘s History is an exercise in irresponsibility without excuse, a lesson in the
necessary rejection of the presumption of innocence. It is a nightmare world, where God
has been replaced by a monster/man, but this nightmare has been dreamed by everyone
inside it. Richard is no random misfortune—he cannot be explained away as an
aberration that simply arrived, like a plague or a storm, and More makes it abundantly
clear that the horrors of his reign are the ―result of the successes and failures of human
will and wit and not the inexorable workings of fate‖ (Fleisher 163). But in targeting
human will, there are still no intelligible answers for the problem of Richard III—why he
arrived, why he was allowed to stay, what we can learn from his short reign of terror.
This is More‘s irresolvable problem: people are not answerable for what they do, because
people have no answers. Answers are ―the business of destiny or of the divinity‖
(Baudrillard Intelligence of Evil153), but when people act anyway, as they must, they
invent the missing answers.21 More‘s figures take responsibility irresponsibly,
encroaching inexcusably onto unfamiliar domains, searching for answers to which they
have no access; there is no discovery inside such domains, only inventions: animal fables,
stories of curses and witchcraft, dreams of escape, king‘s games played on scaffolds—all
manner of methods of illustration for these Great Matters, but no answers. Without

21

Here we are close to an insightful assertion by Prescott: ―More denied that God's truth changes with time,
but he did insist that it unfolds over time‖ (239). More‘s figures perhaps rush the process.
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resolving this problem of lack, More does call for exactly what Baudrillard calls for in the
Intelligence of Evil when he urges us to ―be worthy of our ‗perversity,‘ of our evil genius,
let us measure up to our tragic involvement in what happens to us …‖ (153). More‘s
figures fail to measure up when they fail to recognize the parts they play in the
presumptuous inventiveness that, despite universal incredulity and derision, still succeeds
in substituting Richard‘s presence for the presence of the divine.22 We can appreciate
their failure as a warning against the wrong kind of presumption—of innocence rather
than accountability.
Richard Marius‘ interpretation of the History implies that such a warning would
hardly have been incomprehensible to More‘s contemporaries. Marius discusses ―the
well-known melancholia of the age,‖ inspired by ―the uncertainty of things and the way
appearances gave the lie to reality‖ (120). More‘s Richard III, though transparently
tyrannous, is still an obscure and uncertain figure. More‘s History ―questions, by its blunt
demanding factuality[,] the supposition that human events cohere and that the wise may
discover merely by observing a divine purpose and rationality in the world. God has his
purposes …, [b]ut no one can tell merely by looking what those purposes are‖ (122).
Marius‘ summary gets close to the heart of More‘s antagonism towards not only the Oath
of Succession but also towards Luther and the entire Protestant reform movement.
Traditional interpretations of Protestantism emphasize ―the massive devolution of
religious authority from institutions to persons‖ (Rosendale 1154), and Luther‘s
concomitant effort to separate the carnal and the spiritual realms, which ―have been so
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This is similar to Day‘s argument that More uses his History to ―reshap[e] Richard, not as the evil
monster of popular repute but as rationalist man's monstrous self-deception, the unacknowledged unknown‖
(par. 2, my emphasis).
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confused by humankind, Luther says, that bishops rule over cities while lords rule over
the human souls‖ (Mitchell 691). More rejects this advocacy of the complete separation
between realms, though he certainly agrees that a tension exists between worldly and
spiritual work. Inevitably nature mixes with law, but the mixture itself can be sweet, as it
is in More‘s vision of conscience-with-others, or toxic, as it is in the History. The
solution is not to escape the tension through separation, but to accept, and thus live up to,
its inevitability. Such acceptance must be collective, not individual, and here is where
More appears most incompatible with Luther. Mitchell summarizes Luther‘s position that
―[o]nly through a ‗marriage between a single Christian and Christ where no others are
involved does the basis for community come to view;‘‖ he goes on to assert the necessity
of ―seeing how the pattern of the singular relationship, the marriage, turns back onto the
world, so to speak, and offers a pattern for the right relationship between human beings‖
(693). But for More this version of the construction of conscience is plainly backwards,
even naïve, for knowledge of God is ―something institutionally possessed, [not]
individually pursued‖ (Rosendale 1157). More‘s approach to worship is aesthetic rather
than intellectual,
founded upon the gulf between God and humanity which finds its primary
expression in the ineffability of the aesthetic; its natural medium is in the
elevated strains of high liturgy, and its corollary effect is the elevation of
the mediating institution which renders the gulf crossable. The traditional
Roman Catholic Mass, in which the divine is screened not only by the
aesthetic but by the limited participation of the congregation … and above
all by the mystical opacity of hieratic Latin, epitomizes this position….
Paradoxically, this linguistic wall was the self-authenticating guarantee of
access (albeit indirect) to the divine: the inability of the average medieval
worshiper to fully understand what was being said in church was
presumably an important part of his or her assurance that something
important and otherworldly was in fact happening. (Rosendale 1152-5)
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There is a humility in More‘s understanding of conscience, which derives from just this
belief that contact with God must arrive through obscurity. This is essentially the
intelligence of evil, when evil is understood, as Baudrillard understands it, as an
acknowledgment of inevitable mystification, as ―the energy that comes from the nonunification of things—good being defined as the unification of things in a totalized
world‖ (Passwords 33).
Twenty years later, in his refusal to take the Oath of Succession, More once again
calls attention to the intelligence of evil, once again delivers a warning about assuming
innocence in a non-unified (but necessarily un-separable) sacred/secular world, and once
again employs simultaneous narrative as his method of choice for displaying his own
measuring up to his tragic involvement in the events of the 1530s. To Margaret he writes,
―I had always from the beginning truly used myself to looking first upon God and next
upon the King, according to the lesson his Highness taught me at my first coming to his
noble service …‖ (qtd. in Wegemer & Smith 348-49). To Secretary Cromwell he argues
―that the faithful subject is more bound to his conscience and his soul than to anything
else in the world,‖ adding, ―provided his conscience, like mine, does not raise a scandal
or sedition, and I assure you that I have never discovered what is in my conscience to any
person living‖ (qtd. in Wegemer & Smith 353). More looks upon God first, but not
instead of, the King, and while he privileges his spiritual connection to his conscience, he
takes care to consider the effects of his conscience on the material world. More‘s defense
is an effort to explain the essential difference between choosing a simultaneous or
integrated identity as the King‘s good servant and God‘s, versus choosing a double or
split identity as the public servant of the King and the private servant of the Catholic
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Church. In a letter from Margaret to Alice Alington, which More may have written
himself, he explains that
if in this matter it were possible for me to do the thing that might content
the King‘s Grace without God thereby being offended, there is no man
who has taken this oath already who has done so more gladly than I would
…. But since, my conscience remaining unchanged, I can in no way do it
…. I have no way out of the bind that God has me in. (qtd. in Wegemer &
Smith 320)
For More, the idea of taking the oath while crossing his fingers is impossible,
reprehensible, because, quite simply, it is dishonest. More may admit to two integrable
identities, but he is not a cheater. Here we see the familiar moral stringency of More
existing alongside a more realistic, worldly acknowledgment of combination and
compromise. He refuses to capitulate to heresy, but his denial is not marked by outright
defiance, for in his refusal to serve the King, he continues to serve the King. What
separates More from his characters in the History is his recognition that he is doing both,
mixing incredulity with reverence, exposing his conscience as made up of sacred and
secular components, obscurely mixed, and he begs that others, especially King Henry,
recognize this as well.

4. Lessons for a Twenty-first Century Audience
More‘s integral identities, his simultaneous loyalties, are the result of his very
particular honor code. His understanding of oath-taking as a matter of conscience may
provide insight on the ambiguous relationship between academic integrity and integrity in
general alluded to in the first paragraphs of this chapter. Also relevant are Baudrillard‘s
theories of the intelligence of evil, for as Tricia Gallant points out, there is a ―tendency to
view student academic misconduct as another form of students behaving badly [along
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with, for example, binge drinking]‖ (76). Plagiarism is often reduced to misfortune, in
that it requires an initial presumption of innocence; we are not all presumptive
wrongdoers—only the current generation of students, their innocence, and their morals,
ruined by the convenient seduction of the Internet.23 Certainly stealing an essay from an
online paper-mill is one thing, but many activities that ―count‖ as plagiarism, according
to the various university handbooks, are much less cut and dry, and it is not always easy
to recognize when an oath has been violated. More‘s perspective on identity may provide
us with a more useful perspective on plagiarism. His argument, boiled down to its basics,
is that a person cannot—or, perhaps more precisely, should not—believe in something
but not believe in it. She cannot substitute her own answer to an issue but still make
separate room for a separate, inaccessible answer. She cannot take an oath without taking
it. But the interviews in Blum‘s study of plagiarism suggest nothing less than that
students are taking oaths without taking them; Blum‘s students ―echoed the official line
about universities being built on trust and about the importance of originality, but few
seemed to go beyond the superficial justification offered by faculty‖ (154). The problem
may very well be that students who sign Academic Dishonesty contracts are asked to take
an oath in deference to a standard they are told is determinedly black and white: they
comply, but they know better. ―[P]lagiarism assumes the concreteness of texts,‖ Alice
Roy explains; it assumes ―the reality of authorship, of both words and ideas, and a welldefined role of the reader as receiver of the message. No disappearing subject here, no
creative transaction between reader and writer, or reader and text, no negotiation of
23

Some critics argue that, thanks to the Internet, instances of plagiarism have drastically increased because
students ―refuse to admit that copying from the Web is wrong‖ (Hansen 778). Citing a number of recent
studies, Susan Debra Blum cites the percentage of students who admit to cheating as >75%, though she also
points out that the topic of plagiarism has been ―sensationalized in popular media‖ (1).
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meaning, no indeterminacy of text‖ (56).24 No generation is more familiar with the
indeterminacy of text than the current ―e-generation.‖ It is thus not inconceivable to
imagine that to the oaths of the strictest university honor codes they bring their
incredulity and derision even while allowing themselves to be taken hostage by them, 25
pretending along with some instructors that plagiarism is always a clear moral or ethical
issue despite evidence of just ―how radically rhetorical the atmosphere of professional
self-consciousness has become‖ (Lanham Electronic 63), and despite indications that
digital culture has created ―new media being[s]‖ with new ―digital identit[ies],‖ who have
become, in fact, ―as mixed and appropriated as the compositions [they] write‖ (Rice
69).26
Like sanctuary in the reigns of Henry VII and Henry VIII, Academic Honesty has
been desacralized, its ―originality sanctuaries‖ dismantled, no longer available (if they
ever were) to shelter those model students who are morally secure enough to distinguish
their own ―original‖ ideas from someone else‘s. Indeed, as Gallant argues, ―[t]he
complexity of academic integrity arises because there is no ‗unified front‘ regarding
conceptions of knowledge, information, and academic work‖ (66-7), and thus no unified
front regarding integrity itself. With more and more students gaining access to
information-sharing technology, ―conflicting notions of information (personal versus
communal property) and knowledge (independently versus collaboratively constructed)

24

See also Gilbert Larochelle, 121-130.
Larry Lessig makes a similar point when he argues that we ―can‘t kill the instinct the technology
produces; we can only criminalize it. We can‘t stop our kids from using it; we can only drive it
underground. We can‘t make our kids passive again; we can only make them … ‗pirates‘ […]. They live
life knowing they live it against the law.‖
26
Even before the digital revolution, however, it is important to note that Bakhtin was already arguing that
―thought itself … is born and shaped in the process of interaction and struggle with others‘ thought, and
this cannot but be reflected in the forms that verbally express our thought as well‖ (Speech Genres 92).
25
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hint that academic integrity is less an individual character trait than it is a social
phenomenon located at the nexus of teaching and learning‖ (Gallant 68-9). Rebecca
Moore Howard agrees that ―[a]ll writers appropriate language from other sources and
reshape it as their own, but inexperienced writers don't do that very well‖ (qtd. in Hansen
777); focusing on ―capture-and-punishment‖ might deter individual instances of
plagiarism, but it doesn‘t accomplish much in the way of teaching, and, according to
Howard, may in fact ―encourage a reductive, automated vision of the educational
experience‖ (qtd. in Hansen 789).27 Gallant agrees that ―[t]his blanket response …
neglects the complexity of the issue precipitated by the ways in which technological
inventions may be redefining concepts of information, authorship, and knowledge;
challenging the expertise of educational institutions; and reshaping the nature of
academic work‖ (66).28 If honor codes ignore these complications, they are guilty, at best,
of oversimplifying the complexity of students‘ experience with postmodernism, at worst,
of begging the question, assuming that the honor of the code already exists as an entirely
unambiguous, unchanging concept. Unlike the Oath of Succession, which aimed to create
conscience out of nothing, honor codes assume a consciousness about integrity already
exists, and students must simply sign on. Thomas More, of course, would say that both
methods fail to recognize the true, double-sided nature of Integrity. What he displays in
his writings, his letters, and his famous last words, is an integrity based on consciencewith-others, constantly regenerated, reformed, and remodeled, but out of material that, at
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See Howard‘s thoughts on heroic plagiarism and positive plagiarism in ―The New Abolition Comes to
Plagiarism,‖ 87-96.
28
Gallant finally suggests that ―academic misconduct should be examined less as the disease and more as
the symptom of a disease‖ that privileges an intellectually constraining independence and a morally
ambiguous academic capitalism (77).
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least in part, derives from the highest and purest ideal. Indeed, integrity is both ideal and
material. It is still, timeless even, and yet—to borrow Galileo‘s alleged aside—it moves.
In considering a new approach to the problem of plagiarism, it may indeed be
helpful to consider the writing of Thomas More and the speculations of postmodernists
like Baudrilliard, along with the theories of established professionals in the field of
composition. More‘s use of simultaneous narrative hints at a rhetorical strategy detailed
by Jeff Rice, for example, who suggests using ―discrepancies in meaning to motivate
further exploration‖ in writing; ―[w]hat do I do when I encounter opposing meanings of
the same term? How can these meanings be combined in order to generate a new idea? …
In other words, I am choosing a lack of control (discrepancy) over control (method
comparison) …‖ (42). Several of the rhetorical practices Rice outlines (such as
chorography and appropriation) seem reminiscent of simultaneous narrative. Similarly,
Richard Lanham suggests paying more attention to the ―volatile nature‖ of electronic
texts in the composition classroom (75). Studying and imitating interactive texts could
inspire ―a pervasive reversal of use and ornament, a turning of purpose to play and game,
a continual effort not … to purify our motives, but to keep them in a roiling, rich mixture
of play, game, and purpose. All of this yields a body of work active not passive, a canon
not frozen in perfection but volatile with contending human motive‖ (51). 29 More‘s
perspective on consciousness very much brings to mind Richard Lanham‘s theories on
homo rhetoricus (rhetorical man), particularly his assertion that ―[p]rivate selves are
created by public ones‖ (220). ―In America,‖ Lanham argues, ―every time we create a
means of communication that allows us to create a separate public self, we spoil it by
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See also N. Katherine Hayles‘ recent work, Electronic Literature: New Horizons for the Literary.

68

making it more intimate‖ (Electronic 220). Such an eagerness stems from what Lanham
calls the ―American delusion‖ that ―the computer classroom, or network, will abolish the
central self and create a genuine collective enterprise … that the oscillation of the self can
be shut down, that the private self can exist without a public doppelganger‖ (Electronic
220). Lanham suggests that ―if we seek to protect the central self, its rich interiority …
we shouldn‘t do it by singling it out, but by focusing on the rich, tense interaction
between central and social self which creates that interiority in the first place‖ (Electronic
220).
More exemplifies the richness of this interaction in his musings on conscience as
knowledge-with-others; the tension comes through in his perplexing portrayal of
ineffectual consensus, which appears over and over in the History of Richard III. More
perhaps inherited much of this tension from his background in humanism, a philosophy
that certainly made room for debate about interaction between central and social selves.
As Mary Crane explains, ―English humanists imagine[d] a subject formed not by a
narrative history of personal experience but by an assimilated store of texts that seek to
forestall and replace such experience‖ (162-63). Individualism and individual expression
is episodically subsumed by a socially constituted identity, for humanism fostered a
legacy of enthusiasm for individual progress and social mobility along with a sustained
sense of discomfort and alarm at the prospect of too much of it. The ―store of texts‖
Crane describes could only advance such an oscillation between central and social self.
She explains:
In theory at least, all texts formed a common storehouse of matter,
validated by existing cultural codes, from which all educated people could
gather and through which all educated subjects were framed. This
common textual matter provided a form of symbolic capital that could be
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accumulated without threat to the existing hierarchy, and the social
mobility that it enabled could be imagined as a collective project which
did not involve dangerous singularity or personal aggregation of power.
(6)
In theory, the texts as houses for cultural codes did not involve such danger, but in
practice the collective project could be so interrupted. Elizabeth Eisenstein‘s ambitious
examination of the effects of the printing press on the early modern era can shed light on
this possibility. ―Sixteenth-century publications not only spread identical fashions but
also encouraged the collection of diverse ones,‖ Eisenstein remarks, and this duality can
help explain how ―[c]oncepts pertaining to uniformity and to diversity—to the typical and
to the unique—are interdependent, they represent two sides of the same coin‖ (84). While
some authors were interested in ―laying bare all the quirks and peculiarities that define
the individual ‗me, myself,‘ as against the type, other genres of literature were defining
ideal types—setting forth the requirements of service to king or country and delineating
the role played by priest, merchant, and peasant; by nobleman and lady, husbandman and
wife, well-bred boy and girl‖ (84). Through More‘s use of simultaneous narrative, we
have seen him experimenting with different combinations of individuals and types: in the
History of Richard III we watch as loyal courtiers become singular, treasonous enemies,
obstinate queens become scheming witches, shyly resistant audiences become
acquiescent prisoners, and, of course, the Lord Protector becomes the King of England
becomes the perverted Divine. Renaissance subjects lived with dual illustrations of
singular personalities and general types, were confronted with them more and more as
printing caught on in England, and Thomas More was in the unique position to see just
how this might complicate his fellow citizens‘ definitions of subjecthood, social
consciousness (knowledge-with-others), social responsibility, and ‗self‘-expression. King
70

Henry, himself educated inside a humanist framework, was likewise confronted with the
dual representations Eisenstein describes, and it is fair to say he struggled with his own
subjectivity—as humanist king, constructed out of the careful tenets of the humanist
educational process,30 or as individual, untouchable warrior and head of state, owing
allegiance to no one.
Henry VIII appears to suspend this struggle in favor of one extreme—full
identification as a singularity—in his pursuit and punishment of Thomas More. In his
defense of himself, More also defends Lanham‘s idea of rhetorical man31—one created
through the constant oscillation of a central (sacred) and a social (secular) self, an
oscillation that, when viewed with the same attention used to view simultaneous
narratives, may reveal the morally significant but tangled stages of an identity in
construction. More offers himself as the model on which to practice this viewing method,
as he had earlier offered Richard III and his History‘s ensemble cast. His unwillingness to
divulge his own conscience becomes an invitation for his interrogators to re-familiarize
themselves with what consciousness is, with the awkward, disordered, often guilty and
always interactive process by which it is constructed.
It would seem that interrogators of student plagiarists could also benefit from refamiliarizing themselves, and their students, with the same process. Lanham warns that
once education ―has become simply instrumental, the clear, brief, and sincere
transmission of neutral fact from one neutral entity to another, it loses its numinosity and
then its power …. If you pursue only clarity, you guarantee obscurity. And people lose
30

Humanists like More and Erasmus hoped that Henry VIII ―would inaugurate a golden age‖ (Fleisher 63).
Such hopes were quickly dashed.
31
Though it should perhaps be noted that Lanham himself aligns More with Plato, Peter Ramus and others
who ―despised‖ rhetoric as ―a series of ad hoc fixes‖ divorced from human reason (57). The bulk of the
History of Richard III appears to refute this claim.
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their vital interest in language …‖ (Electronic 83). Bakhtin makes a similar point when
he reminds us that ―[d]iscourse lives, as it were, beyond itself, in a living impulse toward
the object; if we detach ourselves completely from this impulse all we have left is the
naked corpse of the word, from which we can learn nothing at all about the social
situation or the fate of a given word in life‖ (Dialogic 292). In a world where more and
more people have access to information-sharing technology, to literacy tools and to
language itself, it seems absurd that people would lose their interest in language and its
impact in life, as absurd as the informed but ineffectual consensus of the masses in
More‘s History, who are exposed to discourse after revelatory discourse, but who have
lost the link between information and interest, transparency and action, instinct and
critical consciousness. More sends the message that the availability of the means for
connection (for his audience, through printing, schooling, nationalism, and/or shared
religious beliefs) by no means guarantees the ability to communicate at the same time as
he keeps alive ―the possibility that multiple invisible interactions were introduced by a
silent communications system‖ as well as ―the possibility of social ‗action at a distance‘‖
(Eisenstein 150).32 E-communication suggests similar if not identical possibilities, but
More can help us recognize that this action must be catalyzed by an appropriate attitude
toward social identity and responsibility along with the necessary readiness to confront
the real life obscurity of any discourse. The concepts of sacred/secular selves,
simultaneous identities, and social action at a distance certainly complicate any definition
of Academic Honesty, but they could also reinvigorate the Composition classroom, as
32

Eisenstein does not fully define this phrase or explain what this action might look like. Her main point is
that even ―a singularly impersonal medium‖ (148) such as print nevertheless ―did create a new kind of …
reading public … composed of silent and solitary individuals who were often unknown to each other‖ but
who nevertheless proved capable of interaction (149).
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More‘s final speeches about conscience and his History of Richard III are reinvigorated
by more pronounced attention to his experiments with simultaneous narrative. If More‘s
efforts are disorienting, they are also valuable in delivering a more accurate illustration of
the collectivity involved in any ‗self‘-expression and the accountability affixed to any
inventive intelligence.33 This is an important lesson for students and teachers today, as
the debate continues about what kinds of expressions are valuable and/or useful, what
kinds of selves—public or private, split or simultaneous, irresponsible or without
excuse—are in play, inside the classroom and out.

33

Prescott seems to agree when she suggests that More‘s work ―anticipates many postmodern concerns and
he shared with many of us at the start of a new century the sense that if we are to find our way in this
world, and make it more humane, we will need collaboration more than self-esteem or pride of authorship;
a multiplicity of voices more than closed ears; paradox more than single-minded smugness; attention to the
margins, not just to the centers of wealth or power; and wariness of the words by which we can slither into
lies and self-delusion‖ (239).
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Chapter Two
Duck, Rabbit, or Other ―Wyld Beast?‖ The Interinvolvement of Audience
Perception and Rhetorical Seduction in the Works of Edmund Spenser

―but bon that once had written bin, / Was raced out, and Mal was now put in‖ (V.ix.26).1

1. Seduction and Repulsion: Spenser and 24-hour News
Chapter one has explored Thomas More‘s work as an illustration of, and perhaps
a warning against, the manner in which an audience may be paradoxically seduced and
repulsed by a rhetorical argument. Spenser examines the same kind of paradox in The
Faerie Queene, and he provides perhaps a fuller explanation of how this process of
seduction and repulsion works. Though Spenser has traditionally been labeled a
conservative poet, critics have alluded to the presence in his work of a skeptical or
―contradictory sense of authority‖ (Highley 15) as well as ―serious criticisms of the very
notions of Britain and Britishness‖ (Hadfield 585).2 Andrew Hadfield goes as far as to

1

All quotations from The Faerie Queene. Ed. A.C. Hamilton, London: Pearson Education, 2001.
See also David Norbrook, Poetry and Politics in the English Renaissance; Mary Ellen Lamb; Richard
Chamberlain.
2
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say that ―The Faerie Queene is a poem which appears to make an explicit rejection of the
sovereignty and independence of England‖ (Hadfield 585). Such a claim radicalizes
Spenser‘s design and his very ambition to ―fashion a gentlemen‖ to serve a court that
appears increasingly unable to maintain the coherence of its authority. Of course, in a
poem in which Elizabeth is represented by several inconsistently admirable figures, it is
hardly inconceivable that the poem might as well include the indisputable
acknowledgement and endorsement of British sovereignty on top of its ―explicit
rejection.‖3 And Spenser is by no means alone in such ambiguity. Alan Sinfield explains
how
[t]he inter-involvement of resistance and control is systemic: it derives
from the way language and culture get articulated. Any utterance is
bounded by the other utterances that the language makes possible. Its
shape is the correlative of theirs: as with the duck/rabbit drawing, when
you see the duck the rabbit lurks round its edges, constituting an
alternative that may spring into visibility. Any position supposes its
intrinsic op-position. All stories comprise within themselves the ghosts of
the alternative stories they are trying to exclude. It does not follow
therefore, that the outcome of the interinvolvment of resistance and
control must be the incorporation of the subordinate. (47)
The last point is especially important for a discussion of the later books of the Faerie
Queene; book V in particular is composed almost entirely of instances of brutal
subordination, yet Artegall can hardly be said to contain fully or effectively the forms of
resistance he encounters. Artegall too is subject to ―the way language and culture get
articulated,‖ and his greatest challenges are not physical, but rhetorical. This seems true

3

See David Baker, who suggests that ―Britishness, for Spenser, was not so much a coherent identity as an
ongoing predicament …‖ (―Uses‖ 196). Judith Anderson also remarks on Spenser‘s ambiguity and the
ways in which ―The Faerie Queene contains perceived threats to its own assumptions and conditions of
meaning; that is, it includes and ambivalently attempts to control them‖ (Words 167). See also Dissing
Elizabeth: Negative Representations of Gloriana, ed. Julia Walker.
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as well for Scudamore, for Triamond and Cambell, and for the poet himself, who must
encounter, by the end of the last completed book, his most crafty foe, the Blatant Beast.
In these later books, and in The View of the State of Ireland, Spenser provides a
model for unapologetically delivering an extreme ideological position that nevertheless
invites the consideration of perspectives that may indirectly undermine that position—
indirectly, because these perspectives are not necessarily contradictory in the sense of
being the reverse extreme. (A duck is not the opposite of the rabbit, nor is a rabbit the
opposite of the duck.4) Rather, they are oppositional in the sense Sinfield describes as
lurking alternatives that may ―spring into visibility.‖ Inevitably, something else must
wander into the boundaries of any ―original‖ or initial view, something that may increase
or even generate the seductive influence of that view. This particular strategy of
seduction is explicated by Baudrillard: ―To be seduced is to be diverted from one‘s truth.
To seduce is to divert the other from his truth. This truth then becomes the secret that
escapes him‖ (Selected Writings 160). Seduction is essentially defined as the process by
which we find, as the seduced, or expose, as the seducers, truths/secrets to lose.
Arguably it was Spenser‘s experiences in Ireland that positioned him to
emphasize in his poetry the harder-to-follow rhetorical conflicts, the disorientingly
seductive processes by which language and culture get articulated. Living outside the
immediate vicinity of the crown, Spenser‘s ―feelings of displacement in Ireland were also
interwoven … with ones of opportunity‖ (Highley 14), for he was better placed to reflect
on the efforts of the monarchy to spread Englishness abroad. Registered in 1598,

4

See the image above, originally published by Joseph Jastrow in ―The Mind‘s Eye,‖ Popular Science
Monthly 54 (1899): 299-312. Accessed 23 February 2010 at
http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~kihlstrm/JastrowDuck.htm.
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Spenser‘s View of the State of Ireland directly participates in the question of English
colonialism, and while it has been read as an apology for the brutal subjugation of Irish
culture, the dialogue also registers a profound ambivalence about England‘s capacity to
impose its own law effectively and to resist the influence of the customs and rituals it
condemned as savage. This is close to what David Baker means when he says that the
View‘s ―potential for disruption … must lie elsewhere‖ than in its exposure of English
violence against Ireland (―Border Crossings‖ 69). Baker argues that, as brutally
straightforward as some of Irenius‘ statements seem to be, the View ―could not look like
the self-consistent statement of English right to rule that the Privy Council would
demand‖ (―Border Crossings‖ 73); Spenser, ―fully conscious of the ‗secret‘ implications
of his own text,‖ established that he ―at once believed, and denied that he believed, and
allowed himself to intimate, that [English] law had reached a point of almost total
collapse …‖ (―Border Crossings‖ 72).
This is hardly straightforward conservatism, this experimentation with the
exposure of ideology closely followed by the reinforcement of the same ideological
points.5 The View instead performs as a warning about how awareness can function ―as
the most seductive tool in ideology‘s arsenal‖ (Huehls 66), and how ―knowledge can too
easily become complicity, not power‖ (Huehls 78). According to Baker, it is when
Spenser attacks native Irish law most vociferously that English common law appears
most ―self-canceling and incoherent‖ and even ―suspiciously akin to the native law it

5

Mitchum Huehls covers a similar experimentation in postmodern texts. He provides the example of a
contemporary film whose plot revolves around corporatism, painting advertisers as scandalously greedy,
though rather remarkably easy to outwit, while including ―real‖ advertisements from ―real‖ companies
throughout the film. Huehls explains how each real-life ad ―consciously uses our recognition of its
hypocrisy against us, convincing us that we know enough of the game to feel comfortable participating in
it—convincing us that our recognition of its illusions is tantamount to our knowledge of them‖ (61-2).
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claimed to displace‖ (―Border Crossings‖ 72). The ideology of English colonialism
appears so transparently, via Irenius, that it thereby announces its violently manipulative
strategy outright. But the View only purports to be about justifying English colonialism,
for it suggests at the same time that colonization is a doomed enterprise, leaving
audiences in a kind of no man‘s land, asked both to support and oppose an ideological
exertion that has been exposed as insecure and unstable.6
The effect is that audiences are asked to focus less on the question of English
violence and more on their own complicity in the articulation of a questionably
operational ideology. The way language and culture get articulated is a mixed up,
ambiguous process even when it seems most blatantly straightforward—e.g. when a
dialogue about the subjugation of Irish cultural traditions by a superior system of English
force and resolve turns into the sly presentation of that system‘s faults and flaws, yet
manages to invite persuasively and even flatteringly (while more than a little
distastefully) audience complicity anyway.
Spenser seems very interested in this process of articulation as well as in the idea
of himself as the articulator. Baker‘s thesis of the View in particular implies a masterful,
if disorienting, rhetorical skill on Spenser‘s part.7 Like Thomas More sixty years earlier,
Spenser finds himself in possession of truths difficult to translate unambiguously. The
View can hardly be read as the news of the day; there is too much of the spectacle about

6

This is close to what Norbrook means when he says that ―Spenser problematises the act of reading,
discouraging his audience from taking the interpretations they are offered immediately on trust …. The
enormous self-consciousness of the poem is designed to reinforce the didactic aim of fashioning a
gentleman, not to undermine it,‖ but this reinforcement may only arrive after ―deep suspicion of false
resolutions, of deceptive claims to transcendence …‖ (Poetry 111).
7
Writing on The Faerie Queene, Lamb remarks on the ―strenuous labor required from the readers as well
as the writer …. To an extent not possible for a play, a primary subject of Spenser‘s Faerie Queene is the
process by which it is read‖ (163).
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it, most evidenced in the oft-quoted passages that detail the Munster rebellion, the
aftermath of which brought such ―extremitie of famine‖ to the Irish, which, Irenius is
quick to point out, ―they themselves had wrought‖ (Spenser 102). Elsewhere, Irenius
describes a scene ―at the execution of a notable traytor at Limericke … [where] I saw an
old woman, which was his foster-mother, take up his head, whilst he was quartered, and
sucked up all the blood that runne thereout, saying, that the earth was not worthy to
drinke it, and therewith also steeped her face and breast, and tore her haire, crying out
and shrieking most terribly‖ (66). But Baker points out that even the most spectacularly
ghastly scenes in the View ―emerg[e] as the conclusion of a distinct historiographical
argument‖ (―Uses‖ 200):
This shrieking mother implies a widespread disruption; what she
demonstrates for Spenser is the ―Britishness‖ of her protest. Her howls
resonate with other voices that can be heard across the Irish Sea, in Wales,
in Gaul, in Scotland, all linked by a history of crisscrossing traditions that
disperse challenges to English authority around the British Isles and
beyond. (―Uses‖ 200)
Excerpted, Irenius‘ language may be excruciatingly monologic, but put alongside his
discussions of the unsuccessful imposition of English law, plus the degenerative tendency
of the old English to take on Irish customs, like a contagion ―which could never since be
cleane wyped away‖ (69-70), along with what Baker calls Spenser‘s ―historiographical
and retrospective‖ project to recover a British past (―Uses‖ 200), Irenius‘ language takes
on a dialogism almost despite itself. No matter what the View implies is Spenser‘s
ultimate position on the necessary treatment of the stubborn Irish, it undeniably extends
an invitation to examine the English/Irish problem with a critical and careful attention
that is not dismissed effectively even in those moments when the View‘s brutal
indifference seems most transparent.
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Spenser‘s pattern of vaguely-concealed subversion must feel uncomfortably
familiar in the present era of 24-hour ―news‖ programs, which exist perpetually in the
unreliable no-man‘s-land of infotainment, but which also manage to take on a dialogism
despite familiar complaints that ―[t]hose who dominate the mainstream media channels
do not engage the public in meaningful conversation‖ and that ―[e]mpty communication
… is now a routine part of the political landscape‖ (Whillock 6). ―The overwhelming
conclusion,‖ some contend, ―is that the media generally operate in ways that promote
apathy, cynicism, and quiescence, rather than active citizenship and participation‖
(Gamsen et al. 373). Recent studies of specific news programs such as Bill O‘Reilly‘s
No-Spin Zone find instances of propaganda, purposefully unresolved tensions, the
promotion of ―undercurrent[s] of fear‖ and the general use of rhetorical strategies that
―pla[y] on a primal human emotion to attract and maintain viewers‖ (Conway et al. 21415), rather than educate and inform them. And yet, few of even the most ideologically
motivated newscasters or pundits would deny that their essential purpose is to
communicate the ―truth,‖ even as skeptical critics question their ability to communicate
anything at all.8
O‘Reilly in particular provides a good example of the careful use of what Bakhtin
calls monologic or unitary language, which he describes as ―an expression of the
centripetal forces of language‖ that ―at every moment of its linguistic life … is opposed
to the realities of heteroglossia‖ (Dialogic 270). O‘Reilly‘s rhetoric is often synonymous

8

An equally critical motivation, of course, is to increase ratings and make money. Diana Mutz and Byron
Reeves quote O‘Reilly‘s acknowledgement that ―[i]f a producer can find someone who eggs on
conservative listeners to spout off and prods liberals into shouting back, he's got a hit show. The best host is
the guy or gal who can get the most listeners extremely annoyed over and over and over again‘‖ (13).

80

with his rather narrow world view, but his language is nevertheless not immune from ―the
realities of heteroglossia,‖ however stridently opposed to them. Bakhtin reminds us that
[e]very utterance participates in the ―unitary language‖ (in its centripetal
forces and tendencies) and at the same time partakes of social and
historical heteroglossia (the centrifugal, stratifying forces). Such is the
fleeting language of a day, of an epoch, a social group, a genre, a school
and so forth. It is possible to give a concrete and detailed analysis of any
utterance, once having exposed it as a contradiction-ridden, tension-filled
unity of two embattled tendencies in the life of language. (Dialogic 272)
We might add Fox News and English common law to Bakhtin‘s list of fleeting languages,
the tensions and contradictions of the latter exposed by Spenser‘s artistic labors, those of
the former exposed by any vigilant watcher/reader of almost any of its most well-known
programs. Jon Stewart, host of The Daily Show on Comedy Central, has made such
vigilance a staple of his broadcast, but he provides an imitable model available to anyone
with a DVR, or even just a good memory. On August 19th, 2009, for example, Stewart
showed a clip of a self-congratulatory O‘Reilly reminding his viewers on August 10th
that, in covering health care protests at town hall meetings, ―we don‘t describe the
protestors as loons.‖ Stewart then cut to a past clip from September 2004 in which
O‘Reilly alludes to ―surveys‖ which show that ―most protestors are simply loons.‖ Before
showing more excerpts in which O‘Reilly refers to protestors as ―sore losers‖ who ―can‘t
control their emotions,‖ Stewart remarks on the irony that ―the entire Fox network
seemed to have a somewhat less charitable view of protestors … every time in history
except for now‖ (―Fox News: the New Liberals‖). One of Stewart‘s more recent catches
came after Fox News host Sean Hannity used old file footage from a crowded
conservative political rally on September 12th, 2009, to document the live event of a more
sparsely attended GOP-endorsed health care rally on November 9th (―Sean Hannity‖).
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Both examples support the possibility that even the most ideologically extreme
rhetoric of assertion, the kind of unitary language that appears to suppress any
oppositional response, may inevitably invite just such a response.9 Nor must these
responses consist of clean reversals from one extreme viewpoint to its opposite. Derek
Attridge discusses in detail the experience of re-encountering older texts,
however familiar to me, [that] can always strike me with the force of
novelty if, by means of a creative reading that strives to respond fully to
the singularity of the work in a new time and place, I open myself to its
potential challenge. Rather than the familiar model of the literary work as
friend and companion, sharing with the reader its secrets, I propose the
work as stranger, even and perhaps especially when the reader knows it
intimately. (26)
A faithful viewer who watches Fox News devote its coverage to praising the moral
courage of government protestors but who remembers or reencounters earlier coverage
lambasting or dismissing government protestors is not faced with an easy judgment
between cleanly contrasting perspectives. The ―potential challenge‖ is greater than that.
Stewart implies that Fox News has simply reversed its position with the installation of a
new U.S. president, embracing everything it used to attack. But the examples above result
from nothing so simple as a conversion process, and Fox News is representative of much
more than just a transparent hypocrisy. Stewart‘s straight-man jibes notwithstanding, Fox
News is engaged in the construction of a delicate and entirely nonlinear narrative
sequence that must shore up an increasingly fragile and less internally or logically
persuasive ideology. The work involved in discovering the channel‘s hypocrisy, if one is

9

See William A. Gamson, David Croteau, William Hoynes, & Theodore Sasson. The authors agree that
this kind of language may be revisited as a ―many-voiced, open text that can and often is read
oppositionally, at least in part‖ (373). ―Even an uneven contest on a tilted playing field is a contest,‖ they
explain. ―Moreover, great success in getting one's preferred meanings featured prominently in media
discourse does not ensure dominance in the meaning constructed by readers‖ (382-83).
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inclined to cast any kind of backward glance, is hardly work at all, as Stewart ably
demonstrates on at least a weekly basis. The question becomes, in combination with the
invitation to recognize blatant hypocrisy and bias, what additional labor such a channel
encourages its viewers to perform. It probably also makes sense to ask, given Fox News‘
increasingly impressive ratings, how it manages to make such labor so attractive.
In their study of O‘Reilly, Conway et. al. found that ―fear was a dominant frame
in O‘Reilly‘s discussion of issues … in over half (52.4 percent) of the commentaries,‖
and that ―[w]hen O‘Reilly invoked the fear frame, he offered resolution to the threat in
only 1 percent of cases‖ (207). O‘Reilly leaves out what the authors of the study identify
as a traditional journalistic value: the restoration of order principle, designed to soothe
fears after initially magnifying them (201); they conclude that O‘Reilly‘s ―rhetoric has
potential to instill concern—perhaps even panic and fear—in the audience,‖ with little
hope left over for the possibility of working solutions to answer this concern (207).
O‘Reilly is just one of Fox‘s most recognizable hosts who routinely link President
Obama to a dangerous progressivism that will do nothing less than destroy American
values, while continuing to insist that America is the greatest country in the world. 10 But
how can the United States be the greatest country in the world and in danger of
annihilation by its own democratically elected leader? How can American citizens be the
strongest in the world, and also ―loons‖? How can Glenn Beck love his country so much
while distrusting so many of the people who actually work inside its government? When
10

Sean Hannity‘s program, Hannity’s America, which ran throughout the 2008 presidential campaign
before being replaced in 2009 with Hannity, provides perhaps the best example of fear-mongering in
combination with a sometimes oddly belligerent patriotism. Michael Massing writes of Hannity‘s ―nightly
campaign to depict [Obama] as a treacherous enemy of the people, who, if allowed to take office, would
subvert every value and tradition Americans hold dear‖ (15). Hannity‘s colleague Glenn Beck sets a similar
tone, and though his populist position requires a broader target, his criticisms of Obama are equally
aggressive.
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media figures consistently repeat such tense contradictions, they are engaged in the same
kind of seductive secret-revealing process as Spenser engages in his View. We do not
watch Fox News because we are convinced by the ―fair and balanced‖ reporting—indeed,
how could we be? Instead, we respond to the secret(s) (not) revealed about the
unreliability of political power, the inconsistency of patriotism, the vulnerability of the
economy and the general insecurity of democracy as a world-stabilizing practice. These
are the ―truths‖ that even the most loyally conservative viewers must find to lose.

2. Seduction and Ideology: the Fantasy of the Network
Rather than dismissively call out the blatant hypocrisy of Fox News, a better
approach requires that we look past its obvious duplicity to its less transparent rhetorical
strategies, those that allow O‘Reilly to change his tune about protestors and Hannity to
substitute past footage for a live event, neither suffering any damaging consequences.
Fox News takes full advantage of what Rita Raley identifies as the Electronic Empire, the
inner workings of which, Raley suggests, can best be understood by ―the figure of the
network, that which subtends the organic and the nonorganic. The inchoate,
indeterminate abyss beyond the long twentieth century may … best be articulated in
terms of the electronic network, that which writes, coordinates, and implements its own
rules of operation‖ (120-21). Raley explains further how a network ―is by nature a
counternetwork and thereby embodies contradiction, internal contest, and multiplicity‖
(126). It is ―not only neither organic nor whole, but arguably not even a system at all.
Rather, it is a loose assemblage of relations characterized by another set of terms:
flexibility, functionality, mobility, programmability, and automation‖ (132). Finally, and
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perhaps most importantly, networks ―are by nature connective, suggestive of traceable
and identifiable affiliations, alliances, and group politics, and their connective tissues
provide a fantasy of community, of sociality, of collectives, of utopias‖ (132). It is this
last feature that Fox News most exploits, and it happens to provide a reasonable
explanation for why Hannity‘s use of false footage might actually enhance his credibility
rather than undermine it. In his apology to viewers, Hannity claimed the use of the
footage was inadvertent; in an Electronic Empire such an excuse may be not only
credible but also reassuring, for it reinforces the fantasy of community and connectivity
that a (counter)network provides. So what if the footage was wrong? Hannity might have
said. Such a mistake is simply an indication of how close-knit and committed is Fox
News to its constituents, that a piece of footage is not simply lost in the abyss of our fastpaced Electronic Empire, too quickly displaced by the new news of the day; rather, it
comes around again to remind hosts and viewers alike of its presence and continuing
significance, not just as a story, but as proof of the hyper-functionality of a news station
so appreciative of, in-touch with, and only occasionally disoriented by, the way
information really and truly circulates in this postmodern world.
Fox News is exemplary of a postmodern imagination which makes every effort to
conceive of the world, along with the news about the world, as a powerfully intimidating
but ultimately inclusive network. Occasionally and perhaps inevitably, news anchors
register their dispiriting bewilderment with a ―system‖ which is really no system at all,
whose connections are never concrete but only suggestive. The real work inflicted on the
Fox News audience involves nothing less than concretizing those seductive suggestions
put to them by their favorite hosts, and it is fair to say they have risen to the challenge,
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answering O‘Reilly‘s cranky doom-and-gloom and Beck‘s teary distress with the highspirited exuberance of Tea Party protests and the alarming passion of Town Hall
meetings. Suggestive connections between Obama and Hitler, and between individuals
who allege a connection between Obama and Hitler, are made to appear all the more
concrete when hundreds of protestors are holding photoshopped signs of the president in
Nazi paraphernalia.11
Rising to a challenge is not necessarily equivalent to meeting that challenge,
however, and it is with this point that we may finally return to Spenser and the sixteenth
century.

3. Seduction and Advancement: the Network in the Sixteenth Century
Similarly to Raley, Jonathan Sawday and Neil Rhodes argue that ―certain aspects
of the [modern] computer create a bewildering sense of fragmentation and disorder, while
others, working in conjunction with political, economic and environmental processes,
reinstate an awareness of a global network, a sense of universal interconnectedness …‖
(13). Sawday and Rhodes go on to make the connection between the modern electronic
age and the ―new social structure emerging‖ in the sixteenth-century: ―a public arena, a
place of uncontrollable and noisy debate, dispute, and exchange‖ (6), tempered in part by
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See the image above, attributed to the Lyndon LaRouche Political Action Committee, accessed 23
February 2010 from http://www.larouchepac.com/node/11422. It is worth noting that the comparisons
LaRouche draws between Obama and Hitler are not at all suggestive; they are explicit. Conservative
bloggers took issue with what they saw as attempts by the mainstream media to blame Right-wing
commentator Rush Limbaugh for inventing the Obama/Nazi image, when all the evidence pointed to
LaRouche‘s website. But Rachel Sklar points out that ―there is a clear link‖ between obvious supporters of
LaRouche, carrying their pre-made posters, and Rush Limbaugh referring to Obama‘s ―Brownshirts,‖
between Sarah Palin facebooking about ―death panels‖ and ―Chuck Grassley talking about ‗pulling the
plug on Grandma.‘ They may not pass out the same posters, but make no mistake of it, those messages are
linked.‖
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technological advances that fostered the ―concept of the book of nature as a giant
intertext of multiple connections and allusions‖ aided by a ―rhetorical programme of
sixteenth-century pedagogy [that] involved the dismemberment and dislocation of texts‖
while also ―encourag[ing] their relocation and re-membering—or, to be explicitly
rhetorical, their reconfiguration‖ (13). Sawday and Rhodes suggest that the Renaissance
too experimented with the idea of the world as a (counter)network, a seductive system
that invited exploration, encouraged the fantasy of connectivity, but inevitably inspired
dispute, dissension, and uncertainty.
Along with print-based technological advances, the Renaissance saw
groundbreaking progress in the area of cartography. 12 Donald Kimball Smith argues that
―[t]he consumption of maps, their viewing and comprehension, made available to their
audience new possibilities of imaginative control‖ (42). This new ―cartographic
imagination‖ allowed for ―the possibility of imagining the entire country as a knowable,
even intimate, space …, and it allowed the whole nation to be organized and spatially
imagined‖ (Smith 62). These advances in mapmaking trickled down, according to Smith,
so that for any average citizen his ―country became not simply an abstract social and
political entity of which he was a part but a physical whole which he could imaginatively
encompass and manipulate‖ (68). However, Smith cautions that ―by turning the world
into a text that can be read, these maps also enable it to be re-read, re-interpreted, and rewritten‖ (69). The cartographic imagination worked in conjunction with other changes in

12

The correlation of information circulation and geography continues today. Debbie Lee and Tim Fulford
point out that ―the Internet is referred to in the same geo-political terms that the British empire was‖ (9). It
―has become a geographical construction … characterized with terms like ‗domain,‘ ‗site,‘ ‗worldwide,‘
‗cyberspace,‘ and ‗dead zone,‘ while [Bill] Gates and Microsoft are increasingly referred to with terms like
‗expansion,‘ ‗conquer,‘ and ‗domination‘‖ (4).
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information gathering, processing, and especially manipulating, such that the promise of
―universal interconnectedness‖ became less of a given and more of an expressed call to
action, a mass effort, among the increasing number of participants enveloped by
sixteenth-century developments in technology, to make it so; but individual efforts to
prove the existence of a network of connections through re-readings and reinterpretations say more about the individual readings themselves—their flexibility,
mobility, automation, etc.—than they do about the ―system‖ that supposedly organizes
them.
In recent years, Fredric Jameson has described such efforts as ―degraded
attempt[s] … to think the impossible totality of the contemporary world system‖ (38). In
his explanation of the ―postmodern hyperspace‖ that ―has finally succeeded in
transcending the capacities of the individual human body to locate itself, to organize its
immediate surroundings perceptually, and cognitively to map its position in a mappable
external world‖ (44), he comments on the ―‗high-tech paranoia‘‖ that imagines ―some
immense communicational and computer network‖ that operates by ―a complexity often
beyond the capacity of the normal reading mind‖ (38). The concept of a powerful yet
broadly conceivable network becomes a kind of shorthand for ―that enormous and
threatening, yet only dimly perceivable, other reality of economic and social institutions‖
that has arrived with global capitalism (38). Some of even the most intimidating
conspiracy theories promise the existence of a centrally located power source, a place to
which all of the network‘s connections may be traced. The threat of the network that is by
nature the counternetwork may be downplayed by reinforcing the fantasy that all of its
dots do connect, that they all trace back to a single, and therefore vulnerable, source.
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If Renaissance audiences were not yet in the position to ponder such concepts as
postmodern hyperspace and global capitalism, their own experiences with technological,
informational and imperialistic developments did inspire similar efforts to ―think the
impossible totality‖ of their own world system; the concept of the (counter)network
arrives as one of the results of this effort. What Postmodern and Renaissance participants
face are seductive opportunities to support and oppose, simultaneously, specific
ideological perspectives that the necessarily tenuous conception of networking endorses.
In his View of the State of Ireland, Spenser roots out the fundamental naivety of the plan
for the establishment of universal interconnectedness between Ireland and England at the
same time as he hand-picks a precise strategy to accomplish it (albeit by the most ruthless
means possible). But it is in the later books of The Faerie Queene that he most deeply
invests himself in exploring the seductive appeal of accepting the network as the proper
representation of how language and culture get articulated, as well as the specific
rhetorical activities that this embrace of a network requires.

4. Seduction and Absence: the Network Versus the Abyss
We can see in the works of Spenser an attempt to represent both the fantasy of the
network as a system and the reality of the network as a counternetwork, a non-system. To
mask the essential disconnection of the counternetwork, the longed-for connectivity and
collectivity of the network—that truth we have found to lose—must be skillfully
simulated. In book IV of The Faerie Queene, Spenser attempts to manifest this
connective effort through the character of Scudamore, who, in canto x, relates the story of
his journey through the Temple of Venus. Scudamore successfully passes through to the
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center of Venus‘ network of authority, but his own labors, though they are initially
presented as natural and intuitive, appear increasingly manufactured and artificial as his
narrative proceeds. The threat of the counternetwork returns even as Scudamore most
directly and successfully approaches his goal—the abduction of Amoret.
As he seizes Amoret, Scudamore draws his listeners‘ attentions to Venus herself,
who appears at the center of the Temple‘s network of power and authority, but who
remains conspicuously silent and impassive, apart from the mysterious smile she directs
toward Scudamore as he leads Amoret away:
Whom when I saw with amiable grace
To laugh at me, and favour my pretence,
I was emboldned with more confidence,
And nought for niceness nor for envy sparing,
In presence of them all forth led her thence,
All looking on, and like astonisht staring,
Yet to lay hand on her, not one of all them daring. (IV.x.56)
Earlier, Scudamore describes the appearance of Venus in detail; her most distinguishing
feature is, of course, that she is a hermaphrodite, one who ―hath both kinds in one, / Both
male and female, both under one name: / She syre and mother is her selfe alone, / Begets
and eke conceives, ne needeth other none (iv.x.41). 13 Surrounded by worshippers, one of
the lovers at Venus‘ feet goes so far as to credit her with creating the world (47). It is this
world-making Venus who appears to favor Scudamore‘s endeavors. He fancies himself a
superior reader of the hermaphrodite‘s silent gestures. In doing what no one else dares to
do, Scudamore draws himself as the one exception to a rule that every other figure in the
Temple must follow. And we might be willing to believe him exceptional, if we did not
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See the image above, accessed through commons.wikipedia.org, 23 February 2010. This statue of
Hermaphroditus is located in the Istanbul Museum of Archaeology, dated from the third century B.C.E,
Pergamon. The photograph is attributed to Giovanni Dall'Orto, 28 May 2006.
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know what we already do about Amoret and Scudamore‘s future separation and the
latter‘s inability to rescue his new bride from Busirane. Here Scudamore manages to
build up Venus as an impenetrable figure, untouchable in her complexity and selfsufficiency, right before he proceeds to do nothing less than penetrate her circle, grab her
adopted daughter, and assume his own self-sufficiency in interpreting her favoring laugh.
The hermaphrodite is a perfect emblem for the fantasy-enabling network; it
provides an impressively intimate model of the natural connective tissues imagined to
constitute the network‘s ―body.‖ And the fact that the hermaphrodite has ―both kinds in
one,‖ that it is not just any body, makes its positioning in Scudamore‘s narrative more
strategically seductive. It is a body that announces its organically systematized
materiality simultaneously with its indeterminably unpredictable flexibility. Undeniably,
Scudamore‘s hermaphrodite Venus is a manufactured image, a posited suggestion that
Scudamore simulates in material form. That this Venus is virtually silent increases our
suspicion that she is not the true power center to whom all things trace back. By denying
her any language or gesture that favors anything but his own endeavors, Scudamore
exposes his entire narrative as a form of monologic, unitary language, the kind that
presumes to be absolute, perfectly unified, and uniquely capable of serving as the
―language of truth‖ (Morson & Emerson 315). Like O‘Reilly with his Talking Points,
Scudamore has been following the same rhetorical strategy from the beginning of his
monologue, ignoring any and all opportunities for dialogism. Bakhtin explains how ―[t]he
event of the life of the text always develops on the boundary between two
consciousnesses, two subjects‖ (Speech Genres 106). Furthermore, ―any word exists for
the speaker in three aspects: as a neutral word of a language, belonging to nobody; as an
91

other’s word, which belongs to another person and is filled with echoes of the other‘s
utterance; and, finally, as my word, for, since I am dealing with it in a particular situation
… it is already imbued with my expression‖ (Speech Genres 88). Scudamore certainly
speaks for himself, promising to deliver a complete narrative of his ―travel and long toil‖
for the benefit of his listeners, ―[m]y hard mishaps, that ye may learne to shonne‖
(IV.x.3). But Scudamore goes out of his way to silence any echoes of any ―other‘s word.‖
He cannot be entirely successful, for any utterance ―is a link in the chain of speech
communication, and it cannot be broken off from the preceding links that determine it …,
giving rise within it to unmediated responsive reactions and dialogic reverberations‖
(Bakhtin Speech Genres 94). Still, these reverberations are muffled. Scudamore‘s story,
populated as it is, flaunts its single-voicedness whenever possible. His success in muting
anyone he comes across in part serves to amplify himself and his own merit, but the
result of his effort, initially, is a kind of deafness to this merit on the part of his listeners.
This is Scudamore‘s story, and by the end of the canto—in which no one but Scudamore
has been give the chance to speak—he is talking to no one but himself.14
It is Cupid, whose shield Scudamore finds outside of the Temple, who could
potentially add some dialogism to Scudamore‘s narrative; he is the other—the link in the
chain—whose words ought to echo continuously behind the knight who carries his shield.
But Cupid, in fact, is the first voice Scudamore attempts to stifle. Scudamore begins his
narrative by boasting to his listeners of the trials he endured to abduct Amoret from her
14

Andrea Walkden‘s interpretation of Scudamore, while not complementary, is certainly comparable; she
argues that ―Scudamore's heroic pretensions are those of a minor character aspiring to the place of a major
one,‖ and that ―[b]y granting him a voice, Spenser … suggests that Scudamore may be at least partially
responsible for diminishing his own possibilities, that his marginalization represents a failure not of the
poem's design, but of his own imagination‖ (98). See also Jan Kouwenhoven, who suggests that
Scudamore‘s ―prominence [within his narrative] is almost vacuous,‖ and in the end ―the sheer objectivity of
his tale nearly extinguishes him as a ‗consciousness‘‖ (122).
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childhood home, but it is soon made clear that Scudamore was essentially a welcome
intruder into Venus‘ castle, despite his insistence that he engaged in activities that were
extraordinarily difficult at the same time as they led inevitably to success. Upon arriving
at what he calls ―the place of perill‖ (IV.x.5), Scudamore ―discovers,‖ in the middle of an
open field, the ―shield of Love‖ bearing what he considers an entirely transparent
inscription: ―Blessed the man that well can use his blis: / Whose ever be the shield, faire
Amoret be his‖ (IV.x.8). In picking up the shield, Scudamore believes that Amoret is as
good as his already. He has only to follow the route designed to lead him to her. But this
interpretation disguises Scudamore‘s own interpretive effort and his own role in
designing the route and the rules. If this is Love‘s shield, then the words belong to Cupid;
but in interpreting these words in the most simplistic and convenient way possible,
Scudamore seizes them for his own. And indeed, the remainder of Scudamore‘s
―perilous‖ journey is conveniently simple, so that the double-voicedness that initially
adheres to the shield is suspended as Scudamore‘s suspicious story continues. Through
obstacles that are hardly obstacles,15 he easily finds his way to Amoret, and it is only
Womanhood who speaks up when he lays a hand on the girl, rebuking him ―for being
over bold‖ (IV.x.54), before she is quickly and predictably silenced by Scudamore‘s
shield of Love.16

15

These include Doubt, who opens the door to him wide after seeing the shield; Delay, who threatens
Scudamore with, of all things, conversation; Daunger, who like Doubt stands aside as soon as Scudamore
reveals the familiar shield; Concord, who guides him gently ―twixt her selfe and Love,‖ mollifying Hate, on
her other side, so that Scudamore can pass through to the inner temple unharmed (IV.x.36).
16
Our focus continuously shifts so that Scudamore is scrutinized as a narrator, and we are encouraged ―to
toggle back and forth between AT and THROUGH vision, alternately to realize how the illusion is created
and then to fool [ourselves] with it again‖ (Lanham Electronic 81). Scudamore, however, makes it virtually
impossible for us to fool ourselves, so transparent is his denial of dialogism and his insistence on using
language that refers only to itself, that tries to serve as its own justification.
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Scudamore‘s annoyingly transparent efforts at self-aggrandizement encourage us
to dismiss him and his Temple as a fantasy-land inside which the lovelorn knight may
engage in increasingly preposterous miracles of wish-fulfillment. Canto x is Scudamore‘s
own Magical Kingdom, inside which his single-voiced self-promotions, his dreams, come
true; outside it, he seems to meet with nothing but failure.17 Scudamore‘s use of unitary
language is so persistent, his rhetoric so rehearsed, his images so superficial, they cohere
in the construction of a hyperreal reality. As Baudrillard explains it, ―the very definition
of the real is that of which it is possible to provide an equivalent reproduction‖ (Symbolic
Exchange 73), but in an age of simulation, ―the real is not only that which can be
reproduced, but that which is always already reproduced: the hyperreal‖ (Symbolic
Exchange 73). Venus the smiling, approving hermaphrodite provides the best evidence of
the hyperrealism of Scudamore‘s account, especially when we recall that the seduction of
the network as a system includes the promise of connection and collectivity while
necessitating the inevitable effort to simulate the network‘s connections in a manner that
exposes them as unnatural, disconnected, and artificial (the truth is lost as it is found).
Connections appear, simultaneously, as exposed (true) and manufactured (false). So
when Venus is exposed as a world-making hermaphrodite, the truth of the world as a
diverse and variously structured system linked to an accessible center is likewise

17

This puts Spenser the storyteller out on his own limb, and though he invites his listeners to accompany
him, we resist. But nor do we rest on the firmer ground promised by a confident skepticism. We find
ourselves instead in a kind of no-man‘s land, understanding, on the one hand, that the Temple provides an
escape from a hostile reality—so effective an escape that the poet must wait for a new canto to reintroduce
himself and this same reality, full as it is of ―pittie‖ and ―payne‖ and hopeless ladies in ―thraldomes
chayne,‖ and sadly void of sufficient miracles to relieve them immediately (IV.xi.1). But on the other hand,
we can see that the Temple is not so disconnected from the more real spaces and places of the Faerie
Queene after all. In other words, what goes on in the Temple—Scudamore‘s effort to stabilize his own
identity, his own voice, by destabilizing every other voice—goes on outside of it, too.
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exposed, but this very exposure can function just as convincingly, if disappointingly, as a
denial of the truth of an accessible center, which could never be accessed so suspiciously
and straightforwardly. For Scudamore, Venus is already reproduced; he knows what he
will find before he finds it.
To return to our contemporary connection, the Fox News crowd‘s images of
Obama/Hitler are also always already reproduced. In other words, the unaccompanied
and clearly photoshopped (false) image displaces any obvious efforts to argue the
connection. Arguments are unnecessary, as is any additional language beyond a
soundbite (What would the founding fathers do?) or an expletive (Liar!). Obama/Hitler
simply is Obama and Hitler, ―both kinds in one,‖ as Venus is. For many readers, the
understanding that these images have been obviously and even crassly manipulated
results in their immediate and inevitable rejection. But what does such rejection entail?
To what extent is it even possible? Considering again the duck/rabbit drawing, it is easy
enough to accept that this image includes both duck and rabbit, because at no point is the
viewer being asked to consider the possibility that actual, living ducks may morph into
rabbits, and vice versa. Yet many perceive that the implication carried by the
Obama/Hitler crowds is that Obama very well could morph into a fascist dictator, if he
hasn‘t already. But Obama/Hitler, it turns out, has nothing to do with either Obama or
Hitler, as hermaphrodite Venus has nothing to do with any Venus who appears elsewhere
in Spenser‘s poem or with any identifiable authority figure outside the poem, and as the
duck/rabbit has nothing to do with any living rabbit or duck. Each of these images

95

substantiates Baudrillard‘s assertion that, ultimately, ―there is no relationship between a
system of meaning and a system of simulation‖ (Selected Writings 212).18
But how much can this reinforcement of the division between the real and the
hyperreal help us, as readers both of Spenser‘s poem and of our own political
environments? Are we to dismiss the entirety of canto x as a lie, and dismiss Scudamore
as a liar? Are we to dismiss the hundreds of protestors who have carried Obama/Hitler
signs for the same reasons? Baudrillard would advise against this, as, I believe, would
Spenser. In his discussions on simulations and simulacra, Baudrillard suggests that our
more familiar magical kingdom, Disneyland, was in fact built ―to conceal the fact that it
is the ‗real‘ country,‖ and that it is consistently ―presented as imaginary in order to make
us believe that the rest is real … to conceal the fact that real childishness is everywhere‖
(Selected Writings 172). ―The Disneyland imaginary is neither true nor false‖ (Selected
Writings 172), Baudrillard argues, and neither is the Temple of Venus or anyone inside of
it. Taken into consideration with the entirety of Book IV, Scudamore‘s hyperreal reality
is hardly exceptional; indeed, his simulated environment casts a shadow of suspicion over
many of the spaces of Book IV and over many of the characters that occupy them,
bringing to mind Baudrillard‘s assertion that ―simulation is infinitely more dangerous
since it always suggests, over and above its object, that law and order themselves might
really be nothing more than a simulation‖ (Selected Writings 177).19

18

The images are similar to the opinion poll, which Baudrillard claims ―does not represent opinion, but
does the work of obscuring the lack of opinion in the nostalgic wish that opinion did still exist, that is, that
it pre-existed the representational regime that makes it. What is left is only the incessant and frantic
generation of a surface of signs, with no depth or perspective between the real and its representation‖
(Cormack 102).
19
So much is suggested in Spenser‘s View of the Present State of Ireland, which, as was stated above, was
not suppressed from publication because it revealed the disturbing secret of English brutality in Ireland and
then too-strenuously attempted to justify such force; rather, Spenser‘s View ―never encompassed the brutal
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Book IV, Spenser promises, is the book of friendship, but the model friendship
the poet delivers is so ambiguously constructed as to be impossible to imitate or
articulate, to reject or accept. The process whereby Cambell and Triamond become
companions seems as suspiciously rehearsed and badly staged as Amoret‘s abduction.
Before Cambina arrives with her magic wand to stop the long battle, Cambell and
Triamond fight to the point where ―life it selfe seemd loathsome‖ (III.36). Triamond in
fact has already ―died‖ twice, losing the souls of his two brothers. He and Cambell battle
in despair, past caring who wins or loses, lives or dies. Such a situation of equallymatched fighters doomed to a ceaseless conflict might be understandable, but the knights
are not in fact equally matched. Cambell is hardly fighting fair—the ring he wears ―did
not from him let one drop of blood to fall, but did restore his weakned powers, and dulled
spirits whet, through working of the stone therein yset‖ (24). To a lesser extent Triamond
also fights unfairly, fortified as he is by the souls of his defeated brothers. Even
considering a less literal and more allegorical reading of the knights‘ magical
reinforcements, they are nevertheless complicit in whatever despair they suffer.
Cambell‘s ring may restore his weakened powers, but it has no effect on his self-loathing,
which continues to increase. What we have is another suspiciously constructed situation
of peril that is presented to us in all seriousness, as Scudamore presents his narrative of
the Temple; it is a perilous ordeal that is entirely artificial at the same time as it is entirely
―real.‖ Cambell and Triamond have been seduced, and/or seduce themselves, into an

realities of English administration because for him they were neither brutal nor real‖ (Baker ―Border
Crossings‖ 68). Baker asks ―if what the View ‗revealed‘ was ‗not so much secrets, but secrecy itself‘ ….
Does the secret … always conceal—and thus potentially reveal—some ‗fact,‘ or is it sometimes that
‗secreting‘ itself creates the illusion that there ‗is‘ a ‗fact‘ ‗there‘ … to be concealed? And, if some ‗fact‘ is
concealed, is it truly hidden, or is it hidden precisely in order to elicit its own uncovering?‖ (―Border
Crossings‖ 69).
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unnecessarily complicated scenario; they are in large part responsible for inventing the
complications they are now despairing over, and the result is that the audience to their
conflict, like Scudamore‘s audience, is estranged from this process of seduction. We
cannot be fooled by it, for we have no place in it. Spenser makes this irrevocably clear at
the end of canto iii, when Cambina finally arrives in her lion-drawn chariot:
And as she passed through th‘unruly preace
Of people, thronging thicke her to behold,
Her angrie teame breaking their bonds of peace,
Great heapes of them, like sheepe in narrow fold,
For hast did over-runne, in dust enrould … (41)
Clearly the people who have been so far interested in the tournament have no place in the
reconciliation soon to be magically enforced by Cambina. Spenser sees to it that they do
not simply lose interest; rather they are violently excluded, literally trampled. Difficulties
are not resolved; they are merely run over, and enemies are just as abruptly and
uncomfortably transformed into friends, hate into love (45), as Cambina delivers her
drink, Nepenthe, ―devised by the Gods, for to asswage harts grief, and bitter gall away to
chace‖ (43). ―Who would not to this verture rather yield his voice?‖ (45), the poet asks
after describing the transformative powers of the miraculous drink. The answer is simple,
but the question itself is entirely out of place given what has just been described in the
canto. Yielding to the virtue described is not at all a matter of choice available to anyone,
as the question implies; it is available only to Triamond and Cambell. Everyone else has
been driven to ―rude confusion‖ (41). Almost at the same time as Spenser offers the
people a common voice, he silences the potential for this voice to speak. Readers,
meanwhile, must understand the kind of love Cambina introduces as impossibly difficult

98

to come by, even as it is described as a natural virtue to which anyone and everyone
would yield.
Spenser‘s model friendship thus collapses as a model, as does any hope of an
unequivocal directive as to how to accomplish such a friendship. Instead, we leave the
four friends enclosed, and closed off, in a ―perfect love‖ (52) that is as dubious as Venus‘
ingratiating smile. And like the hermaphrodite, they are exposed as simultaneously
accessible and inaccessible. Spenser‘s attempts to qualify this unsatisfactory conclusion
in the next canto are equally unsatisfying:
It often fals, (as here it earst befell)
That mortall foes doe turne to faithful frends,
And friends profest are chaungd to foemen fell:
The cause of both, of both their minds depends,
And th‘end of both likewise of both their ends.
For enmitie, that of no ill proceeds,
But of occasion, with th‘occasion ends;
And friendship, which a faint affection breeds
Without regard of good, dyes like ill grounded seeds. (IV.iv.1)
Spenser argues that Triamond and Cambell‘s capacity for friendship was inside the
friends all along, and that the change in attitude toward each other occurred as a result of
their own minds. Spenser cannot articulate what exactly it is that sparked such a change,
and he in fact absolves himself of the responsibility to try, suggesting only that the
specific occasion of the tournament required that Triamond and Cambell be enemies, and
that when that occasion ended, their natural feelings for each other were allowed to
manifest. The problem with this explanation is that it fails to coincide with what actually
occurred in the previous canto, for Triamond and Cambell‘s reconciliation was not there
described as wholly instinctive. Their minds, dubbed the controlling parties in the first
stanza of canto iv, are in the last stanzas of canto iii described as ―doubtfully distraught,‖
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and the men themselves stand ―astonisht‖ (48) as Cambina works her magic. More than
anyone, she and her very particular power deserve credit for the ―sudden change‖
between the two knights (49), so that Spenser‘s attempt to either generalize or properly
allegorize the situation falls flat.
What Spenser imposes on his audience here is a kind of false footage—his entire
explanation is a doomed attempt to fool himself into accepting as universal and inevitable
what he has only just illustrated as particular and contingent. His audience is invited to
fool themselves likewise, but how could they? Like Scudamore‘s audience, the poet‘s
readers are estranged from the process of seduction. Can we do anything more than look
in from the outside as the poet rewrites, right in front of us, what he has only just written?
We can, if we recall Baudrillard‘s theories on the strategy of seduction. In spite of his
failed narrative, we are uneasy about abandoning Scudamore so abruptly; we want to
witness the reunion (with Amoret) we are denied, as we want to believe in the perfect
love of the four friends at the end of canto iii. Neither Scudamore nor the poet are failures
under Baudrillard‘s definition of seduction. They are actually successes, for Baudrillard‘s
strategy of seduction ―consists in drawing the other within your area of weakness, which
will also be his or hers …. To seduce is to weaken. To seduce is to falter. We seduce with
weakness, never with strong powers and strong signs. In seduction we enact this
weakness, and through it seduction derives its power‖ (Selected Writings 162). Unlike
interpretation, seduction does not want ―to get beyond appearances … [G]etting beyond
appearances is an impossible task: inevitably every discourse is revealed in its own
appearance, and is hence subject to the stakes imposed by seduction, and consequently to
its own failure as discourse‖ (Selected Writings 150). Certainly we witness a failure of
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discourse in Scudamore‘s narrative. Our impulse may be to reject and expose it to
uncover the truth underneath its weakness. But what Spenser introduces is the prospect
that there is nothing underneath. Baudrillard at his most fatalistic warns us: ―We must not
wish to destroy appearances (the seduction of images). This project must fail if we are to
prevent the absence of truth from exploding in our faces …‖ (Selected Writings 154).20
Spenser risks such an explosion; he introduces the ―abyss of language‖
(Baudrillard Selected Writings 152), which readers must stand above in the silent gap
between cantos x and xi, knowing what should be there—the reunion of Scudamore and
Amoret—finding nothing in its place. ―The secret is to know how to make use of … the
absence of meaning‖ (Baudrillard Selected Writings 162). Such is the lesson Spenser
provides by denying a satisfactory love story for his knight of love. Explanations and
interpretations are less important than the appearances (and disappearances) we are
invited to examine. What occurs for the willing reader is a shift from her external
judgment as an interpreter unsatisfied with a too-self-conscious simulation to the internal
participation in a real abyss of language. ―In the reading of literature,‖ Attridge suggests,
―meaning is simultaneously formed and performed‖ once the text is understood to occur,
―in being read, as an intellectual-emotional event‖ (27). We find ourselves inside
Scudamore‘s magical kingdom, which we must accept, weakly drawn as it is. 21 The

20

Similarly, but less gloomily, Bakhtin reminds us: ―When we seek to understand a word, what matters is
not the direct meaning the word gives to objects and emotions—this is the false front of the word; what
matters is rather the actual and always self-interested use to which this meaning is put and the way it is
expressed by the speaker, a use determined by the speaker‘s position … and by the concrete situation. Who
speaks and under what conditions he speaks: this is what determines the word‘s actual meaning. All direct
meanings and direct expressions are false …‖ (Dialogic 401).
21
Cormack has much to say about what is ―unsettling about a theorist who can sanguinely formulate mass
compliance as a type of back-handed resistance …. The idea of a modern, suggestible mass is usually
conceptually tied in with more concrete images of the irrational and violent crowd or mob …. But these are
for Baudrillard early and crude manifestations of modern culture, in which the mass is passionately aroused
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alternative is the void, to which Spenser does abandon us, but not before exercising his
own attempt at seduction—namely, leaving out the reunion of Amoret and Scudamore.
Absent, existing only as an excised scene from Book III, the missing reunion is all the
more seductive, and as readers we desire it all the more, missing it in its absence.22 Our
desire for it is in fact emphasized when we recall Spenser‘s original conception of the
lovers‘ reunion: ―Had ye them seene, ye would have surely thought, / That they had
beene that faire Hermaphrodite, / … So seemd those two, as growne together quite …‖
(III.xii.46). Readers are encouraged to recall Spenser‘s specific language in the void
between cantos x and xi. The reunion of the lovers ―performs here as authoritative
discourse, and as internally persuasive discourse‖ (Bakhtin Dialogic 342). The discourses
of audience and poet, in other words, cohere. But Spenser anticipates what Bakhtin
describes as the inevitable process whereby authoritative discourse is no longer internally
persuasive—―[o]ne‘s own discourse and one‘s own voice, although born of another or
dynamically stimulated by another, will sooner or later begin to liberate themselves from
the authority of the other‘s discourse‖ (Dialogic 348). This process of liberation occurs
because ―the internally persuasive word is half-ours and half-someone else‘s. Its
creativity and productiveness consist precisely in the fact that such a word awakens new
and independent words …; this discourse is able to reveal ever newer ways to mean‖
(Dialogic 345-46). The image of the hermaphrodite, that intimidating and complexly
layered image that only the most exceptional may penetrate, returns as the perfect
representative of the interanimating relationships between words; what was a suspicious
and directed towards particular beliefs and actions in a world of charisma, propaganda and identification‖
(106).
22
―The secret of seduction,‖ Baudrillard says, is ―in movements whose slowness and suspense are poetic,
like a slow motion film of a fall or an explosion, because something has had, before fulfilling itself, the
time to be missed and this is, if there is such a thing, the perfection of ‗desire‘‖ (Selected Writings 163).
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image in Scudamore‘s self-aggrandizing narrative is re-accentuated as a profound symbol
of both the centrifugal and the centripetal forces of language—new and newer ways to
mean. Such is the task we are invited to set for ourselves. Recalling the absent image is
our way back into a text that has worked hard to exclude us, if only to make us aware of
the peril of that exclusion, which we could only confront in the void to which Spenser
abandons us, suspends us, then invites us to fill.

5. Seduction and Dialogism: Saving the Reality Principle
At stake in Spenser‘s invitation is what Baudrillard describes as the postmodern
problem of ―concealing the fact that the real is no longer real, and thus saving the reality
principle‖ (Selected Writings 172). By the end of Book IV Spenser is comfortable with
this communal effort, inviting his readers to oversee, with a veritable god-sight, the
marriage of the Thames and the Medway, which Richard Helgerson describes as an
exercise of ―sovereign will‖ (354), bringing together bodies of water that, in nature, do
not touch. The fantasy-connectivity of the (counter)network is simulated once more, and
most impressively.
The key to saving the reality principle so far has been language—the use of
particular rhetorical strategies that reinforce the existence of the (counter)network. In
Book V Spenser is still concerned with unitary language that makes itself suspicious,
exclusive, or incoherent, and if he seems to be more in favor of exclusion and
unintelligibility than he was in book IV, it perhaps shows how confident he has become
in exercising Baudrillard‘s strategy of seduction-by-weakness. For as intimidating,
forceful and violent as Artegall and his henchman Talus are, the immediate lessons
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supplied by Spenser‘s Knight of Justice are pedagogically and morally enfeebled. 23
Spenser uses weakness as a strategy to reactivate the communicative power of his work,
seeking an even more monologically authoritative exercise of influence to provoke
potentially more seductive opportunities for such authority to be interanimated by a
willing, if sometimes offended, collective participation.
Artegall‘s brand of Justice is derived from one of the oldest virtues, ―most sacred‖
and even ―[r]esembling God‖ (V.proem.10). It is introduced to Artegall through the
immortal figure Astraea, but the poet is quick to point out that ―[w]hilest here on earth‖
this daughter of a god ―lived mortallie‖ (V.i.5). She lures the child Artegall away from
human companionship and raises him in a cave, teaching him her diluted version of right
and wrong, and encouraging him to practice justice not with human beings—where it
might be dialogized—but on ―wyld beasts‖ (i.7) incapable of interpretation and reaccentuation. Artegall‘s questionable past serves to dialogize each of his judicial
decisions; it acts as a consistent reminder that ―[a]uthoritative discourse can not be
represented—it is only transmitted‖ (Bakhtin Dialogic 344), or, as Baudrillard would
have it, only already represented. Once again, we are not dealing with straightforward
hypocrisy, for, like the Fox News broadcasts earlier discussed, Spenser‘s book of Justice
displays its contradictions and its hyperrealism as explicitly as its authoritative discourse,
and there are ample opportunities—invitations, rather—to reintroduce past narratives.

23

See Jeff Dolven, ―Spenser‘s Sense of Poetic Justice,‖ Raritan, 21.1 (2001): 127-140. ―[P]unishment … is
a pedagogical mode,‖ Dolven argues, but certain of Artegall‘s punishments ―transcen[d] questions of …
justice.‖ Dolven explains, for example, how the treatment of Munera ―becomes a pure testament to
someone's power to dissect. It is an allegory which does not need to explain itself, and its inscrutability is
the perfection of its threat‖ (139). Judith Anderson also remarks on Artegall‘s ―simplistic, furious, even
vengeful‖ impositions of justice, which by the end of the book are ―inconclusive‖ (―Nor man‖ 65).
Elsewhere Anderson describes the outcomes of Artegalls‘ ―unqualified absolutism‖ as ―conceptually
strained and recurrently touched by whiffs of parody‖ (Words 173).
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Many readers, for example, have discussed the incompatibility of the argument Artegall
presents to the second canto‘s giant with the argument of book V‘s proem; Artegall
claims that ―no change hath yet been found‖ in the Universe (V.ii.36), while the Proem
laments the ―dissolution‖ of the cosmos and ―of all this lower world‖ (V.proem.4).24 A
similar dilemma occurs at the beginning of Canto viii, which rewrites Britomart‘s selfless
repression of her ―womanish complaints‖ (V.vii.44) into an attempt to seduce Artegall
away from his duty. Radigund, the real captivator of Canto vii, seems effectively erased
from Artegall‘s memory, while Britomart is remembered as the conniver who tried to
delay his mission with ―her strong request‖ (viii.3). This lurking alternative springs into
visibility, inspiring some uncomfortable (though by this point, hardly unexpected)
questioning of the ―original‖ narrative, a questioning that disallows any reliable
movement beyond appearances. Perhaps the best example of such unreliability in book V
is Malfont, the lewd poet whose tongue is nailed to a post, above which appear the words
―BON FONT: but bon that once had written bin, / Was raced out, and Mal was now put
in‖ (ix.26). Judith Anderson explains that ―Malfont‘s fate threatens both its opposites,
whether unrestrained or immaterialized expression;‖ he ―embodies an amorphous but
very real danger, the meaning of which is hard to contain, though clearly this danger
touches free expression—even language itself—to the quick‖ (Words 187).
Book VI emphasizes and more or less establishes the inability to move beyond
appearances and the general ―failure of discourse‖ Baudrillard describes as an
inevitability. In this book appears the last threat not neutralized in the Faerie Queene, the
24

Anderson discusses Artegall‘s encounter with the giant in great detail. In addition to pointing out the
divergence between Artegall and the proem, she remarks on the ―ritualized rhythms‖ of Artegall‘s final
arguments: ―What is ‗heard‘ in the passage is less truly a ‗voice‘ than a text, a rhythmically and allusively
defined block of biblical writing‖ (Words 175), what Bakhtin would certainly label already represented
authoritative discourse.
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Blatant Beast, a rumor-mongering monster that escapes its bonds and promises to speak
its speech anywhere and everywhere. No discourse is safe from this ranging, raging
beast; it is the embodiment of lurking alternatives, and of the (counter)network, too. For
the poet to pretend otherwise would mean fostering a delusion of the possibility of
unquestionable access to, and invulnerable imposition of, authority, and ignoring what
Hadfield calls the ―problematic and amorphous presence of Britain,‖ which, as it
embraced expansion, encouraged paradoxically the undermining of its own monarchy,
―even if the stated reason for the expansion was to protect such a system of government
through the establishment of an imperial authority‖ (590). Thus the concluding image of
the last complete book of the Faerie Queene must be the Blatant Beast ―barking and
biting all that him doe bate‖ (VI.xii.40), infecting the ears and minds of the nation, such
that all Spenser may ask of his own rhymes is that they, like the speech of some
originally benevolent but now bitterly exhausted god, ―seek to please‖ (41) his audience,
rather than directly change, inspire, or rule them.25 Perhaps Spenser would have been
more at home in the role of a pundit, for the ―combination of capacious skepticism and
provisional idealism‖ (Anderson Words 189) in his parting wish to please may be read as
a desire to seduce as effectively and inexhaustively as the Beast.
25

Here Spenser appears to locate himself and the authority he respects at one end of an extreme while
locating the Blatant Beast on the other. His impulse toward extremism is relevant, for it allows us to return
to Lessig‘s presentation on copyright law quoted in the introduction. Lessig identifies a similar extremism
in reaction to copyright infringement on the Internet: one side interprets the law as strictly as possible and
supports the removal of any copyrighted content, while the other supports ―copyright abolitionism;‖ Lessig
describes ―a generation that rejects … copyright and believes that the law is nothing more than an ass ….
The extremism on one side begets the extremism on the other.‖ Lessig ultimately hopes, however, for a
neutral platform upon which both sides can locate themselves, find a way to communicate, and strike some
kind of creative balance. If such an accord is not struck at the end of the Faerie Queene, Spenser at least
recognizes that the creative potential for unauthoritative, bestial speech cannot be contained or silenced. If
such potential fills him with anxiety, it does not stop him from writing, from practicing his art, like
Artegall, upon ―wyld beasts‖ that are perhaps more capable of understanding than those in more traditional
positions of authority are ready to admit.
106

As our 24-hour news networks prove, there is a place for a rhetoric that extends a
constant invitation to investigate the relationship between discourse and ideology. And
the most extreme rhetoric may perhaps extend this invitation most strenuously, even as it
relinquishes no territory from its extreme position. The Blatant Beast spends all its time
―barking and biting all,‖ yet it only grows stronger, for it has perfected the strategy
necessary to function and flourish in a (counter)network, where extremism works best not
(only) through fear and domination but through complicity—comprehensive agreement
that the false says as much as or more than the true. Called out for his use of false footage
on November 12th, ―We screwed up,‖ Hannity admitted, acknowledging the collective
error of his network. Unquestionably and absolutely, Fox News got it wrong. But why,
after all, would they want to be right?
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Chapter Three
The Gods Must be Asses:
Recognizing the Constitutive Potential of Social Networking in Much Ado About Nothing

1. Strategic Manipulation
Chapter two has focused on the seductively unstable image of the network as an
appealing representation of the world in both the early modern and the postmodern eras.
Just as attractive in contemporary discourse is the idea of networking—furthering one‘s
professional, social or romantic interests through advantageous interactions with people
and groups linked in a complex web of associations. Networking is a strategic method of
interaction; it is also paradoxical, as Paul McLean explains:
We become more fully the persons we are through interaction, our
personhood being constructed out of a number of different identities we
adopt, singly or in combination, in different interactional settings…. We
want autonomy, but the only way to get it is by becoming connected.
Freedom must be relationally achieved; autonomy without connection is
isolation. (2)
Beyond this initial paradox, there are further difficulties attached to networking. The
introduction to this dissertation briefly discussed the murky conceptions, among student
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users of Facebook, of how networking actually works. Many of the survey responses
suggest a belief that social networking sites such as Facebook facilitate networking
automatically, that the common use of the site is enough to bring about any particular
interaction. But such an assumption ignores the more cautious but more accurate
understanding of networks as ―places where action is happening, not where it has already
happened. [Networks] do not simplistically determine mobilization, or alliance building,
or career formation. They are more like congested, and therefore potentially fecund,
arenas of persuasive social interaction‖ (McLean 16).
The students surveyed respect the network‘s potential, but their responses lack a
sense of how potential translates into action, and, following that translation, what the
discourse of the action looks and sounds like, what is strategically persuasive about it.
Forty-Seven percent of the 231 users surveyed used identical phrasing to answer
questions about the use of Facebook: to keep in touch or stay in contact. But almost none
of these responses, or the other 53%, detailed any specific explanation of just how
Facebook facilitates such a process.1 Keeping in touch appears to be shorthand for the
specific interactions that actually occur on the site. While the responses suggest
widespread agreement that a person‘s Facebook page communicates enough about her
that she may be successfully and consistently kept in touch with, where, how and when
these communications actually take place is less clear. Indeed, what is most vaguely
recognized is the precise role of language in social networking, the image of the network
full of not only people, but also conversation—dynamic, contingent, rhetorical speech.
Too often absent from the fantasy of collectivity are the specifics of speech between the
1

Other similarly imprecise phrases that showed up in multiple surveys include the following: to see what
everyone is up to; to connect; to communicate; to creep.
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collective‘s members, the language they choose, and how those strategic choices reflect
what a site like Facebook is believed to reflect—the identities of the people who use it.
Shakespeare‘s Much Ado About Nothing provides a portrait of a social network
confused about the functionality of language and its relationship to identity, but it may
also provide some strategies for how to confront that confusion. Other critics have
already noted the ways in which ―[s]ocial transmission becomes a medium of distortion‖
(Salinger 228) in the play, but more can be said regarding characters‘ shifting and often
inconsistent attitudes towards the distortions they encounter. Though ―[i]ncidents of
news, gossip, reporting follow thick and fast‖ (Salinger 227) the play‘s opening scene, it
is possible to pause and examine the unique features of individual misinterpretations in
addition to the ways they amalgamate to overwhelm what might otherwise be an
uncomplicated comedy. Undoubtedly, the main events of the drama are driven by an
increasingly irrepressible hearsay, absent scenes wherein conversations are witnessed by
particular characters, but off-stage and out of range: Antonio hears Don Pedro and
Claudio talking in the orchard; Borachio overhears the same two men; the courting of
Hero by the disguised Don Pedro is also absent from the text, though we do hear of his
success in Claudio‘s name; Claudio overhears Margaret, disguised as Hero, conversing
with Borachio. All of these important scenes are introduced twice-removed, as hearsay,
so that scene after scene in Much Ado consists of characters talking about listening to
other characters talk. But what is this talk? Of what does it consist? And what is so
confusing about it that each of the play‘s many eavesdroppers, somewhere in between
overhearing and reporting these absent scenes, often misinterpret and thus misreport what
they hear? Much Ado places social networking under pressure, its main instrument—
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language—under increasing suspicion, yet it is unclear who or what is applying the
press.2
Lynne Magnusson suggests that ―[f]rom the outset, the characters treat mistakemaking as their normal expectation of language. They anticipate mistaken
communications, and more important, they deploy a complex range of prevention and
repair mechanisms to compensate‖ (158). She concludes that ―the play deals not only
with mistake-making and mis-taking in words, but also in their remedy and correction. Its
concern is not with how language fails but with how language works. And this practical
outlook on language is also the play‘s general outlook on life‖ (158). Reworking this
argument slightly, it is possible to say that the play‘s concern is not with how language
fails, but with how speakers fail. Shakespeare dramatizes Language‘s capacity to work
despite characters‘ incapacity or reluctance to work with it. Language is in some ways the
hero of the play, the nothing/noting over which to make much ado.3
Magnusson is certainly correct to suggest that characters, from the outset, make
much ado over language and seem trained to anticipate mistakes, but what is most
curious is how this anticipation does not translate into pessimism. Indeed, the pressure to

2

Possibly Shakespeare registers an anxiety over oral communication. Many scholars have speculated about
a growing conflict between oral and textual communication in Renaissance England, specifically in the
contexts of the printing revolutions and the Reformation. Margaret Ezell comments on how ―histories of
print and of bookselling have framed their narratives as histories of a type of civil strife, with the new
(young, democratic) technology overthrowing the established (old, aristocratic) one to usher in a new,
better world‖ (7). But more recent scholarship, such as that by Adam Fox, suggests that ―[w]e are much
better off conceiving of overlapping spheres of the oral and the literate‖ (8), and that ―far from being the
twin enemies of speech, literacy and print culture may have actually reinforced the spoken tongue‖ (34).
Alexandra Walsham agrees, ―For all their ‗imperialistic potential‘ print and writing never entirely displaced
speech: on the contrary, their increasing diffusion served in the short term to enhance and rejuvenate oral
culture and communication‖ (173). Oral communication is certainly enhanced in Much Ado about
Nothing—it is responsible for the unnecessary complications in the courtship between Hero and Claudio.
Then again, it is the presence of multiple voices engaging in oral communication that is responsible for
bringing together another couple—Beatrice and Benedick.
3
For more on the nothing/noting pun, see Paul Jorgensen; Dorothy Hockey.
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compensate for misunderstandings seems less urgent than Magnusson implies. Anthony
Dawson suggests that the pleasure for both the audience and the characters ―resides in the
transport rather than the content of messages, and the world the play creates is one in
which attention is directed as much to the way meaning is produced as to what the
meaning is‖ (211). Characters do not only expect mistakes; they live by them, rely on
them, with pleasure and even enthusiasm. The play‘s most impressive protagonist, Don
Pedro, embraces quite eagerly the kind of askance communication that gets things
moving throughout Much Ado. It is his idea to disguise himself as Claudio in the wooing
of Hero, vowing to ―take her hearing prisoner with the force / And strong encounter of
my amorous tale‖ (I.i.324-25).4 It is likewise his plan to fool Benedick into falling in love
with Beatrice. He boasts a supreme confidence in his own power to see the manipulative
capacity of language, though he must rely on Hero‘s and Benedick‘s inability to
recognize this same manipulative capacity. Here we can begin to understand why social
networking is defective in this play—because its practitioners operate under a reductive
definition of what language is and what it can accomplish. Language for Don Pedro is
less a functional argument or rhetorical interaction than it is a magic spell, preconstructed and formulaic. Such a definition does not appear immediately to be reductive,
and in fact tries to pass itself off as the opposite, as a glorification of language‘s power to
operate. But Don Pedro‘s self-congratulation has more to do with his privileged access to
an already established modus operandi than with any constructive rhetorical skill. His
logic is similar to the logic of simulacra explicated by Baudrillard, a logic in which
―[e]verything that appears to serve a function becomes a sign of the abstraction
4

All quotations from The Riverside Shakespeare, 2nd edition, ed. G.B. Evans. Boston: Houghton Mifflin,
1997.
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functionality,‖ so that ―an object does not actually need to function for it to signify
functionality …‖ (Bishop & Phillips 135-36). Similarly, Don Pedro‘s rhetorical skill does
not actually need to function for him to celebrate its functionality. He uses language,
performs language, but in so doing he threatens to substitute the spectacle of
communication for communication itself.
Initially, Don Pedro discusses the Beatrice/Benedick matchmaking proposal as if
it is both impossibly difficult and the easiest thing in the world to accomplish. ―I will in
the interim undertake one of Hercules‘ labors, which is, to bring Signior Benedick and
the Lady Beatrice into a mountain of affection th‘ one with th‘ other,‖ he claims (II.i.36467), exaggerating the difficulty of his enterprise. Yet a few lines later he confidently
asserts that he will teach his co-conspirators ―how to humor [Beatrice], that she shall fall
in love with Benedick, and I, with your two helps, will so practice on Benedick that, in
despite of his quick wit and his queasy stomach, he shall fall in love with Beatrice‖ (38084). On the one hand Don Pedro‘s actions are supernaturally creative, akin to the feats of
demigods; on the other they are simple, natural skills that can be passed along by a good
teacher. Indeed, Hero, who seems to need little or no directions from Don Pedro about
what to say to convince Beatrice of Benedick‘s affection, solicits the help of Ursula,
―teaching‖ her the appropriate language:
Now, Ursula, when Beatrice doth come,
As we do trace this alley up and down,
Our talk must only be of Benedick.
When I do name him, let it be thy part
To praise him more than ever man did merit.
My talk to thee must be how Benedick
Is sick in love with Beatrice. Of this matter
Is little Cupid‘s crafty arrow made,
That only wounds by hearsay. (III.i.15-23)
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The ways of ―little‖ Cupid are hardly mysterious to the educated gentleperson.5 In
comparing themselves to the god of love, Don Pedro and Hero are remarking both on
how powerful and remarkable is language, and how remarkably easy it can be to come to
such power.6 Anyone can be a Cupid—―his glory shall be ours,‖ as Don Pedro says
(II.i.385)—and yet the universality of this capacity somehow fails to diminish the sense
of accomplishment—―for we are the only love-gods‖ (386, my emphasis). The
explanation lies in the subtlety of Don Pedro‘s attitude toward the undertaking. He
himself is a Hercules or Cupid, but the tools he uses—words—are only that. Language is
an accoutrement, a vessel for Don Pedro‘s inherent intellectual artillery. The words
themselves become weapons, which anyone might pick up, but which only Don Pedro (or
his hand-picked students) can appropriately aim.7
Such boasting seems not uncharacteristic when we take into account some of the
paradoxical attitudes toward rhetoric that flourished during the Renaissance. Mary
Thomas Crane explains how
rhetoric and other artes could not be considered authentic unless they were
in some sense natural, perfect, and God-given, while at the same time they
could not be taught as skills unless they were also artificial, and unless the
5

This trend of characters aligning themselves with gods is easily spotted throughout the play, but the
arrogance of the gesture is often diminished by the low stakes with which these supposedly godlike efforts
are associated. Before Hero, Ursula and Don Pedro, Benedick is first associated with Cupid. In Act I,
Beatrice claims that Benedick ―challeng‘d Cupid at the flight‖ (I.i.40). Joost Daalder explains: ―Beatrice
wishes us to view Benedick as claiming that he can shoot further, if both he and Cupid use flight-arrows,
than Cupid can. He claims, in effect, that he, the military man, is more capable than Cupid of wounding a
woman so as to make her fall in love with him‖ (523). Stephen Dobranski comments on Benedick‘s efforts
to align himself with Hercules when Benedick ―suggests a series of Herculean labors to escape Beatrice,‖
but he points out that Benedick initially appears more as a ―burlesque version of the Greek hero …
rattl[ing] off a list of pointless Herculean labors‖ and, in short, introducing ―the idea of a great deal of work
for nothing‖ (235).
6
We might also interpret this as commentary on the anxieties of anti-theatrical writers who devoted
themselves to alerting helplessly compliant audiences about the dangerous, corrupting influences of
theatrical spectacles. See Nova Myhill; Jonas Barish.
7
See Rebecca Bushnell, who uses a different metaphor [that of ―harvesting or mining‖ (129)], but who also
comments on the ―materiality of the textual fragment‖ and its conversion ―into counters or currency,
spatially distinct, usable, and exchangeable‖ (133).
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natural, God-given state was in need of completion by artificial means ….
Supplementation allowed [humanists] to present a double face to power,
claiming that they were simultaneously both essential and inessential to its
assertion. (16)
Don Pedro is similarly double-faced here, though it is important to note he is no
humanist. Though he is temporarily willing to share his divine titles with Hero, he is little
interested in passing on the means by which one might attain his trademark doublefacedness.8 And again, his communications toward Benedick are organized as a series of
false fronts, designed to manipulate rather than educate. What this suggests is a belief on
Don Pedro‘s part that words always exist at someone‘s disposal; his own script will skate
across the surface of Benedick‘s consciousness, dragging behind it the appropriate strings
Don Pedro has decided to pull, thus moving Benedick in the preferred direction. This is
in large part an entirely sophisticated comprehension of how language works. Of course
words exist at someone‘s disposal. Bakhtin tells us that
[w]e speak only in definite speech genres, that is, all our utterances have
definite and relatively stable typical forms of construction of the whole….
We know our native language—its lexical composition and grammatical
structure—not from dictionaries and grammars but from concrete
utterances that we hear and that we ourselves reproduce in live speech
communication with people around us. We assimilate forms of language
only in forms of utterances and in conjunction with these forms. (Speech
Genres 78)
But Bakhtin also reminds us that ―the words of a language belong to nobody …‖ (Speech
Genres 88) and that ―it is necessary to come to terms with discourse as a reified, ‗typical‘
but at the same time intentional phenomenon‖ (Dialogic 367). Don Pedro undercuts this
intentionality when he suggests that only certain people are equipped to assimilate and

8

This seems true enough especially when we recall Don Pedro‘s earlier consideration of Hero‘s intellectual
capacity; Myhill points out that when he first sets out his plan to woo her for Claudio, ―[t]he possibility of
failure, or even of a response from Hero, never crosses Don Pedro's mind‖ (298).
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manipulate language; the rest are there to be manipulated. And these categories, in Don
Pedro‘s eyes, are fixed quite early on. ―I would fain have it a match,‖ he says of his plans
for Beatrice and Benedick, ―and I doubt not but to fashion it …‖ (II.i.367-69). The
―lovers‖ are entirely in his hands.
What the Prince doesn‘t account for, however, is the inevitable diminishment of
his own authority should his perspective on the creative potential of language be
universally accepted. By celebrating the success of his effort to bring together Beatrice
and Benedick before the actual effort is performed, by anticipating ―[t]he sport [that] will
be, when they hold one an opinion of another‘s dotage‖ (II.iii.215-16), Don Pedro in fact
robs the romance of its capacity to occur as a real, interactional event. Baudrillard
explains how ―[w]hen an event and the broadcasting of that event in real time are too
close together, the event is rendered undecidable and virtual; it is stripped of its historical
dimension and removed from memory. We are in a generalized feedback effect.
Wherever a mingling of this kind—a collision of poles—occurs … we see the confusion
of existence and its double‖ (Evil 75). Don Pedro assumes, inhabits, and finally
privileges, a virtual reality on top of the real, but in doing so he positions himself to
demonstrate the instability of his own power and privilege, the inevitable way in which
―[p]ower itself fights against becoming total‖ and in the end ―works secretly against
itself‖ (Baudrillard Evil 24). For, to borrow another question posed by Baudrillard,
―[h]ow are we to believe in reality once its production has become automatic?… There is
no way now for the dream to be an expression of a desire [when] its virtual

116

accomplishment is already present‖ (Evil 19).9 So when Don Pedro assumes the virtual
accomplishment of Beatrice and Benedick, he comes close to stripping it of its
genuineness and flattening it into an automatic, non-event, one in which its major
players—the lovers themselves—have no say and no part.
Don Pedro‘s deafness to the interactive potential of other voices contributes in
large part to his reductive, lopsided impression of social networking, the idea that only a
handful of people are ever fully conscious of it working. To put it another way, Don
Pedro rightly sees the social network as a place where action is happening (because he,
and the few others like him, make it happen), but he assumes that almost everyone else
sees it as a place where action has already happened. He sees no contradiction in these
conflicting perspectives, but the most damaging miscommunications that occur in the
later acts of the play arise from this irresolvable conflict.

2. Strategic Oscillation
Indeed, the flaws in Don Pedro‘s ungenerous perspective reveal themselves as the
play moves forward.10 While he successfully demonstrates that ―[a]ction in networks is
…strategic‖ (as McLean says of networking in Renaissance Florence), he fails to
recognize that action as simultaneously ―constitutive of identities‖ (McLean 34),

9

Alan Sinfield asks a similar question: ―if we come to consciousness within a language that is continuous
with the power structures that sustain the social order, how can we conceive, let alone organize,
resistance?‖ (35). He suggests that ―dissident potential derives ultimately not from essential qualities in
individuals (though they have qualities) but from conflict and contradiction that the social order inevitably
produces within itself, even as it attempts to sustain itself‖ (41).
10
Many critics have discussed Don Pedro‘s diminishing authority and credibility in Messina. ―He should be
the most levelheaded man in the group,‖ says René Girard, ―the fixed point of reference around which
everyone and everything could form a stable configuration. However, he is the very reverse …‖ (89).
Morriss Henry Partee agrees that ―Shakespeare circumscribes the ability of Don Pedro to function as a
stabilizing force in this work.‖
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identities which are not always predictable, subject to one-sided manipulation. While it is
true that ―networking really is more like a sport than other aspects of social life, since
actors are typically conscious of it as a game and have meditated upon and theorized
about the ‗rules,‘‖ it is nevertheless important not to ―eviscerate the temporal unfolding
of social action and ignore the suspense that derives from not knowing with certainty how
another actor will respond‖ (McLean 19). Beatrice and Benedick‘s complex responses to
the conversations they overhear exceed the parameters of Don Pedro‘s original strategic
action and prove their capacity to assimilate and manipulate language in the service of
strategies of their own. Persuaded to begin thinking of each other romantically, Beatrice
and Benedick do not stop there; they are able to reclaim the eventness of their courtship,
for their fresh romantic pursuits are accompanied by nothing less than the renunciation of
their current identities in favor of behaviors more palatable to not only each other, but
their entire social circle. Subjectivity, through Benedick and Beatrice, is depicted ―as
something of a dialectical negation of power, not a mere effect of its operations; as an
orientation to multiple potential selves or identities, not merely the production of a
unitary one; as a mental space critically distanced from, and not entirely defined by,
circulating ideologies and discourses of institutions of power‖ (Grady 121).
Hercules and his cupids do succeed in their work, though in a rather curious way,
for Beatrice and Benedick both are inspired more by the censure of themselves than by
the reported merits of the other, the first sign that Don Pedro is not as in control of the
discourse as he would like to believe. By overhearing themselves described, Beatrice and
Benedick come to see, and then focus on, their own defects: ―I hear how I am censur‘d,‖
says Benedick; ―they say I will bear myself proudly, if I perceive the love come from
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her…. I must not seem proud; happy are they that hear their detractions, and can put them
to mending‖ (II.iii. 225-230). Beatrice is likewise first struck by overhearing herself
―condemn‘d for pride and scorn so much. Contempt, farewell, and maiden pride, adieu!‖
(III.i.108-9), she resolves. Neither eavesdropper questions or denies the shortcomings
attributed to them, or indeed any part of the conversations they overhear. ―This can be no
trick,‖ Benedick says; ―the conference was sadly borne‖ (II.iii.220-21). But if we can
fault them for their comic gullibility, we are soon given more and weightier matter to
consider; Beatrice and Benedick appear less and less as the pawns in Don Pedro‘s
Herculean labor as we hear them (re)situate themselves, strategically and persuasively, as
the authorities on their own identities. They appear, in fact, as both subjects and objects,
simultaneously.
Both characters begin by settling on a single and primary goal: to reverse the
censures against them. And both quite optimistically assume they can accomplish their
ambition. The emphasis shifts back and forth from failure—the deep-seated personality
or identity issues that may have made Beatrice ―too disdainful‖ (III.i.34) or reserved in
Benedick his ―contemptible spirit‖ (II.iii.180-81)—to repair—Beatrice will tame her
―wild heart‖ (III.i.112) while Benedick ―will be horribly in love with her‖ (II.iii.235).
Thus both characters project dual identities: they see themselves, at once, as others
currently see them, and as they would like to see themselves in the near future.
Benedick‘s remarks are particularly supportive of this projective faculty:
I may chance have some odd quirks and remnants of wit broken on me,
because I have rail‘d so long against marriage; but doth not the appetite
alter? A man loves the meat in his youth that he cannot endure in his age.
Shall quips and sentences and these paper bullets of the brain awe a man
from the career of his humor? No, the world must be peopled. (II.iii.23542)
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Here Benedick relegates his repeated vows against married life to ―quirks and remnants
of wit,‖ which he anticipates will be thrown back at him as proof of his inconsistency.
But such ―paper bullets‖ do not trouble him seriously, because indeed they were never
seriously indicative of any fixed identity; they were merely the declarations of a youth
who ―did not think I should live till I were married‖ (243-44). Benedick admits here to
fashioning an unstable, inherently alterable version of himself through ―paper bullets of
the brain,‖ ―odd quirks and remnants,‖ youthful rhetoric. Now he is ready to be true to a
more serious and stable self, one interested in high social callings such as peopling the
world.
In fact, Benedick provides another example of the paradox of rhetoric and
rhetorical education, or what Richard Lanham describes as ―rhetorical man,‖ one who
―was a dramatic game-player but [who] was always claiming that the ground he presently
stood upon was more than a stage. Rhetoric‘s central decorum enshrined this bi-stable
oscillation: the great art of art was the art of hiding art, but you had better start out with
some art to hide. In behavior, you should always be sincere, whether you mean it or not‖
(Electronic 111).11 Benedick implies in his speech that his bachelor front is a mere
leftover from a youthful appetite that need not have anything to do with this newer, and
thus more real, Benedick, the one prepared to people the world. Overhearing the
conversation about himself offers Benedick the opportunity for a unique kind of
perspective, an interactive encounter with himself, as object, from the point of view of a
different self, as subject. We have no guarantee beyond Benedick‘s word that his
professed love for Beatrice is anything more than another paper bullet of the brain. His
11

Philip Collington locates specific instances of sprezzatura throughout Much Ado.
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railing for marriage may be just as much a matter of appetite as railing against it, but he
can objectively view and interpret only one version of himself at a time. Lanham
explains:
That we can see one version of ourselves only while inhabiting the other
violates deep-seated feelings about the wholeness of human vision. That
every front stage only exists when seen from a back stage, and vice versa,
is something that at a very profound level we simply do not want to
admit…. Self-consciousness is burdensome enough, but to have to choose
your degree of it, and then vary that choice from time to time, constitutes a
real interpretive challenge. (Electronic 149)
It is such an interpretive challenge that Much Ado About Nothing places before its
readers. Benedick‘s self-consciousness depends on using language both self-consciously
(strategically) and un-self-consciously (constitutively). Lanham explains: ―To look at
language self-consciously is to play games with it; to look through language
unselfconsciously is to act purposively with it,‖ the goal being to ―break down the
compelling urge to see through our means of seeing to the ‗reality‘ established by that
seeing. Fabrication of the ‗decorous,‘ unselfconscious Western reality, stylistic or social,
is done through a trick, a series of tricks, just like perception itself, and we want to know
how the trick is done‖ (Electronic 189, 81). The study of rhetoric provides the means by
which this urge can be mastered, for rhetoric can be seen as ―a method of literary
education aimed to train its students to toggle back and forth between AT and
THROUGH vision, alternately to realize how the illusion is created and then to fool
oneself with it again‖ (Electronic 81). This is what Lanham means by the ―bi-stable
oscillation‖ he claims marks rhetorical man (Electronic 111).
Benedick first demonstrates such oscillation early on in the play, while in
conversation with Claudio about the charms and merits of Hero. Benedick offers Claudio
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a choice: ―Do you question me, as an honest man should do, for my simple true
judgment? Or would you have me speak after my custom, as being a profess‘d tyrant to
their sex?‖ (I.i.166-69). Claudio must repeatedly assure Benedick that his interests are
serious and sober before the two companions manage to find the ―key‖ to harmonize their
conversation (186), though Benedick, for his part, continues to speak of Claudio‘s
intentions at least half in jest, as if his ―simple true judgment‖ and his customary
discourse may not be divided after all. When Don Pedro arrives and asks the two men
what they have stayed behind to discuss, Benedick, rather than answer his question
directly, introduces an alternate scenario in which he must break Claudio‘s confidence in
telling Don Pedro of Claudio‘s love for Hero. However, no such confidence exists to be
broken; ―If this were so, so were it utt‘red,‖ Claudio says (215), but in fact the situation is
hardly so complex. Benedick simply imagines it to be so, and invites the other two
speakers to imagine likewise their roles in this resituated conversation. Benedick suggests
―that every conversation is … made up of playlets at least minimally pre-scripted‖
(Magnussen 155.) He continues to demonstrate his skill as a collector of genres of
discourse—in fact painting himself as a very genre or sign of discourse (and intercourse)
when he vows that, if ever he fall in love, his eyes are to be plucked out ―with a balladmaker‘s pen, and hang me up at the door of a brothel-house for the sign of blind Cupid‖
(252-54). Don Pedro plays along, suggesting that Benedick ―wilt prove a notable
argument‖ (256)—will function, that is, as either a manifestation of what goes on in a
brothel or the matter for a debate on the subject. In attaching himself, even transforming
himself, to a particular instrumental example of speech, Benedick shifts the
conversation‘s theme: the remainder of the discourse in this scene is marked by the self122

conscious impulse to role-play and manipulate, to play games with language while acting
purposefully with it, to examine even the plainest phrases for both their instrumental
customs and tricks, and their ―simple‖ truth. Benedick oscillates between both tasks more
successfully than his companions, who get a bit carried away in one direction. When Don
Pedro, for example, states simply that ―the lady (Hero) is very well worthy‖ (221-22),
Claudio accuses him of ―speak[ing] this to fetch me in‖ (223). Discounting the coexisting
presence of simple truth in Don Pedro‘s statement, Claudio assumes instead that the
form, emptied of substance, is all. Later, when Benedick takes leave of his companions,
he frames his valediction in the form of a closing for a letter. Claudio and Don Pedro,
both eager to spotlight ornamentation , quickly recognize this familiar form of discourse
and jokingly extend it:
Bene: I have almost matter enough in me for such an embassage, and so I
commit you—
Claud: To the tuition of God. From my house—if I had it—
D. Pedro: This sixt of July. Your loving friend, Benedick. (279-284)
―Nay, mock not,‖ Benedick rejoins, for ―[t]he body of your discourse is sometime
guarded with fragments, and the guards are but slightly basted on neither. Ere you flout
old ends any further, examine your conscience …‖ (285-89). His parting words remind
his friends not to be too eager to perform just one task—looking AT language—without
also vigilantly and reflexively looking THROUGH, even if that means looking through
the most stilted, affected valediction. When he urges his friends to examine their
consciences, Benedick not only reminds them that everyone is guilty of uttering
formulaic speech tags; he also links conscience explicitly with language. His chief
purpose may be to suggest that every utterance is a ―living impulse‖ that ―tastes of the
context and contexts in which it has lived its socially charged life; all words and forms
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are populated by intentions. Contextual overtones (generic, tendentious, individualistic)
are inevitable in the word‖ (Bakhtin Dialogic 292-93). If he entered this first scene of the
play in cheerful control of his own witty discourse, the oscillating Benedick leaves asking
for an examination of conscience and context which should sober the levity inspired by
his amusingly mannered exit, or at least decelerate Claudio‘s sudden romantic interest in
Hero in order to make room for some additional attention to the inevitable ―taste‖ his
communication with her will finally have. Claudio himself admits that his ―liking might
too sudden seem,‖ and wonders if it ought to be ―salv‘d … with a longer treatise‖
(I.i.369), but his brief gesture towards a deeper examination of conscience and context is
discarded by Don Pedro, who convinces him that ―what will serve is fit: ‗tis once, though
lovest, and I will fit thee with the remedy‖ (I.i.317-19). Once again Don Pedro reduces
language to a fixed and pre-assembled form—a remedy, absent any socially charged
overtones, that he may fit onto a context equally fixed.
Benedick seems to understand, already, what his comrades do not about the
interactive potential of language, and as the play moves forward he is able to expose
handily the limitations of Don Pedro‘s perspective, proving that not just Herculean
princes are capable of seductive and subtle rhetorical designs. But there is a reason that
Don Pedro and Claudio persist in laughing at Benedick rather than pondering his advice.
Like many of the characters in Much Ado, they are clearly aware of the instability and
illusive aspects of language, and they indeed make use of such instability selfconsciously in their efforts to make things happen, to make each other laugh and to
manipulate other characters. And yet they are themselves fooled by the same kinds of
manipulative tricks when, ―[i]n conceiving of themselves as subjects making discoveries,
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they become the objects of deception‖ (Myhill 294). Innocent as some of these tricks may
be, one of them, Don John‘s slander against Hero, results in the public humiliation of an
innocent woman. One could argue that characters like Don Pedro and Claudio are too
eager to fool themselves in this play, that the bi-stable oscillation Lanham defines breaks
down into self-delusion, as characters, expectant of mistakes in direct conversation—and
rather entertained by them—assume a mistake-free veracity surrounds the conversations
they indirectly overhear.12 This inconsistency betrays more flaws in Messina‘s social
network, its members unreliably vigilant about their own communicative competence and
the extent to which this competence extends to their neighbors. Such unreliability stems
from the paradox—coming into increasingly brighter view throughout the play—of a
network at once strategic and constitutive: ―where all agents are aware of the strategic
subtlety of others, how can intrinsic relationships ever get locked in?‖ (McLean 33). Don
Pedro and Claudio react to this very anxiety, to ―the puzzle of how intrinsic relations can
be secured through instrumental means,‖ through ―culturally specific strategies‖ to which
everyone inside that culture has access (McLean 33). This is similar to the question asked
earlier: ―How are we to believe in reality once its production has become automatic?‖
―By presenting the manipulation of interpretation and questioning the privileged status of
the spectator,‖ Myhill asserts, ―the play challenges the idea of omniscience in any
spectator, or the possibility of any spectator having the sort of automatic access to truth
that the position implies‖ (294). If everyone can be a Cupid, and knows he can be a

12

Girard remarks on the oddity in Claudio‘s suspicion that Don Pedro has betrayed him and courted Hero
for himself: ―Having heard the promise of the prince with his own ears, he should trust Don Pedro, but
what he knows for a fact seems less credible to him than the unconfirmed rumor spread by people who
have no firsthand information‖ (83).
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Cupid, who is left to shoot? If everyone can labor like a Hercules, is it even fair to call it
labor? If not just men but all people are ―deceivers ever‖ (II.iii.63), what becomes of
constancy? How can any communication, any form of social networking, be trusted as
sincere once the hierarchy of access is toppled? When looking AT begins to feel
automatic, how can one remember to look THROUGH?

3. Strategic In-articulation
In light of these questions, the cruel eagerness with which Claudio condemns
Hero may also be interpreted as a strange and stubborn optimism, for by Act IV, the play
is less interested in defending Hero than in defending the framework of its entire social
network, one that can accommodate only a reductive understanding of the open access of
rhetorical skill. Claudio is able to trust what he overhears only because he does not trust
that Don John is capable enough to fool him.13 For as long as possible, the social network
of Messina accommodates Don John as a truth-teller—because deception and
manipulation and all the ―instrumental means‖ by which reality is produced are
determinedly reserved in Much Ado, not for bastards like Don John, but for the real
elite.14

13

Don John himself is guilty of the same oversimplified understanding of social interaction. Partee points
out that though Don John claims to be a ―plain dealing villain, he resorts to the coarsest of subterfuges,‖
relying completely on Borachio; ―Appropriately, the least sophisticated clown in Shakespearean comedies
foils this one-dimensional villain.‖
14
See Joseph M. Williams; attaching these morally questionable methods to Don Pedro may at first
resonate uncomfortably with the work of Williams and other scholars who have documented the growing
sense in the sixteenth century of ―a congruence between a person‘s language and his social status,‖ along
with a movement toward condemning ―language spoken by those that were not the ‗better sort‘ as not
merely barbarous but morally degenerate‖ (Williams 75, 73). Much Ado, however, seems to be playing
with this idea of a distinct line between good speech and bad, along with the idea that the potential
usefulness of so-called barbarous language might be attractive to some of the ―better sort,‖ attractive
enough to appropriate, to use strategically but not constitutively. Don Pedro, in other words, does not run
the risk of losing his membership among the better sort, despite engaging in deceptive rhetoric. Patricia
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Indeed, for Claudio to scrutinize the words of Don John with the same
misdirected energy with which he earlier attended to the teasing wit of Benedick and the
possible betrayal by Don Pedro would be, quite frankly, exhausting. For proof of the
strain of this effort, we need look no further than the verbal recitals of Constable
Dogberry and Verges. These lawmen show complete self-consciousness in their use of
language; they also happen to be completely wrong in such their use of it, to the point
where they literally speak the exact opposite of what they mean. Not only do Dogberry
and Verges misspeak single words—salvation for damnation (III.iii.3), desartless for
deserving (9), senseless for sensible (23)—but the full directives they give the Watch
succeed only in relieving the latter of any responsibility. Dogberry in particular is
interested in using decorative, rhetorical flourishes in his speeches and in demonstrating
his skills in logical argument. His answers to the questions put to him by the Watch read
like epigrams or axioms drawn from rhetorical ―places‖ identified by leading
rhetoricians:
Dog: If you meet a thief, you may suspect him, by virtue of your office, to
be no true man; and for such kind of men, the less you meddle or make
with them, why, the more is for your honesty.
2 Watch: If we know him to be a thief, shall we not lay hands on him?
Dog: Truly by your office you may, but I think they that touch pitch will
be defil‘d. The most peaceable way for you, if you do take a thief, is to let
him show himself what he is, and steal out of your company.
…
Verg: If you hear a child cry in the night, you must call to the nurse and
bid her still it.
2 Watch: How if the nurse be asleep and will not hear us?

Fumerton suggests that ―[a]s a marginalized consumer group, the aristocracy becomes particularly
everyday in its use of the trivial, common, or low—a practice redefined in terms not of a suppression or
absorption of that other but of a more nebulous involvement or negotiation with it‖ (5-6). See also
Stallybrass & White; Bryan Reynolds; Bristol & Marotti.
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Dog: Why then depart in peace, and let the child wake her with crying, for
the ewe that will not hear her lamb when it baes will never answer a calf
when he bleats. (III.iii.50-72)
While Dogberry pays some deference to his and the Watch‘s ―office,‖ he is more
interested in delivering quotable but ultimately impractical answers to straightforward
questions about how to perform a particular job. What is remarkable is that despite their
frequent mistakes and their poorly conceived directives, Dogberry and Verges are not
misunderstood to any lasting degree; generally they remain comprehensible in their
incomprehensible choice of words. The Watch, for example, are not paralyzed by
Dogberry‘s oratory, but succeed in apprehending Borachio and Conrade, even as they
display their own lack of verbal dexterity in the process. Rhetorically expert or not, they
get their men.
Much more successfully than Don Pedro, Dogberry demonstrates both the
strategic aspects of social networking and its constitutive aspects. Don Pedro‘s attitude
toward language actually prevents us from seeing its full constitutive potential—he
simply identifies himself as a god and assumes that what he says and does will reinforce
that already constructed identity. Dogberry, however, in his attempts to assimilate
language skillfully and train his Watch effectively, constructs himself, word by word, as
an ass. And the portrait is entirely believable, if rather exhausting to examine. More than
any of the elite, Dogberry provides a lesson for how language works—indeed, for how it
refuses to fail. It is language that appears heroic, despite its inarticulate speaker, for
Dogberry does not simply use language—he is made up by it. Words still exist at his
disposal, but he is able to demonstrate how ―[d]iscourse lives … beyond itself, in a living
impulse toward the object‖ (Bakhtin Dialogic 292). Don Pedro, in contrast, has detached
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himself from this impulse, so that all he can offer ―is the naked corpse of the word, from
which we can learn nothing at all about the social situation or the fate of a given word in
life‖ (Dialogic 292).
The tiresome Dogberry offers plenty of opportunities to learn the fates of words,
and he prevents any hasty assertion of the disconnection of language from the identities
of those who speak and hear it. Instead, he offers the opportunity for a different kind of
departure, best explained by Carla Mazzio. The inarticulate utterance, Mazzio says,
when represented as something to be heard and not simply dismissed as a
comedy of error or a marginalized sociolect, could generate a halting
effect in the process of reception as well as transmission, a halting that
could make space for alternative temporalities and directions of thought
otherwise eclipsed by the flow of verbal fluency. Departures from
communicative norms … provided drama with an almost ready-made
form of tensional error: occasions for laughter, doubtless, but also for
investigating the psychological, sociological, and theological stakes of
indistinct speech. (Inarticulate 56)15
Dogberry‘s departures from communicative norms certainly have the potential to
generate halting effects, though more often than not his frustrating exhaustiveness only
decelerates, temporarily, the conversations in which he takes part. As a result of
Dogberry‘s tediousness, for example, Leonato refuses to stay for the examination of the
apprehended criminals, and as a result Don John‘s plan to disgrace Hero is allowed to
come to fruition. Leonato, in his rush to make the wedding, believes himself to be
uninterested in what he considers the tiresome nonsense of the constable‘s speech—he

15

Anthony Dawson provides a perfect example of such investigation in his dissection of Dogberry‘s eager
reminders that he be written down as an ass:
the simple correlation, ass-Dogberry, is complicated by a series of interpretative
interventions on our part, a series which goes something like this: he is saying he's an ass;
he doesn't mean what he says; this is not because he doesn't understand the word ―ass‖ or
the word ―am,‖ but because he lacks the linguistic power to achieve control over his
meaning; nevertheless, what he is saying is true; in fact saying it shows him to be an ass‖
(218).
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refuses to halt to examine Dogberry‘s surfaces attentively. By neglecting the offered
opportunity for investigation, Leonato unwittingly drags the comedy of the last scene of
Act III into the catastrophe of Act IV. 16
Importantly, in the following scene Claudio, Don Pedro, and again Leonato make
the same mistake in their rush to condemn Hero, despite her attempts to defend herself
and her honor. Claudio attacks Hero‘s ―seeming‖ (IV.i.56). ―She‘s but the sign and
semblance of her honor,‖ he claims; ―O, what authority and show of truth can cunning sin
cover itself withal! … Would you not swear, all you that see her, that she were a maid, by
these exterior shows?‖ (IV.i.33-40).17 Oddly enough, Claudio gives Hero credit here for a
temporary ability to deceive and manipulate, but the hierarchy of access to rhetorical skill
still stands, for as Hero is welcomed into the elite club she is simultaneously booted out
of it. She is given no opportunity to interact or reconstitute her defamed identity as her
accusers position her as nothing more than ―the object of a gaze constituting itself as
respectable and superior by substituting observations for participation‖ (Stallybrass &
White 42). And yet, an expressive defense still arrives to preserve her. Claudio and Don

16

Kathryn Walls points out the paradoxical significance of this scene: ―it accomplishes nothing‖ (200). But
like all the other ―nothings‖ in this play, we can make much of it. Others have commented on the
sandwiching of the church scene between two scenes that feature Dogberry. Steve Cassal suggests that
―[t]hese comic scenes are meant to cushion the negative impact of the church scene, and it is primarily
through this cushioning that the ugliness of that scene is absorbed within the comic spirit of Much Ado ….
and so the play accommodates the sordid business of the church scene and maintains its comic trajectory‖
(140-41). But this reading appears to underestimate the disruptive impact of Dogberry‘s speeches, and
indeed the comic trajectory is disrupted before the church scene begins—when Leonato cuts short the scene
that precedes it. What we see is not absorption but, once again, oscillation—a perpetual shifting back and
forth between the elements of comedy and tragedy present in all three scenes, and a reassertion of ―the
theme of the mixed, paradoxical nature of feelings, of the unexpected relations between pathos and gaiety,
and outward expression and inward emotion, [which] runs through the whole play‖ (Salingar 232).
17
William McCollom points out the ―distortion of wit‖ Claudio expresses in this scene, especially his
punning on Hero‘s name—―Claudio‘s speeches rely more and more on the verbal tricks recorded in the
rhetorical texts of the time‖ and on conventional idioms ―of the kind that Shakespeare will overtly ridicule
at the turn of the century‖ (167). Though less exaggerated than Dogberry‘s lack of wit, Claudio‘s is still
noteworthy, and his unimpressive rhetorical displays further link him, and the whole of the church scene, to
the distorted wit of the constable.
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Pedro are all too eager in this scene to paint themselves as perspicacious, critical thinkers
capable of seeing beyond surfaces to hidden depths and truths, but the reported scene, in
which Don John fooled them with a superficial disguise—Margaret for Hero—rebuts
their claims for their own exceptional discernment. It is this reported scene—we may call
it an absent one—that arrives and speaks to us most persuasively during Hero‘s censure. 18
Answering the question—―What kind of speech is better than that which is clear, open,
distinct?‖—Mazzio further explains how
the unclear, the less than accessible, distinct, or even audible, when
examined as a process rather than a product, was the key to transforming
tragedies of cultural deafness into a comedy of another kind. Conversely,
the resistance of individuals and collectives to acknowledging the
potential content and power of the indistinct utterance could lead to
something more like tragedy ….‖ (Inarticulate 93)
Claudrio and Don Pedro are perhaps more ignorant than resistant, which keeps the scene
from toppling fully into tragedy. Angry as they are, neither man comprehends what is
really at stake in the scene, for Hero and for themselves. They arrive in the church
already failures, having neglected to examine appropriately Don John‘s less than
accessible, less than distinct Margaret-as-Hero—having neglected to follow Benedick‘s
advice to examine their own consciences/contexts as well. Every word they speak is
marked by these failures, and most of their hearers (Hero, Beatrice, Benedick, the friar)
recognize them as easily as they recognize Dogberry‘s constant gaffs. And just as the
sense of Dogberry‘s meaning appears beneath the transparent senselessness, the
unreliability of Don Pedro and Claudio‘s slander appears beneath their brash confidence.
The absent scene, hyperconforming to its own silence, makes the racket of Act IV, Scene

18

Thomas Moison suggests that the scene‘s invisibility ―only underscor[es] the infidelity that hasn't
occurred‖ (170).
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1 brazenly clamorous by contrast, and exposes it, as Don Pedro‘s earlier brash speech
about Benedick and Beatrice was exposed, as a performance of communication rather
than communication itself.

4. Strategic Conformity
It is the friar who first articulates, at length, his sense of the failure of discernment
on the part of Claudio and Don Pedro. He produces his own elaborate plan to save Hero‘s
reputation, recover her groom, and teach a lesson about the strategic and constitutive
potentials of language at the same time. Committed to their nontransgressive view of
Messina‘s social network, Don Pedro and Claudio prove in Act IV their failure to
respond to or consider the merits of the rhetoric of struggle or of the strategy of
oscillation first performed by Benedick and later exaggerated by Dogberry. The final
scenes of the play call for a more drastic strategy whereby these elites may finally and
inescapably confront the constitutive aspects of rhetorical networking. Specifically, the
friar proposes the strategy Baudrillard describes as hyperconformity (Selected Writings
218). Since Hero is effectively dead to Claudio already, her subjective self suffocated by
Claudio‘s objective reproach, Claudio will be informed that Hero ―died upon his words,‖
the hope being that the
idea of her life shall sweetly creep into his study of imagination, and every
lovely organ of her life shall come apparel‘d in more precious habit, more
moving, delicate, and full of life, in the eye and prospect of his soul, than
when she liv‘d indeed. Then shall he mourn, if ever love had interest in his
liver, and wish he had not so accused her; No, though he thought his
accusation true. (IV.i.223-233, my emphasis)
The friar suggests that Hero disappear into the objective identity Claudio has accused her
of inhabiting, but disappearance, as Baudrillard explains, ―is a very complex mode‖
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(Selected Writings 213); denied subjectivity by Claudio, Hero ―is not only condemned to
disappearance, but disappearance is also [her] strategy; it is [her] way of response to this
device for capture, for networking, and for forced identification‖ (Selected Writings 213).
Hero embodies Baudrillard‘s conception of ―an original, positive, possibly victorious
strategy of the object,‖ turning herself ―into an impenetrable and meaningless surface,
which is a method of disappearing‖ (213). By overconforming in this way, by reflecting
back Claudio‘s image of herself, Hero additionally passes along ―a wave of derision, of
reversal, and of parody which is the active exploitation, the parodic enactment by the
object itself of its mode of disappearance‖ (214). This is ―refusal by overacceptance‖
(219), meant not to dislodge Claudio from his subject position but to expose the subject
position as ―absolutely alienated in its sovereignty‖ (214).
On the surface, what the friar proposes is a kind of discernment test: Claudio must
let Hero‘s silent body move him as her living, protesting body could not. Indeed, Hero
dead does not and cannot protest, for the friar includes the possibility that her death might
be regarded as an admission of guilt. Claudio, confronted not with protest but with
acceptance of his accusation, still will ―wish he had not so accused her.‖ The problem,
however, is that Claudio is not given the chance to pass or fail this test. While it is true
that he barely reacts to the news of Hero‘s death, he is hardly given the opportunity to
contemplate the idea of Hero‘s inarticulate body, lambasted on both sides as he is by
Leonato and Antonio, who loudly and very articulately accuse both him and Don Pedro
of murder and villainy. The Friar‘s strategy is undermined by their noise, and then by
Benedick‘s poorly timed challenge, which occurs just after Leonato and Antonio exit in
their huff.
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Meeting Benedick, Claudio and Don Pedro request that he use his wit to drive
away their melancholy. Benedick, however, is in no mood to jest, constrained as he is to
challenge Claudio at the request of Beatrice. It is not until the end of their confrontation
that Claudio or Don Pedro begin to consider that Benedick‘s anger is sincere, despite
Benedick‘s direct and repeated declarations that Claudio is a villain (V.i.145) and has
―kill‘d a sweet lady‖ (148). Direct as he is, Claudio rightly supposes that it is Benedick‘s
love for Beatrice that is responsible for such charges. Thus Claudio quite accurately
discerns Benedick‘s true motives beneath the surface of his seemingly unequivocal
challenge. Finally, he successfully manages to look both AT and THROUGH Benedick‘s
rhetoric, understanding the strategic seriousness of the challenge as well as the way in
which Benedick‘s words constitute him inside a specific identity as he delivers his
speech. Philip Collington remarks that Don Pedro‘s and Claudio‘s ―quips after
Benedick's departure barely conceal their nervous apprehension that, even in his foppish
civilian dress, Benedick has never been so fierce or frightening as he is for the love of
Beatrice‖ (301).
Regardless, Claudio‘s discernment skills are inconsistent and ungenerous, and the
wit in this scene is ―a struggling wit‖ that points more to callousness and ineptitude than
sensitivity (McCollom 168). For what good is judging Benedick if Claudio cannot subject
himself and his own complicated affairs to the same scrutiny? ―What your wisdoms could
not discover these shallow fools [Dogberry and Verges] have brought to light,‖ (V.i.232233), Borachio pointedly announces upon informing Don Pedro and Claudio of his part in
Don John‘s deception. We are a long way from Don Pedro‘s confident identification with
the likes of Hercules and Cupid. Dogberry, the text makes clear on multiple occasions, is
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an ass (IV.ii.73, V.i.306), not a god, and yet he bears the truth Don Pedro and Claudio
failed to uncover, thus acting successfully as the outside party that reunites Claudio and
Hero, as Benedick and Beatrice were united by outside parties. The ways of little cupid
are, finally, as legible to the play‘s fools as to its heroic elites.
Gods or Asses? Subject strategies or Object strategies? The characters of Much
Ado do not know quite how to think of themselves by the play‘s conclusion, but,
optimistic as ever, they seem for the most part untroubled by the idea of such an extreme
oscillation. Benedick and Beatrice are not angry upon discovering they have been
deceived into affection for each other by their friends; if the ―halting sonnet[s]‖ (V.iv.87)
discovered in their pockets make asses of them, they are also dubbed miracles (91) which
somehow seal their fondness for each other.19 ―[M]an is a giddy thing‖ (108), Benedick
asserts in his final speech, and it is still true despite the fact that Benedick has selfassuredly, and not at all giddily, declared man to be so. Like Dogberry, he and the stagefull of speakers around him are each eager to let it be remembered ―that I am an ass;
though it be not written down, yet forget not that I am an ass‖ (IV.ii.77-78). Benedick
speaks what these characters have learned—they are asses, but now they know it. And
with this new omniscience, now they may ―be vigitant‖ (III.iii.94) about it.
Much Ado may not come to a perfect resolution, but nor does it dissolve into an
impenetrable incoherence. The kind of dialectic that Benedick establishes via his
―conclusion‖ (109) about humankind‘s inevitable inconclusiveness is in fact what allows
the play to end happily. Benedick invites all his fellow men and women to inhabit the
19

Dawson discusses how messages such as these along with the entire ―act of message-sending and
receiving … are integral to both the comic obstacles (those features which retard the resolution of the
comic action), and to the resolution itself. Hence messages become in themselves signs, as well as vehicles,
of the major concerns of the play‖ (214).
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object position while retaining their subject positions. Act V finally legitimizes both
strategies, articulating the route that the characters and the audience of Much Ado have
been encouraged to find ―between ineffectual directness and effectual indirectness:
between the urgently ‗said‘ and the ‗fourme‘ of address that might leave a great deal
unsaid but still manages to get something done‖ (Mazzio Inarticulate 85). Indeed, most
of the successful social networking in the play is accomplished through this combination
of ineffectual directness (a rhetoric of assertion) and effectual indirectness (a rhetoric of
struggle), though the latter strategy perhaps asserts itself more impressively and more
memorably through the likes of Dogberry and the ―dead‖ Hero. The object strategy is, of
course, the harder sell, for both an early modern and a postmodern audience. Baudrillard
asserts that object strategies are effective because people actually want to transfer the
responsibility to know what they want—hardly a comfortable thought. But rather than
reproach the masses with ―stupidity and passivity,‖ Baudrillard is quick to suggest
instead that
the mass is very snobbish; it … delegates in a sovereign manner the
faculty of choice to someone else by a sort of game of irresponsibility, of
ironic challenge, of sovereign lack of will, of secret ruse. All the mediators
… are really only adapted to this purpose: to manage by delegation, by
procuration, this tedious matter of power and of will, to unburden the
masses of this transcendence for their greater pleasure and to turn it into a
show for their benefit. (Selected Writings 216)
The object strategy involves, then, the subjective, sovereign authority to abandon
authority—a ―merry war‖ if there ever was one. To identify as an object requires ―a
strategy of ironic investment in the other;‖ elites like Don Pedro ―are there … to tell the
masses what they want,‖ and the masses, in turn, ―thoroughly enjoy this massive transfer
of responsibility because perhaps, very simply, it is not easy to want what we want;
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because perhaps, very simply, it is not very interesting to know what we want to decide,
to desire‖ (Baudrillard Selected Writings 215-16). Baudrillard‘s conclusiveness does not
entirely hold for all the characters in Much Ado: Beatrice and Benedick are interesting
and interested people before and in spite of being told what they want by others, but it is
finally quite comforting, even for these lively and decisive subjects, to be able to rely on
others to make decisions, to be swept up in the spectacle of ironic investment in the other.
―[G]et thee a wife, get thee a wife‖ (V.iv.122), Don Pedro himself is urged in the play‘s
final scene, a piece of advice as intricate as the friar‘s invitation to ―let wonder seem
familiar‖ (V.iv.70), because it encourages him to do exactly that—to allow others‘
authority to feel as familiar as his own. Part of the masses now, whether he likes it or not,
Don Pedro must open himself to the rewards of the object strategy, abandoning his oldfashioned belief that being alienated in sovereignty is the sole efficient or operative
strategy inside a community that thrives on unrestricted interaction, which can only result
in a commingling of subject and object, elite and servant, god and ass.

5. Strategic Objectivity
Baudrillard‘s theories are not easy to accept without reservation, but the numerous
student-Don Pedros surveyed about Facebook could benefit from a similar encounter
with the constitutive potential of social networking. Like Don Pedro, almost every
student surveyed demonstrated, in his or her response, a reductive perspective of
networking, describing the entire site, all its various communicative applications, as one
big tool to use strategically, but not constitutively, and therefore not fully interactively.
Students privilege the subject position, claiming almost universally that Facebook exists
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to help the user keep in touch with other users. Almost no one discussed the actual
construction of his or her own pages or reflected on the idea of someone else looking at
specific components of his or her page. Using just these gathered responses, it would
appear that everyone on Facebook is in the subject position at all times, and that this
position is invulnerable—as if every Facebook friend were a Hero seen close up, rather
than a Margaret, disguised and ―afar off‖ (III.iii.151). There are efforts to look AT and
even THROUGH the content of others‘ pages, yet once again Benedick‘s advice to
―examine your own conscience‖ is discarded. But what better way to describe Facebook
than as one giant object strategy, a chance to examine oneself, as Benedick does, from
backstage? Facebook puts users in the perfect position to oscillate between relinquishing
responsibility and reassuming it—shifting back and forth between the page I make and
the page that makes me. Social networking welcomes both extremes, but it appears
students either do not want or do not know how to talk about both of these strategies, not
when every survey response ignores the strategic and constitutive possibilities of the
object position. These possibilities should be explored, for if the preceding discussion of
Much Ado has demonstrated anything, it is that subject strategies do not always function
effectively, and may furthermore result in hasty and alienating assessments that may spill
over from discrete experiences of online social networking into daily habits.
Shakespeare‘s protagonists needed a lesson in ―vigitance,‖ some proof that they
could be just as vigilant as objects as they were as subjects. Facebook demonstrates such
vigilance with every status update, each one an opportunity to constitute further a
rhetorical identity as well as draw attention to that constitutive effort. Facebook is an
interactive site that partakes of ―an interactionist theory of culture‖ (McLean 7), and it is
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time its users talked about it as a site that moves its members rather than keeps them
locked in the stagnant, ―generalized feedback effect‖ that must result from any ―failure of
representation‖ (Baudrillard, Evil 78).20 Baudrillard imagines this failure as a screen that
―reflects nothing. It is as though you are behind a two-way mirror: you see the world, but
it doesn‘t see you, it doesn‘t look at you‖ (Evil 78).21 Baudrillard is in fact quite skeptical
of any possibility of ―discovering something in cyberspace,‖ which he compares to a drug
and then describes as ―closed-circuit interactivity‖ (Evil 81), but his own theories on
object strategies suggest that a kind of discovery may be possible inside the virtual. Once
we convince ourselves of the emptiness of such boring mantras as Facebook helps me
keep in touch with people or The web puts a world of information at my fingertips—
refrains as pathetically un-incisive as Claudio‘s proclamation that, because Hero blushes,
she must be a whore—we may discover instead the possibility that ―the attraction of all
these virtual machines no doubt derives not so much from the thirst for information and
knowledge as from the desire to disappear, and the possibility of dissolving oneself in a
phantom conviviality‖ (Baudrillard Evil 82)—hyperconforming, in other words, to the
transcendence of the objectified mass. This is strategic action, and it is not the end of the
story. It promises instead—more than any easy mantra from a position of lonely
sovereignty—the kind of happy panic, the merry war, the oscillating self- and socialcriticism, the relational autonomy that marks the happily inconclusive conclusion of
Much Ado. Though the moral, political and/or romantic positions of every character are

20

The feeling of being locked into a generalized and depersonalized feedback effect is perhaps the reason
for the recent uproar over Facebook‘s privacy settings, designed not to protect privacy but to broadcast
personal information to partner sites, sponsors and advertisers. The debate over Facebook privacy would
seem to supply the perfect opportunity to consider the movement between object and subject strategies.
21
See Debora Shuger, ―The ‗I‘ of the Beholder: Renaissance Mirrors and the Reflexive Mind.‖
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less impervious than before, the instability has lead to a re-energized perspective on
language, on networking, on identity construction—on a whole community that, now that
it has been looked at, looked through, and disappeared into, may finally look back.
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Chapter Four
Teaching, Speaking, Living the Rhetoric of Struggle: Elizabeth Cary‘s School of Wisdom

1. Oaths of Allegiance in the Contemporary Classroom
Chapter three emphasized the energizing potential of hyperconformity as an
object strategy as well as the potential for users of such strategies to appreciate the
possibilities of relational autonomy, that ―sovereign lack of will‖ utilized by the masses
in a ―game of irresponsibility‖ (Baudrillard Selected 216). If the student survey responses
about Faceboook, also discussed in the previous chapter, did not register any conception
of the existence of object strategies, their responses about electronic writing, given on the
same survey, are a different story altogether. When asked to consider what effects
electronic communication might have on the average person‘s writing ability, most
students asserted that e-writing has a negative effect on writing in general and academic
writing in particular.1 Once again, the explanations students provided for their assertions
were remarkably similar: almost everyone who claimed that e-communication weakens
writing abilities elaborated by giving examples having to do exclusively with grammar,
vocabulary and spelling. But even those students who wrote that e-communication has no
effect on writing abilities still included the same reductive impressions of what writing
involves. In other words, if the first group of students wrote that electronic
communication is detrimental because it causes them to abbreviate or misspell words in
academic papers, the second group wrote that electronic communication is not

1

See Introduction, page 28-29.
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detrimental because they always remember not to abbreviate or misspell words in
academic papers. In both cases, ―writing abilities‖ is synonymous with grammar and
mechanics.
These responses bring to mind, and indeed seem to move beyond, David
Bartholomae‘s concerns in ―Inventing the University‖ that student writers must always
try on a discourse even though they lack ―the knowledge that would make the discourse
more than a routine, a set of conventional rituals and gestures‖ (136). Bartholomae goes
on to list several examples of student essays that rely on poor approximations of the
―specifically acceptable gestures and commonplaces‖ of the academic community (143);
when students, in the process of writing, get lost in a discourse they are not fully familiar
with, approximations are all they have to go on. My survey responses, however, suggest
nothing so dynamic or dramatic. While the preoccupation with grammar and spelling
certainly suggests a relationship, even an identity, between writing and ―conventional
rituals,‖ there is no indication in any of the responses that writing consists of unfamiliar
commonplaces associated with particular communities or, indeed, that it consists of any
actual discourse at all complex enough to get lost in. This is not to say that students‘
writing processes do not involve diligence and vigilance, but if the surveys are any
indication, this vigilance is primarily focused not on ideas but on aesthetics, not on
content but form. And form, in addition to being a matter of professionalism and
presentation is, as John Clifford articulates, ―also an attitude toward reality; it is
rhetorical power, a way to shape experience, and as such it constructs subjects who
assume that knowledge can be demonstrated merely by asserting a strong thesis and
supporting it with three concrete points‖—or, according to the surveys, by avoiding chat
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speak and remembering to spell check. ―But rarely is knowledge or truth the issue,‖
Clifford continues. ―Writing subjects learn that the panoply of discourse conventions are,
in fact, the sine qua non, that adherence to ritual is the real ideological drama being
enacted‖ (43). This is not simply a matter of ―imitation or parody‖ performed by
unskilled students struggling to enter a particular discourse community, and it requires a
better explanation than even Roland Barthes‘ oft-referenced theory that ―[a] writer does
not write … but is, himself, written by the language available to him‖ (Bartholomae
143).2
The survey responses emphasize not imitation or unintentional parody or any
complex textualization of the self, but hyperconformity to traditional conventions and
rituals of academic writing, such that these rituals become the only drama worth talking
about, the only elements brought to mind when students are asked to reflect on
communication and writing and the relationship between the two. Hyperconformity, by
Baudrillard’s definition, concerns more than alienation or submission. That means that
Clifford is only giving us half the story when he writes:
The good student … knows that little depends on the ideas in the essay,
that the discursive shell matters more than the ideation inside. As a result,
the status of the ‗I‘ that ‗writes‘ the essay is so decentered, so alienated
from actual experience that many students have as much emotional
identification with their school writing as they do with geometry. That
identification is absent because students sense that only their submission
to a task is required. (48)
Clifford is correct that students (and not just the “good” ones) sense the requirement that
they submit to discursive conventions, but this does not necessarily lead to an absence of
identification, emotional or otherwise, with writing for school. Another possibility is that
2

See Barthes‘ ―The Death of the Author:‖ ―it is language which speaks, not the author; to write is … to
reach that point where only language acts, ‗performs‘, and not ‗me‘‖ (143).
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students are identifying with this kind of writing in a different way, by over-accepting the
allegiance to submissive decentering required of them. Once again, this would be
disappearance as strategy, a “mass reply” to the academy’s “device for capture”
(Baudrillard Selected 213); it is a “parodic enactment,” not (only) of the specific
discourse required of students, but of their own “mode of disappearance” imposed by that
discourse (Baudrillard Selected 214). The survey responses bear this out; the suspiciously
identical reductive definitions of writing are a perfect parodic enactment of the only
response possible within what is perceived to be an artificial conversation. Students are
not approximating any more appropriate definition of writing, telling us that it is all about
grammar because they do not understand what writing is really about. This is the
reductive definition they are taught to embrace, and so, naturally—but perhaps also
strategically—they embrace it.3 Their responses have nothing to do with writing as most
composition instructors and rhetoricians prefer to conceive of it—as the major process
―through which discourse shapes human thought and social relations in a context of
change and struggle‖ (Harkin & Schlib 6)—and everything to do with writing as an
―insidious and invidious‖ mode of reification that seeks to impose order and inflexibility
(Vitanza 141). Victor Vitanza has vigorously argued that traditional rhetorics, ―[w]hile
they appear to be informed by a set of assumptions that (democratically-capitalistically)
value heterogeneity (in the name of the ‗individual‘), they are, instead, only a reactionary
devaluing of heterogeneity through the homogenization of heterogeneity (as mass
society). While they allow, they simultaneously disallow and disenable‖ (141).

3

There may be, in other words, a sophisticated and comprehensive response to language inside, or
alongside, or hovering over, the reductive response that actually appears on the survey.
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Again, the survey responses perfectly illustrate this contradiction. Take this
characteristically apologetic example:
I do think that electronic communication affects writing because on the
computer we use slang terms and type in codes or have inside jokes that
we wouldn’t really write in a paper or say out loud. It also affects
grammar and spelling because on a computer it corrects or tries to
correct the mistakes it picks up on and recognizes where in real life we
don’t have that luxury and have to catch them by eye. So it makes people
lazy in the long run and inhibits our abilities to need to expand our
vocabularies and use the correct form of words.
Here e-communication, as a relatively new method of rhetorical communication, is
cautiously celebrated as emancipatory, in that it allows for slang, inside jokes, coded
abbreviations and automatic editing, but these opportunities are simultaneously censured
as detrimental and in the long run inhibitive—distractions from the correct form of
words. Language both allows and disallows, enables and disables, in this response. If we
look at it as an example of a strategy of hyperconformity, we can also say that it is
marked by anticipation of the kind of response the student estimates the survey-giver, an
instructor and member of the academy, is looking for. This student is telling me what I
want to know, in other words, and then some. He or she supposes that I, as a member of
the academy, am interested in privileging, even protecting, the kind of writing the
academy teaches. Even though the survey question asks about a kind of writing that
usually takes place outside the academy—electronic writing—it can be safely assumed
that the instructor/survey-giver/member of the academy views e-writing as a potentially
interesting but ultimately debauched form of communication in comparison to academic
writing. The student anticipates and imitates the ―right‖ answer, that e-writing can only
intrude on an already approved mode of communication—hence the characteristically
apologetic responses about chat speak. Students know it‘s bad, and they express their
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regret, in advance, for the inevitable slip-ups, the occasional emoticon or abbreviation.
Lol, survey after survey assures me, has no place in an academic paper. But such
reassurances are overdetermined and over-apologetic; their performative deference can
easily turn to parodic enactment, for within the reverence reserved for academic writing
can be located the unobtrusive but no less bizarre allegation that the integrity of a formal
writing assignment can be fundamentally disrupted by the presence of a smiley. This is a
parody of respect for a form of writing imagined, in the long run, as all form, truly a
―discursive shell‖—one that could crack up completely if splintered by too many
abbreviations for laughing out loud. Is academic writing really so inflexible that this is
the only effect students can imagine another form of communication, another style of
writing, might have on it? Competition without interaction? Destruction without
deconstruction? Traditional academic rhetorics may be under threat, but from lol? Is the
King James Version of Genesis also in danger of being replaced by its translation into
lolcat? (―Oh hai. In teh beginnin Ceiling Cat maded teh skiez An da Urfs.‖ 4) After
reading the fourteenth apology for lol and other abbreviations, I began reading something
much less deferential between the lines of these responses:
Yes, fine, we’re all in agreement that e-writing does have an affect on
writing for school. We apologize that our casual slang sometimes
interrupts the careful process of writing lifeless prose. We know it must
really bug you. As good students, we realize that the expressions that come
naturally to us, the ones we’ve made, have nothing to do with the artificial
assignments we are forced to complete in school.
I do not mean to suggest that each of these 268 World Literature students was on this
same particularly, crushingly cynical wavelength when they completed their surveys, nor
do I want to generalize that the academic writing they submit to their instructors is
4

From http://lolcatbible.com
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artificial, drained of intricacy, or inflexibly bland. But I do believe the uniformity of
responses suggests a common frame of mind among students regarding, if not how to
write, then at least how to talk about writing. Indeed, the discrepancy between the two
activities seems evident, for it is inconceivable to imagine that all a student need do to
prepare for a research paper is brush up on his grammar and avoid instant messenger for a
few hours.
Much has been said about what can easily be perceived as such limited
engagement with, or alienation from, the actual work of rhetorical work.5 This chapter
attempts to contribute further to discussions among working scholars about how to
approach composition pedagogy, how to incorporate discourse strategies that more
effectively uncover the social constructiveness of both texts and selves, how to avoid
activities that reinforce exploitation, dominance and suspicious consensus and instead
make room for writing and communication as exercises in ambiguity, vulnerability, and
multiplicity—interaction-without-consensus—but its most immediate purpose is to
suggest that our students may be already somewhat ahead of the game, better placed than
we might realize to experiment with different discourse strategies and to accept rhetorical
positions that disrupt the classroom allegiance to authoritative clarity. As Donna Haraway
explains through her elucidation of what she calls ―cyborg positions,‖ writing ―can carry
5

Scholars such as Patricia Bizzell and Don Bialostosky suggest confronting this alienation with more
thorough introductions to the various discourse communities or contact zones university students must
encounter, the goal being that students ―reaccent, not just reproduce, the disciplinary languages we and our
colleagues impose on them‖ (Bialostosky 18). A different approach is taken by those critics such as Jeff
Rice, or the contributors to composition journals like KAIROS, who encourage a deeper investment in
incorporating technology into writing pedagogy. Other scholars stress working harder to (re)situate writing
and/or literature courses within specific sociopolitical contexts and so liberate the field of composition and
rhetoric from its service obligation. More radical critics like Victor Vitanza and Diane Davis agree that
community ―traditionally has been the end of rhetoric‖ (Vitanza 140), but question whether or not it must
be or should be. Vitanza envisions discourse as art, as game, an (anti)strategy concerned not with the
production of order, discipline, or even community but with the exposure of free-flowing, paratactic links.
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a lot of the weight for worldly practice because it insists on our own implication in
meaning-making materiality,‖ and the best way for a writer to ensure her own writing can
carry this weight is to
take [her] implication in a fraught world as the starting point. I don‘t think
that‘s true for authoritative writing practices that try very hard to produce
the kind of masterful ―I,‖ a particular kind of authority position that makes
the viewer forget the apparatus of the production of that authority. I think
cyborg writing is resolutely committed to foregrounding the apparatus of
the production of its own authority, even while it‘s doing it. It‘s not
eschewing authority, but it‘s insisting on a kind of double move, a
foregrounding of the apparatus of the production of bodies, powers,
meanings.6
―This is not to say that writers must reject authority,‖ Gary Olson further explains, ―but
that in a truly ethical and postmodern stance they must reveal how authority is implicated
in discourse‖ (12).
The surveyed students engage in the very ―double move‖ Haraway describes,
careful to maintain respect for an assumed authority (academic writing) while
simultaneously foregrounding the apparatus of its production (grammar and spelling,
form and formula) through an object strategy that maintains, by its insistence on the least
dynamic elements of writing, an ―ironic power of nonparticipation of nondesire, of
nonknowledge, of silence … of expulsion of all powers of all wills, of all knowledge, of
all meaning onto representatives surrounded by a halo of derision‖ (Baudrillard Selected
217). Without necessarily knowing what to call it, students have taught themselves a
quite sophisticated object strategy, and the similarities among responses suggest they
have arrived in this strategic position quite comfortably and easily. Certainly I see in
6

Haraway‘s cyborg position is similar to Baudrillard‘s object strategy in that it rejects the assumption that
―people are always … willing partners in the game of truth, in the game of information‖ (Baudrillard
Selected 213). It is also easy to see the connection between Haraway‘s emphasis on ―foregrounding the
apparatus‖ of production and Lanham‘s ideas about looking AT language as well as THROUGH language.
See chapter three.

148

these responses, despite being as predictable as the responses to the Facebook question,
more potential for a rhetoric of interaction or struggle between strategic (writerly)
positions, one that exposes the instability of authoritative discourse and its unsettled
attachment to those it would direct, as opposed to a rhetoric of assertion (Davis
―Finitude‖ 141) that can only reinforce the prevalence and privilege of the
authoritative/subject position, the ―I‖ that would write without being written.
As the e-generation, exposed to multiple platforms for expression, invention and
dialogic exchange, current students are already actors in various dramas that involve
direct engagement with language and often increasingly pressing obligations to decide
what kinds of words are expected and accepted in particular contexts. The surveys
suggest they are already capable of being attentive to language in more than one way—
perceiving it, in other words, as a material substance that might interrupt or destabilize an
authoritative agenda (the chat speak that slips into formal writing); as an inert, reified
form that represents the agenda itself (the formal writing fragile enough to be disrupted
by such chat speak); and as a playfully inconclusive sign that is not wholly representative
of, and thus does not fully correlate with, any single idea on or beyond the page, yet still
manages to communicate its own ambiguous reality (the object strategy of
hyperconformity, the mixed deference/derision that can be deciphered ―between the
lines‖ of the uniform responses).
It is this drama of direct engagement with the slippery substance of language and
its resulting reservations and inarticulations—an engagement that does not ignore the real
work of rhetorical work—that instructors can join as they lead composition and writing
intensive literature courses. And it is another Early Modern drama, Elizabeth Cary‘s The
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Tragedy of Mariam, that provides an experimental model of how to navigate through a
social body‘s multiple and often conflicting efforts to use language to do its own
rhetorical work. Such labor is never innocent, and Cary deftly demonstrates, through
characters who undoubtedly take their implication in a fraught world as their starting
points, the inflexibility of certain discourse conventions in intertextual contradiction with
more unrestricted, imprecise discursive techniques. Mariam‘s tragedy, her fatal choice,
has everything to do with expression, with making a case, with the power of language to
constitute reality, 7 and her decision to place her faith in one sustained and logical
argument dooms her to public execution. The masterful ―I‖ is marked as the losing
strategy in Cary‘s text, easily, albeit tragically, spurned as other and more ambiguous
rhetorics work their wrack on this closet drama‘s ―stage.‖8

2. Allegiance to Pieces: the Multiplicity of Identity and Experience
The first line of the play alerts us to the substantive significance of language, as
does Cary‘s source material—Thomas Lodge‘s translation of Flavius Josephus‘ Jewish
War and Antiquities of the Jews. Before Mariam‘s opening soliloquy, the argument
invites us to imagine Cary‘s drama situated on this foundational material, or as its partial

7

Indeed, to borrow the title phrasing of Judith Anderson‘s well-known work, words matter in Mariam, and
in several overlapping ways: ―as currency and commodity; as vow, memento, inspiration, and sacrament;
they matter as graphic character, as icon, as template, as topos or ‗place.‘ They matter increasingly as the
basis of meaning shifts from essence to word and logic to lexicon. They are the matter of fiction …; they
are the matter of equality and justice and the matter of salvation, belief, and perdurance‖ (Words 231).
8
Alexandra Bennett agrees that the tragedy ―is not simply a tale of one woman's unshakable integrity in the
face of oppression, but instead an exploration of duplicity, multiplicity, and their implications …‖ (298).
Bennett‘s focus is a specifically feminist examination of ―the ways in which both [Salome and Mariam]
choose to construct themselves as speaking and performing agents, revealing a remarkable awareness of the
possibilities afforded to women by different tactics of self-representation‖ (298). This chapter will pay
more heed to language than gender, but it is important to note that as a woman and a Catholic sympathizer
and eventual convert—a sort of double minority—Cary was well-situated to consider the merits of
rhetorical performativity.
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duplication, adjusted by those few revisions that will ultimately make this tragedy
Mariam‘s.9 We are informed of crucial past events: Herod has once before embarked on
an uncertain journey to Rome, once before given orders to have Mariam killed in the
event of his death, and once before returned only to execute the subject who revealed to
Mariam the substance of his decree. Rarely do Mariam or any of the other actors
explicitly state any sense of déjà vu, but their speeches reveal concerns with the
reliability of their own experiences, and, in particular, with the ways they have tried to
use language to reflect these experiences responsibly. The more characters discuss their
real passions inside real incidents, the more these experiences seem disconcertingly
unverifiable and uncategorizable, though none the less meaningful for their ambiguity.
This violates, of course, what some early moderns considered the ideal and most urgently
essential purpose of language: to express the truth and to clarify the uncertain—a purpose
inherited from the period‘s ―profound questioning of ecclesiastical authority,‖ which had
―cast doubt on the relation between the human and the divine,‖ on ―[r]eason and
knowledge, their place, order, reliability, and indeed their very nature‖ (Reiss 127), and
which had contributed to an increasing anxiety that related ―civic catastrophe to linguistic
and conceptual incapacity‖ (Reiss 131). Cary‘s characters violate also the ―habits of
thought‖ often assumed to predominate in an early modern culture in which it is possible
to locate ―the obsessive desire for systematic order evident in the compulsive symmetries
of Ramist dichotomizing, in the visceral hatred of ‗mixture‘ that pervades Calvinism, and

9

In addition, as Nancy Gutierrez points out, Mariam‘s first soliloquy begins with a quite recognizable form
of expression, the sonnet, which ―indicates that [Cary] will respond to both the political and social
meanings of the sonnet that her own elite readership would recognize‖ (240).
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[later] in the radical dualism of Descartes‖ (Shuger 9).10 Thomas Sloane points to ―[t]he
disappearance of controversia in rhetorical theory‖ in this period, and to ―an almost
frantic and nonhumanist urgency to organize clearly‖ (150). It is evident, as Debora
Shuger asserts, that ―these years exhibit conflicting and contradictory tendencies‖ (11);
―the movement from premodern to modern thought describes a thickening of
boundaries,‖ but ―Renaissance habits of thought did not move in a steady, unilinear
direction from interpenetrating boundaries to compartmentalized space. Nevertheless,
these polarities seem to govern the ideological ‗shape‘ of the dominant culture, stiffening,
relaxing, and reconfiguring the lines between categories‖ (11).11
One of the prime instigators of these reconfigurations was probably James I, who,
according to Shuger, led ―a concerted effort … to ‗remystify‘ church, state, and the social
order‖ and exhibited ―a perhaps overly insistent desire to transform mundane institutions
and events into manifestations of the divine‖ (124, 145). In ―longing for mystification‖
(145), James gets exactly what he asks for. His enthusiasm for his own divine-right
absolutism, his claim to an unconstrained, ―absolute and mysterious prerogative‖ (Shuger
154), is tested soon enough by the controversies surrounding Catholic recusancy and
especially the oath of allegiance, which, in order to substantiate James‘ sacred kingship,
could not be what it superficially claimed to be: a merely political act. Michael Questier
suggests that this confusion marks the oath‘s brilliance—he calls it “the most lethal
measure against Romish dissent ever to reach the statute book‖ (313), in that it ―clearly

10

Stephen Greenblatt suggests that ―Elizabethan and Jacobean visions of hidden unity seemed like anxious
rhetorical attempts to conceal cracks, conflict, and disarray‖ (Shakespearean Negotiations 2).
11
See Alexandra Walsham‘s ―The Reformation and ‗The Disenchantment of the World‘ Reassessed.‖
Walsham takes on ―the tendency to herald the Protestant Reformation as a milestone on the road towards
modernity and secularization‖ and the elimination of ―assumptions about the intervention of magical and
supernatural forces in the world …‖ (497).
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probed further than the oath-taker's temporal allegiance‖ (319).12 ―The limited restoration
of Roman forms of religion in England,‖ Questier explains, ―relied entirely on
maintaining a clear and united front towards a regime, by turns hostile or tolerant‖ (316),
but it was just such unity and clarity that the oath denied.13 It would be a mistake, then, as
Questier says, to ―assume that the formulation and enforcement of this particular
statutory measure is a sign of the beginning of a divorce between religion and politics in
the divided English Church‖ (329). Shuger agrees that the controversy ―centered on the
question of participation—the mystical relation between the apparently separate. If the
final outcome of such debates was to deny the sacral character of society, the
intermediate stages present no such clear picture‖ (124). What they do present is the
impression of a conflict ―that seemed to have less to do with formulated doctrines … than
with barely articulated assumptions and feelings about how the pieces of the world fit
together, about what counts as fitting‖ (Shuger 14). 14 Shuger uses the phrase habits of
thought ―to denote this indissoluble mixture of feeling and ideation that constitutes

12

See also Walsham‘s Charitable Hatred: Tolerance and Intolerance in England, 1500-1700. Walsham
cautions modern readers not to misconstrue seemingly neutralizing gestures of toleration in the early
modern period, for toleration was also charitable hatred: it ―emphatically did not mean religious freedom.
Nor did it proceed from indifference or neutrality. To tolerate was not to recognize or to grant equal rights
to a rival system of belief; it was to permit or license something of which one emphatically disapproved ….
It was … a conscious decision to refrain from persecuting something one knew to be wicked and wrong‖
(4).
13
See the rest of Questier‘s article for more detailed explanation. The crux of his argument is that Catholic
opponents ―saw that the polemical genius of the oath, an oblique affirmation (on one reading) of the
supremacy through an ambiguous delineation of allegiance in terms of widely recognized definitions of
temporal and spiritual power, could push people, perhaps unwittingly, towards a protestant view of the
relationship between church and state, and hence make them concede many of the regime's demands over
conformity‖ (321). See also Questier‘s ―Puritans, Papists, and the ‗Public Sphere‘ in Early Modern
England: The Edmund Campion Affair in Context,‖ co-written with Peter Lake, for a more broadly
conceived discussion of the ideological struggles between Catholics, anti-Catholics, and the Crown.
14
Walsham, for example, remarks on ―the extent to which people throughout the period demonstrated an
ability to participate in two cultures simultaneously: both in an intolerant discourse of confessionalism and
in a piety that subordinated polemical enmities to a wish to preserve Christian concord‖ (Charitable 305).
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experience‖ in the early modern period, ―where ‗experience‘ is not simply elemental
feelings but feeling that has become meaningful by being interpreted‖ (254).
Such habits are difficult to reconcile with more conservative beliefs about ―[t]he
concept of proper praxis … rooted in natural moral laws‖ (Adams 566) and with ―the rise
of confidence … in the availability of truth, and in the forms of certainty‖ (Sloane 151).
According to John Charles Adams, it was the Puritan Ramists who most actively
reinforced this belief in ―a natural moral order—that there is a bond that exists among all
people and that what is good is not simply a matter of human convention but has some
status in the order of nature‖ (566). Emotion, furthermore, is according to Sloane
―irrelevant to Ramist thought‖ (153), as truth is presented ―in a manner that the
audience‘s mind itself can perceive unaided—with no distraction by or even assistance
from pathos or ethos. Truth in its proper form is intuitive, impersonal, clear of emotion,
and ultimately nonverbal. The system conceptualizes a kind of natural order, with first
things first …‖ (152). In short, Experience under this system cannot be a matter of
meaning-making interpretation, because Experience, as part of the natural order, has
already been interpreted and requires only an intuitive ―fitting in.‖ John White argues that
this idea was especially attractive to Puritans, since ―having faith depended … on the
individual's unmediated understanding of his or her relationship to God and place in the
divine scheme. Ramist logic was the key to this understanding. It showed how individual
items of knowledge about the world could be plotted on an all-encompassing map‖ (438).
White goes so far as to say that ―Puritans took it for granted that anything they observed
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or discovered in the world could be fitted into such a scheme‖ (438).15 But in opposition
to this Puritan impulse were the tendencies, identified by Shuger, of the many early
moderns interested not (only) in fitting experiences into a scheme but (also) in exploring
what counts as fitting.16 Such an interest could spotlight not the discovery of meaning in
an already established and encompassing scheme but its invention as essentially
ambiguous experiences or actions (such as the oath of allegiance) were so mystifyingly,
excessively classified as one thing, or another thing, or both.
Such ambiguity is urged by the ruling regime‘s efforts to welcome
mystification—supposedly as a route to the divine and unadulterated, but experienced, in
fact, as a route to itself. Mystification as a process leads to no necessary product. As Cary
demonstrates, such an interpretive strategy invites the contemplation of a variety of
―pieces‖ of experience, which fit together in ways that, by the standards of the strictest
interpretive methods, may not ―count as fitting.‖ Cary dramatizes the effort of individuals
15

Sloane agrees that Puritanism exhibited an overconfidence, ―with its belief that natural reason with
guidance from the Scriptures is enough for salvation, that any man with a Bible under his arm is equal to
the pope‖ (152). Timothy Reiss tempers this enthusiast link between Puritanism and Ramism when he
points out that, though Ramus method certainly arose out of a context of generalized anxiety about the lack
of ―any divine confirmation of an assured relation between mind and world and its presentation in
language‖ (127), it did not necessarily set out to provide this confirmation, which can best be seen as ―more
or less a side effect of the endeavor to set the relation between idea, word, and thing on some firm
philosophic and linguistic ground‖ (126). The elements of Ramist method, ―logic, dialectic, and the proper
use of words[,] do allow us to get at meaningful truths,‖ Reiss further explains. ―But they are truths of
relationship and practical truths of manipulative action …. There may be still some hidden origin of order,
but our discourses have no longer any access to it‖ (139), for discourse under Ramism is ―no longer backed
by some founding origin. The relation of orders sufficed …‖ (140).
16
Scholars disagree on the scope of Ramist influence, and I do not want to ―misconstrue the complexity of
the critical response‖ to Ramus‘ method or over-emphasize his ultimate influence in seventeenth century
thought (Feingold 289). Nor do I want to suggest that Cary‘s discursive strategy forms in direct response to
the methods of Puritan Ramists, methods which, Mordechai Feingold argues, lost much of their appeal by
the early seventeenth century and were even interpreted by some humanists as ―arrogant, superficial, and
injurious to learning‖ (289). However, by the time Cary writes her play Ramism can certainly be said to
contribute to the atmosphere in which she contemplates the organization of her own work. In addition, the
strictness and all-encompassing nature of the method has something in common with the ―assumption of a
‗social essence‘‖ (13) that Diane Davis locates inside contemporary composition classrooms, where, again
according to Davis, ―we validate (encourage), as if it were thinking itself, a style of thinking that operates
via negation …‖ (12). For theories about the extent to which such operations are inherited directly from
Ramus, see Walter Ong‘s Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue; see also Anna Freadman.
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to interpret (and sometimes over-interpret) an experience expressively, to make the pieces
fit in any and every way they can.17 We might say that the anxiety hovering over the play
is that these articulations will exceed their boundaries (as an experience will exceed its
boundaries and create a sense of déjà vu), that the language the characters use will move
past the reflection of their realities to the creation of alternate and/or divergent realities,
multiple, non-encompassing schemes—hardly an exercise in clarification.18 As in Much
Ado about Nothing, language refuses to fail in Cary‘s drama, but success has little to do
with clarity and much to do with an inexhaustible ambiguity. The rumor of Herod‘s death
is only the first example of a speech act powerful enough to mystify reality, in the sense
that it allows all the players to react to a death that has not occurred, building on a reality
that proves no less habitable—no less fitting—for being false.
―How oft have I with public voice run on / To censure Rome‘s last hero for
deceit?‖ Mariam regrets in the poems opening lines (1-2). Recanting her ―too rash …
judgment‖ (6), ―too too common‖ in a woman (8), she claims a new insight into Caesar‘s
reaction to Pompey‘s death, weeping over the rival he hated. ―Now do I find by selfexperience taught, / One object yields both grief and joy‖ (9-10). What before Mariam
publicly censured as hypocrisy she now understands as ambiguity, two contrary feelings

17

To borrow Davis‘ terminology, they replace ―hypotactic linking/thinking strategies,‖ where hypotactic is
understood as ―a writing style [and] a value system that privileges hierarchy, mastery, and (Final) closure‖
(12), with paratactic strategies, where paratactic is understood as ―a pattern of connection based on
coordination rather than subordination‖ (Breaking UP 108).
18
Bennett gets close to an identification of the risk in Cary‘s strategy: if ―the ideal of a stable society
depended upon the direct linkage of words and actions to the ideas and beliefs these actions were to
represent (i.e., taking the Tudor Oath of Supremacy or accepting the sacrament at Anglican Communion,
thereby reaffirming one's allegiance to Crown and Church), the articulation and exploitation of the
discrepancy between the inner and the outer person was politically as well as religiously subversive‖ (296).
Cary‘s approach is actually more radical than exposing discrepancies between easily identifiable dualities
(inner and outer, Church and State). Her interest lies less in discrepancy than in ambiguity and
indistinction—relationships that, reasonably or logically, should not relate, interactions that should not
interact, mergings that should not merge, but do anyway.
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that should either battle for prominence or cancel each other out, but instead do neither.
Mariam presents her insight as an apologetic clarification of a previous miscalculation,
but clarity disappears almost as soon as it is proffered, for ambiguity does not substitute
itself neatly for hypocrisy. It requires a longer explanation, and what follows is an
expansive attempt on Mariam‘s part to navigate her own ambivalence. She steers quite
admirably, articulating the various reasons for both grief and joy over Herod‘s demise;
her words, then, are not necessarily difficult to follow, but one does get the sense that,
were she not interrupted by the arrival of Alexandra, she could continue this oscillation
between grief and joy indefinitely. Lack of clarity is not a matter of obscurity but excess,
points that insist on connecting on a line of indeterminate length. Mariam proves that she
is the authority on her own sentiments, but this authority is not imposed, readymade, on
her discourse; it appears as the result of her own effort to make meaning, to make her
feelings fit, an effort she foregrounds, and one which is remarkable in that it is not
interested in closing off inquiry or settling on a single conclusion. Mariam‘s reflections
bring to mind Lyotard‘s impression of thoughts as clouds, ―pushed and pulled at variable
speeds,‖ always ―changing their location one with the other,‖ so that when it comes to the
―rules‖ of language, ―everyone learns by groping around in the stream of phrases like
children do‖ (Peregrinations 6). To ignore this unregulated groping, Lyotard adds, to
believe ―that thinking is able to build a system of total knowledge about clouds of
thoughts by passing from one site to another and accumulating the views it produces at
each site—such an idea constitutes par excellence the sin, the arrogance of the mind‖
(Peregrinations 6-7). Olson agrees and, aided by Haraway and Lyotard, praises instead a
―nonassertive writing‖ as an alternative to ―the discourse of the master,‖ and he links it
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explicitly with an approach that is open, patient, and feminine (13).19 By foregrounding
this feminine posture, Mariam playfully undermines her earlier apology for her sex—―too
rash‖ judgment may not be, in fact, the province of the woman, and more than one female
character will aid Mariam in demonstrating this revelation as the play moves forward.
First is Alexandra, who arrives to scold her daughter for her tears but who also
manages to contribute to Mariam‘s rhetoric of struggle as an alternative to a rhetoric of
assertion. In large part Alexandra‘s speech is certain and unwavering in its condemnation
of Herod, but she also foregrounds the inevitable slippages involved in any effort to
discover—that is, to make—meaning. She castigates Herod for his audacity in killing
Hircanus and Aristobolus in order to ―royalize by right your [Mariam‘s] prince-born
breath‖ (ii.42), a gesture she points out was not only murderous but also unnecessary:
Mariam‘s children are part of ―Alexander‘s brood‖ (65), and Alexander ―of David‘s
blood‖ (67). Herod ―did not raise them,‖ Alexandra claims, ―for they were not low, / But
born to wear the crown in his despite‖ (71-72). She effectively locates the rashness in
Herod‘s impulsive authoritative undertakings. Of course, she is also speaking rashly in
her claims that the supremacy of Mariam‘s blood is unquestionable. Still, the ultimate
impression Alexandra leaves is one of struggle and vulnerability; Herod may have had no
real authority to kill his betters, but he killed them nonetheless. At the end of her speech
Alexandra waxes nostalgic about her earlier, apparently unsuccessful efforts to woo
Felicity ―by winning Antony‖ (88). She‘d sent pictures of Mariam and her son, hoping
that this ―double slight‖ might ―captivate / The warlike lover‖ (93-94). But her gesture
exceeded itself, for Antony, she imagines,
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158

fared like a hungry guest,
That to some plenteous festival is gone;
Now this, now that, he deems to eat were best ….
And, thus distracted, either‘s beauty‘s might
Within the other‘s excellence was drowned;
Too much delight did bare him from delight,
For either‘s love, the other‘s did confound. (97-99, 105-109).
The two images function here as symbolic representations of what Diane Davis calls the
―inappropriability of meaning‖ (―Finitude‖ 130). Alexandra rashly assumed her
intentions would be communicated to Antony effectively, but she now understands that
the tools she used to affirm her communication worked too well. Antony was so
captivated by both images that he was overwhelmed and, finally, confounded. Alexandra
acknowledges her shortsightedness in having assumed only one possible outcome of her
communicative gesture, and in doing so she exposes a more generous attitude toward
meaning-making. As Davis explains, it is a limited view of communication that portrays
it as ―a reaffirmation of what one already knows or what one is already programmed to
assimilate …‖ (―Finitude‖ 130). Alexandra admits this limitation and, in her vision of
Antony neither straightforwardly accepting nor rejecting the images but instead
interacting with them in an entirely different and ambivalent manner, she portrays
communication as a real and unpredictable ―event‖ that ―exceeds any interpretive
endeavor‖ (Davis ―Finitude‖ 130). Mariam‘s picture, like her earlier grief and joy, is
foregrounded as inspiration for a description of a rhetoric of struggle that, once again,
does not close off inquiry but only pauses, briefly, in the picture of Antony‘s
bewilderment, before moving on to an altogether different scenario in which Antony, the
recipient of Mariam‘s picture alone, rejects Cleopatra, kills Herod, and makes Mariam
empress of Rome. True, Alexandra is trying to have it both ways, illustrating how any
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communicative endeavor is unpredictable but engaging in fantasy predictions anyway.
But she has already exposed the vulnerability of her own discourse; her final vision of
Mariam sitting on Rome‘s thrown, however confidently asserted, is as suspect as
anything in her entire speech, which is perhaps why Mariam neither affirms nor denies
the possibility of this alternate reality, but simply says she has no desire for it.
Characters are constantly engaging in these ―what-if?‖ scenarios throughout the
play, as if they cannot quite trust the solid reality of their current positions. Even the most
assertive characters regularly stutter in the course of making their assertions, introducing
hesitation, doubt, bewilderment, contradiction, or simply a general sense of unease. After
ridiculing Salome for her audacity in threatening him with a divorcing bill—―Are
Hebrew women now transformed to men? / Why do you not as well our battles fight, /
and wear our armor? Suffer this, and then / Let all the world be topsy-turved quite‖
(I.vi.47-50)—Constabarus admits that his wife probably does have the means to ―reverse
all order‖ (84). She has done it before, after all. Constabarus can remember when he ―was
Silleus, and not long ago / Josephus then was Constabarus now; / When you became my
friend you proved his foe, / As now for him you break to me your vow‖ (87-90). The
repetition of the indefinite masculine pronouns accentuates the ambiguity Constabarus
begrudgingly welcomes into his indictment. Certain as he is that Salome is worthy of
censure, Constabarus, like Alexandra, ultimately cannot leave the impression of certainty.
―My prophesying spirit doth foretell / Thy [Salome‘s] wavering thoughts do yet but new
begin‖ (99-100), he equivocates toward the end of his scene, now couching his
disapproval in prophesy rather than direct affirmation. What if ―Herod‘s death had been
delayed?‖ (103), he imagines next; then Salome would have betrayed himself, the sons of
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Baba, and ―the sweet-faced Mariam‖ (113). Constabarus replaces his earlier certainty of
Salome‘s obvious, verifiable shame with the certainty that what is obviously supportable
is not a necessarily credible factor in how events determine themselves. ―Though all
Judea yield [Mariam] innocent,‖ Constabarus anxiously but gravely supposes, Salome
would still ―work her wrack‖ (117; 116).
Undoubtedly Salome is the character who most noticeably and most willingly
foregrounds the apparatus of the production of authority. As Shari Zimmerman points
out, Salome ―remains alert (as Mariam does not) to the multiple ways in which things
may, or may be made to, signify—and thus to the ‗weak uncertain ground‘ … of meaning
itself‖ (575). We see Salome re-alerting herself to this position in her first soliloquy. At
first troubled and distracted by Mariam and Alexandra‘s insults, Salome too participates
in a series of ―what-if?‖-style suppositions: if Herod were alive, Mariam ―should not miss
her merit‖ (I.iv.4); if fate had not been ―too too contrary‖ (13), she might have laid eyes
on Silleus before Constabarus. But just as she establishes her tone of helpless complaint,
she stops herself: ―What childish lets are these? Why stand I now / On honorable points?
‗Tis long ago / Since shame was written on my tainted brow‖ (21-23). If she had ever
cared about her reputation, after all, she would still be married to her first husband,
Josephus, whose death she implicitly assumes responsibility for in this scene. Since
Impudency already sits on her forehead and ―bids me work my will without delay,‖
Salome resolves, ―for my will,‖ to ―employ my wits‖ (34-36). Essentially, she stops to
remind herself of everything her husband will later, somewhat redundantly, accuse her. It
is here that Salome defiantly resolves to ―be the custom-breaker, and begin / To show my
sex the way to freedom‘s door‖ by divorcing her husband (49-50). She then appears to
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backtrack by reverting to another what-if-Herod-had-lived scenario, fantasizing about
accusing Constabarus of treason, securing not only divorce but death. But she quickly
replaces this unlikely visualization of the future with a glance back to the past,
remembering with regret how she once begged for Constabarus‘s life: ―I curse my
tongue, the hinderer of his doom‖ (60). Finally Silleus arrives, and Salome ends her
speech by playfully, but also notably and cannily, declaring that had she not named him,
―longer had he stayed‖ (64).
Through the stuttering, the many twists and turns she includes in this monologue,
Salome covers some rich rhetorical ground. It is first of all noteworthy how quickly she is
able to escape from the self-pity Mariam and Alexandra inspire; as she reminds herself
that she does not stand on her poor reputation, she also suggests that, had she wanted, she
could have ―affected an unspotted life‖ (26). This serves as an effective answer to
Mariam‘s accusation that Salome‘s ―baser birth‖ dooms her to inevitable disgrace
(I.iii.27)—for Salome, neither disgrace nor its opposite are inevitable, the result of
inherent advantages or deficiencies. More consistently than Mariam, Salome reveals that
―[p]ersonal integrity is … not necessarily a natural state, but a careful self-construction
…‖ (Bennett 301). Careful is the key word, for Salome does succeed in (re)unifying her
reputation with her single authority over her reputation, fitting together her experiences
quite differently than Mariam, who offers an entirely different interpretation of the
reputation-making process. Both approaches are inflexibly authoritative, however;
Salome perhaps even uses Mariam and Alexandra‘s inflexibility to startle herself out of
complacency, for she forefronts her interest in construction—of herself, her experiences,
and the experiences of others, up to and including their lives and deaths—for the duration
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of her speech. Indeed, we come to see her as a figure brash and powerful enough to
―reverse all order‖ and ―work her wrack,‖ but she still engages in Haraway‘s ―double
move,‖ foregrounding the apparatus of the production of her authority even while she is
producing it, and thus making room for the ambiguity that is a defining feature in Cary‘s
work. Salome‘s renewed sense of authority over her own reputation, for example, is
stimulating enough to extend itself to the authority she assumes as a custom-breaker who
can ―hate as well as men‖ (48). This extension, however, is more paratactic than it is
linear or logical. It is and is not a credible link, for while it is hardly difficult to assume a
connection between Salome‘s awareness of her own reputation-making and her daring
promise to be the first woman to sue for divorce—and thus contribute further to her poor
reputation—she complicates the sense of direct, logical, justificatory movement between
the two propositions. There is actually a vast distance, in other words, between
reputation-making and custom-breaking. Lyotard explains how paratactic linkages work:
Conjoined by and, phrases or events follow each other, but their
succession does not obey a categorical order (because; if, then; in order to;
although …). Joined to the preceding one by and, a phrase arises out of
nothingness to link up with it. Paratax thus connotes the abyss of NotBeing which opens between phrases, it stresses the surprise that something
begins when what is said is said. (Differend 66)20
Salome‘s vow to sue for divorce is certainly surprising, but not simply as another
audacious remark that stems directly from a pre-established bravado. Though it initially
appears as if Salome is subordinating her custom-breaking to her reputation-making
(because she has managed the one, she can manage the other, and by the same means),
the cause-and-effect link she makes is ultimately coordinative—it undoes itself, making
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comma, or nothing‖ (Differend 66).
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her vow to sue for divorce exist side by side, but independently of, her earlier vow of
impudency.21 We might say this is parataxis masquerading as hypotaxis, but the former
breaks through. Indeed, once the many pieces of Salome‘s speech are considered,
hypotactic constructions are rendered illegible. They can no longer count as fitting.
Davis explains that ―what paratactic linkages do for us is point at the wide open
spaces between phrases, at the phrases that are not being uttered‖ (Breaking Up 109).
And there is something wide open about the leap Salome makes from determining her
reputation to divorcing her husband, something wide open between her question, ―cannot
women hate as well as men?‖ (48), and her answer, ―I‘ll be the custom-breaker …‖ (49).
Like the speakers already discussed, Salome foregrounds authority, such that we
anticipate the answer to her rhetorical question: yes, women can hate as well as men. But
even as she sounds this authority, Salome, again like the other speakers, cannot
foreground certainty, cannot lead us comfortably into some hypotactically arranged
conclusion: Because I can hate as well as a man, I’ll be the custom breaker. Any smooth
cause-and-effect process breaks down ―because linear sequences of causality depend
upon being able to define a one-way interaction between the event regarded as a ‗cause‘
and that considered as an ‗effect‘‖ (Hayles 19). Salome‘s interactions in this scene,
however, are multidirectional (Hayles 20): unquestionably, she puts her own will and wit
at the forefront, but in first introducing the divorce question, she invites other wills and
other wits to occupy the same ground, and it is these interruptions that disrupt the
possibility of any smooth, logical movement in her discourse. When she questions the
privilege granted to men to divorce their wives, she is doing just that—questioning the
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privilege, the authority itself, not those who hold it. Authority, as she describes it here, is
something that is ―given‖ (45), not made. This butts against her earlier decisiveness about
her own capacity to construct authority, and the implication that all authority is so selfconstructed. So when she assumes the role of custom-breaker, it is unclear what exactly
this gesture means: is she planning to prove somehow to Heaven (47) that women are just
as worthy of being granted this pre-made authority? Or will she be leading a charge on
Heaven to seize this authority, still pre-made, without permission? Or will she (re)make,
apart from Heaven, an entirely different but much more conveniently applicable version
of this authority? Before she divorces Constabarus, in other words, must she first divorce
God? Has she, in fact, already done so, in her eagerness to reveal her tireless past efforts
to construct her own reality and to make decisions that, while not always wise, were
always hers? Does not Salome become her own idol here, though without asking for
idolatry, for by exposing all the means by which she has achieved her own prominence,
has she not made idolatry impossible?
What Salome initially presents as a simple matter of lack of power—a man can
divorce, a woman can‘t—explodes into questions that have nothing to do with lack and
everything to do with excess. She offers not some predictable answer to an
uncomplicated question about women versus men, but instead offers ―a way out of binary
logic‖ and into what Davis calls a nonpositively affirmative third position: ―Nonpositive
affirmation celebrates the parts, the excess, the playfulness, viewing the No/Thing not as
a loss or lack of ‗Some/Thing‘. Rather, the excess is assumed to preexist the abstractions
and categorizations that we have foisted upon it: there never was any lack but only and
always an ominous and overflowing excess‖ (Breaking Up 61). By the end of her speech,
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Salome appears not as some impudent, over-reaching woman; she hardly appears as a
subject at all, but as ―a hoard of multiplicities, rhizomatic loose ends that will always
overflow abstract categorizations‖ (Davis Breaking Up 57).22
It is perhaps this ominous idea of herself as a loose fluidity rather than a bound
subject that provokes Salome to revert to another ―what-if‖ scenario immediately after
her reflections on divorce. To tattle on Constabarus to a living Herod would indeed be
significantly easier (to follow) than breaking the customs guarded by Biblical precedent,
and it is understandable that Salome would imagine a clearer path to sexual autonomy. It
is also possible to read her final quip about summoning Silleus to her presence by naming
him out loud as an attempt to reinforce playfully all the aggressive assumptions of
authority she has just listed—all the presumptions, the lives she claims to hold, or to have
held, in the palm of her hand. But Salome‘s jest also re-emphasizes the difficulty
introduced by the divorce question: the idea that not every apparatus of constructed
authority can be foregrounded, that the agency behind some privileges are so mysterious
that they can only be remarked on and marveled at, gathered but never fitted in a single,
encompassing scheme.
Certainly Salome presses us to consider more deeply the relationship between
speech-making and meaning-making. In terms of plot, the primary purpose of scene four
is to provide a space for Salome to remind herself of her own agency, to talk herself into
being the prime mover of the play. And she succeeds in convincing herself of this special
22
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authority, bringing into focus the connection between speech and agency—but it is a
connection that moves far beyond a typical perception of rhetoric as an art of persuasion.
Salome‘s rhetoric (not to mention Mariam‘s, and Alexandra‘s, and Constabarus‘) is too
stutteringly, uncertainly certain for its primary purpose to be merely persuasion towards
some single or established position. Persuasion occurs almost instantly for Salome, as she
works to expel any higher power beyond her own initiative. But she inevitably invites
back in more than a measure of inscrutability, offering her revitalized self-importance as
an opportunity to defer a clear picture of a defined self-identity. Words are power—that
Salome knows. Handled with skill, they can persuade people to think and act in certain
ways, and thus constitute and reconstitute reality. But even the most skillful handler can
find herself at the mercy of a material so incessantly itinerant. Indeed, where exactly does
Salome stand at the end of her first speech, appearing as she does as ―one who expresses
a discourse‖ and who is ―simultaneously an expression of discourse‖ (Baillif 78)? Is she a
custom-breaking heretic, a broken idol, a restless adherent to a code she can only
articulate but feel no loyalty toward? We watch the care she takes to make herself into a
text, but even though we are witnesses to the process, we still face the illegibility of the
final product.23 As Davis explains, when ―[o]ne meaning [is] perpetually deferred, we are
also perpetually deferred. Language is finally incapable of habeas corpus; it cannot
produce a stable, unified subject. Our faith in agency … is based on our faith in
grammatical structure, which requires that every deed have a doer, that every action have
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an agent‖ (Breaking Up 94). But when the subject is problematized, disidentified,
scattered—as Salome is—―every attempt to reduce difference to sameness is dispersed
…‖ (Breaking Up 95).
Judith Anderson attempts to trace the awareness, among early modern scholars, of
the resistance to fixity that is a feature of language and, if Salome is any indication, a
necessary feature of the people who use language to navigate their own identities. She
explains that ―[a]lthough language in this period appears to be immensely more flexible
and fluid than in modern times, the pressures and the means to stabilize it were building.
Somewhat paradoxically, they were both reflecting and contributing to a sense of its
always ambivalent substantiality, its elusive manageability, its equivocal ‗thingness‘‖
(Words 65). Dictionaries appeared as ―arbiter[s] of verbal correctness,‖ but the effect of
the dictionary, Anderson explains, was ―finally and doubly two-sided, at once to freeze
language and to display its irrational if productive mutability, and at once to substantiate
its referentiality and its own thingness,‖ displaying ―on the one hand frozen reifications
and on the other variable, mutable, arbitrary openness‖ (Words 64, 80, 98). The effect of
Salome‘s verbalizing is also double-sided, at least. Her shameless self-construction
spotlights a confident belief in a direct correlation between word and thing, but this
unification, Salome‘s discursive attempt to freeze her self as prime mover, leads to a
clarity that, paradoxically, must accommodate ambivalence, a melting variety, an identity
that is confidently articulated but also in crisis. Salome‘s self is both substantive and
referential, like Mariam‘s picture in scene two—finally getting hold of it initiates the very
possibility of losing hold of any one interpretation.
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We might go so far as to say that Salome is primarily responsible for
substantiating the play‘s startlingly articulate incoherence—a persistent ambivalence is
the wrack she works. It is inside this incoherence that we can find justification for the
rhetoric of struggle with which Cary continues to experiment. We discover what is
particularly and peculiarly seductive about this kind of discourse, and we discover what is
less than seductive about its opposite, the rhetoric of assertion. Salome is able to see the
appeal of her own self-constructed illegibility and extend it, once again, to accomplish
some perplexing but effective rhetorical work. When Herod returns, she knows better
than to approach him with any unambiguous accusations against Mariam. Her
disparagement is instead careful, sometimes subtle, and home to more tentative questions
than blanket assertions. Most significantly, as Alexandra Bennett points out, ―the
negative picture she delineates for Herod is based, in part, upon her own traits‖ (304):
Mariam will never blush, Salome suggests, ―[t]hough foul dishonors do her forehead blot
(IV.vii.50); ―[s]he speaks a beauteous language,‖ though ―her tongue / Doth but allure the
auditors to sin‖ (74-76); she has had multiple lovers, but ―[f]or sure she nevermore will
break her vow, / Sohemus and Josephus both are dead (147-48). All these attributes—the
forehead blotted with dishonor, the alluring tongue, the past lovers—are reminiscent of
Salome‘s first speech and of Salome herself. Notice too that all of her contributions,
though purposefully snide, cannot be deemed outright condemnations; though she more
than implies Mariam‘s infidelity, she makes sure to include the possibility that Mariam
will be chaste in the future, now that her ―lovers‖ are dead. Indeed, Herod seems to react
most passionately to this denial of a clear view of his own wife‘s ―wavering heart‖
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(154).24 He can reach no consensus; he can never again be sure of either her guilt or her
innocence. Herod has enough sense at this point to rail against Salome, calling her a
―foul-mouthed Ate‖ (155) who has ―made Herod insecure‖ (159). Though helplessly
confounded about his wife, Herod proves attentive enough to identify the primary effect
of his sister‘s rhetorical strategy—she has not persuaded Herod of anything, only made
him doubt, and doubt is all Salome needs to get everything she presently wants. While
Mariam rejects the rhetoric of struggle, gravitating instead toward belief in some
foundational principle or grand narrative—in this case, a beautiful, invulnerable
innocence—that she can use as a shield against all the less absolute principles that
surround her, Salome retreats from the idea of any absolute power beyond her own
inventive capacity. Opposed to Mariam‘s ―attempts to articulate herself as a unified
subject‖ is Salome's ―revision in her own multifaceted image‖ (Bennett 304), a revision
that proves much more potent than the unwavering certainty of her rival. 25
Cary more than adequately prepares us to spot the weaknesses in Mariam‘s losing
strategy. Zimmerman reminds us that, as despicable as ―the discerning Salome‖ may be,
her ―dissembling speeches and actions … become more defensible, even essential (both
as survival strategy and hermeneutical critique), while the chaste behavior of the
unsuspecting Mariam, unconcerned with the matter of Herod's suspicion or the show of
her own ‗impudence‘ … becomes quite clearly, even hopelessly, naïve‖ (556).
Zimmerman is right to point out that Mariam‘s conviction appears especially pathetic
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when placed alongside Salome, her sometimes double, sometimes foil, but Cary inserts
an additional and more consistent comparison to highlight the untrustworthiness of
Mariam‘s steadfastness: the chorus.

3. Allegiance to Drifting: Ambiguity, Mobility and Production
In the first scenes of the play, every character‘s speech demonstrates a wandering,
unsettled rhetoric which, while determined and home to severe and concentrated
passions, remains vulnerable to an open and continuous inquiry. But just as we are poised
to follow the rhetorical flow Cary works so hard to assemble, she unexpectedly reverses
the current. The chorus at the end of Act I warns us away from the discontented,
―wandering mind[s]‖ we have observed in the first five scenes. Such ―wretches, seeking
what they cannot find‖ (123), are doomed to torment, for ―[t]o wish variety is sign of
grief‖ (137), and the only person ―happy in his fate‖ is one who ―is delighted in a settled
state‖ (141-42). Mariam, the chorus‘ primary target, is misread as a woman incapable of
contentment, perpetually grieved at what she does not possess and disdainful of what she
does. Of course, we remember Mariam‘s earlier navigation of her own feelings, which
she proved were hardly so predictably unequivocal. She can hardly be said to wish for
variety—rather, like all the other characters, she suffers it, wonders about it, and reflects
it in her speech.
The Chorus‘ rhetoric of totality, its stiff proverbial wisdom, seems singularly
inappropriate given the drift of the drama thus far. As the play moves forward, it
threatens to entrench itself deeper and deeper into a too-articulate irrelevance. At the end
of Act II, the chorus takes prejudice as its theme, accusing all the actors, and humanity in
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general, of believing rumors too eagerly, ―never try[ing] before we trust‖ (II.iv.122) and
―drown[ing] objections in the flood / Of partiality‖ (131-32). Those who want Herod
dead believe that he is dead immediately, says the chorus, while those who want him
alive doubt the rumor at first, but are quickly swayed by ―the multitude‖ (139). The
implication is that the believability of a rumor is dependent first on the existence of
already-established, clearly-defined prejudices. But we have already seen that, when it
comes to Herod, such unambiguous feelings are nonexistent. The chorus make no space
for ambiguity—everyone, they claim in the final stanzas, believes ―the news of Herod‘s
death … of most undoubted credit‖ (149-50), and no one stops to consider ―the peril that
ensu‘th, / If this should prove the contrary to truth‖ (145-46). Once again, in their haste to
over-generalize, the chorus is guilty of a careless and shortsighted misreading/miswriting.
No character in the tragedy accepts Herod‘s death without doubt, even those who have
the most to gain by it. The ―what-if?‖ suppositions continue into Act II, as everyone
pauses to consider the ―peril‖ that will ensue if the rumor proves false: Pheroras, thrilled
that Herod‘s death means he can marry Graphina without interference, still imagines a
reanimated Herod ―leav[ing] the sepulcher‖ (II.i.81) to ―be my nuptial hinderer‖ (83); the
sons of Baba each ―fear this tale of Herod‘s death, / At last will prove a very tale indeed‖
(II.ii.61-62), and so wish to remain in hiding; Constabarus, whose doubts we are already
acquainted with, attempts to rally them, but ultimately concedes that, if Herod ―have his
life, / Concealment would not then a whit avail; / For certain ‗tis, that she that was my
wife, / Would not to set her accusation fail‖ (110-13); even Doris imagines Herod
returning to show some kindness to their son Antipater, despite his cruelty to herself.
Such examples hardly provide unequivocal support for the chorus‘ conclusion that
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prejudice ―makes us foolish, heady, rash, unjust‖ (II.iv.121). Prejudice is too totalizing
and unambiguous a word for what is really going on among these characters, none of
whom exhibit any perfectly straightforward bias; all of them entertain the possibility of at
least two realities, one in which Herod is dead, one in which he is alive.
Having exposed its sloppy and neglectful deductions, Cary provides her chorus
with a somewhat atypical function—it begins to stand for the rhetoric of assertion and all
its limitations. It becomes the frozen embodiment of this particular discourse, the kind
that refuses to wander, the kind that relies on proverbs or sententiae that ―operate as
templates of meaning, freeze language, and appear to solidify it‖ (Anderson Words 35).
Such precepts could function, in the early modern period, as ―the spectacles through
which new experiences are seen and hence understood. The essential significance of an
experience appears to be settled beforehand. … Experience merely provides an occasion
on which to fit the precept …‖ (Anderson Words 35-36). Cary displays what can happen
to an experience once it is enclosed within a precept‘s discursive shell. The experience of
the characters, the very drama of the play, bears little to no resemblance to the chorus‘
individual summations of the drama, enclosed in the several even stanzas appearing at the
end of every Act, summations which are clearly meant to unify all the elements of
experience into an inflexible, carefully assembled whole. But each of these ―wholes‖
utterly fails to encompass the parts it is meant to assimilate, and so ―[t]he whole not only
coexists with all the parts; it is contiguous to them, it exists as a product that is produced
apart from them …‖ (Deleuze & Guattari 44). Indeed, the contrast between what actually
happens and the chorus‘ restrictive, moralizing abstracts grows more and more distinct,
so that by the time we hear Mariam make her strange pronouncement that, despite
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knowing she ―could enchain [Herod] with a smile, / And lead him captive with a gentle
word‖ (iii.45-46), she will instead put all her hope in her innocence (62), unassisted by
any discursive rhetorical strategy, we see her as not only naïve but also stubbornly, even
selfishly obstinate. Act III‘s chorus accuses Mariam of lack of self-restraint (iii.102),
another misreading, for by asserting the existence of an unassailable, totalizing
innocence, Mariam is showing all the restraint in the world, uncomplicating herself the
same way the chorus tries to uncomplicate the tragedy. 26 Each dispenses with
ambivalence in favor of single and supposedly irrefutable interpretations. Mariam settles
on innocence, even going so far as to claim, in front of Herod, her inability to ―frame
disguise‖ or teach ―[m]y face a look dissenting from my thought‖ (IV.iv.58-59)—a claim
we know, as Bennett points out, ―to be fundamentally and factually untrue‖ (300).
Likewise, the chorus settles on a single theme each time it appears—in Act I, variety; Act
II, prejudice; Act III, verbal chastity; Act IV, forgiveness 27—in an attempt to reduce the
drama‘s complex inarticulations to a few clear-cut, catch-all diagnoses. Ignoring the
variety of factors that may contribute to Mariam‘s impending arrest and execution—
Salome‘s machinations, Doris‘ prophetic curses, Sohemus‘ disloyalty, Herod‘s
capriciousness, Mariam‘s refusal to flatter—the chorus of Act III settles on a single
cause, Mariam‘s ―common mind‖ (III.iii.126), and, engaging in their own brand of
―what-if?‖ hypothesizing, declare that if she had just kept her mouth shut around
everyone but Herod, she would be ―free from fear, as well as innocent‖ (132). In Act IV,

26

Nancy Gutierrez is less hard on the chorus, and suggests that their ―critical comments about Mariam's
assertiveness, on the one hand, misconstrue the reason for Mariam's rebellious stance, but, on the other
hand, pose the moral problem of the validity of self-assertion when it results in self-destruction‖ (246).
27
The cherry-picking strategy of the chorus proves impossible to sustain by the end of Act V. See below.
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however, the chorus changes its mind, settling on a different all-inclusive fault of
Mariam‘s on which to blame the tragedy, her lack of ―virtuous scorn‖ (IV.viii.123):
Had Mariam scorned to leave a due unpaid,
She would to Herod then have paid her love,
And not have been by sullen passion swayed.
To fix her thoughts all injury above
Is virtuous pride. Had Mariam thus been proved,
Long, famous life to her had been allowed. (135-140)
There is no indication that the chorus is building on the case it earlier made in Act III, no
attempt either to link hypotactically Mariam‘s unchaste verbosity to her inability to
forgive or to suggest that one fault contributed more to Mariam‘s fate than another. Both
are credited as the thing that destroys Mariam‘s chances for life, fame and happiness.
Inadvertently but also inevitably, through hyperconforming to its responsibility to sum up
the drama, through over-settling the significance of the characters‘ experiences, the
chorus finally does court ambivalence when it includes two contrary explanations, both
of which claim prominence. If these two interpretations are not to cancel each other out,
if they are to link at all, they must do so paratactically, inelegantly and even, to borrow
the terminology of Deleuze and Guattari, schizophrenically. Deleuze and Guattari use
their belief in a productive, desiring, not essentially repressive unconscious to argue for
the existence of disjunctive, non-exclusive ―flows,‖ which are impossible to absorb or
contain fully —to encompass in (or as) a Whole or a Cure—and which they place in a
forceful and interactive relation with the traditional ego, the bounded subject of
psychoanalysis. In contrast to the psychoanalyst, the schizoanalyst ―is not an interpreter,
even less a theater director; he is a mechanic, a micromechanic. There are no excavations
to be undertaken, no archaeology, no statues in the unconscious: there are only stones to
be sucked … and other machinic elements belonging to deterritorialized constellations‖
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(338). Certainly what we see in Cary‘s work is a constellation of experiences, parts that
do another kind of work than cohering or synthesizing. They work, in fact, to desynthesize, to deterritorialize, to lead us away from familiar or common ground, away
from consensus, including the consensus that would deliver to us a fully legible
explanation for the tragedy of Mariam. ―The task of schizoanalysis is that of tirelessly
taking apart egos and their presuppositions; … mobilizing the flows they would be
capable of transmitting, receiving, or intercepting; establishing always further and more
sharply the schizzes and the breaks well below conditions of identity …‖ (Deleuze &
Guattari 362). So the chorus‘ inadvertent de-legitimizing of their own conclusiveness—
instead of being this kind of woman, Mariam should have been this kind of woman … or
wait, this kind … or this kind!28—saves them from dismissal, in that their productively
unconscious discursive activity ultimately does not neglect, and thus betray, the full and
actual dramatic action of the drama. Finally, they become part of it.
By Act V, in fact, the chorus seems to acknowledge consciously the necessary
revision of its inferior rhetorical strategy, admitting that the ―strange events‖ (i.261) of
this drama will from its participants and witnesses ―all certainty bereave‖ (263). True, the
chorus reverts to its familiar tendency to try to resolve irresolvable complications with
one more, by now familiarly unreliable, ―what-if‖ proposal: ―Had [Herod] with wisdom
now [Mariam‘s] death delayed, / He at his pleasure might command her death‖ (28384)—hardly a prescription for a happy or even a fully intelligible conclusion. If Herod
had only waited to kill Mariam, he could have killed her later? The chorus does better to
28

This is what Deleuze and Guattari call free disjunction: ―A disjunction that remains disjunctive, and that
still affirms the disjoined terms, that affirms them throughout their entire distance, without restricting one
by the other or excluding the other from the one…. ‗Either … or … or,‘ instead of ‗either/or‘‖ (AntiOedipus 76).
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admit the weak ground of such a proposal and reiterate instead Herod‘s unbalanced
raving, just one home for the ―many changes‖ (291) present in this drama, one arena for
the ―admirably strange variety‖ (292) that persists through the text and exists in service to
no larger, grander, or final narrative.

4. Allegiance to Education: Agency in Uncertainty
That said, the chorus is not wrong to read into its own inconclusiveness a
―warning to posterity‖ (290) and to see in these events potential for a ―school of wisdom‖
(294). Such a pedagogy would partake of the nondisciplinary rhetoric of struggle
modeled by Cary‘s characters, a rhetoric that ―speaks no logical course of action; it gives
us no rational answers. But it does, nevertheless, urge us to act in our uncertainty‖ (Davis
Breaking Up 103). The disquieting link Davis makes between language and drug use is
perhaps relevant here: she proposes a pedagogy that
would invite students to take a full hit of language, to Be-on-language
without censorship, without protection. [This pedagogy] would invite
them to shed their inherited need to fix meaning and erect solutions; it
would offer them a not-at-all safe space to test the boundaries of the
Proper …. This pedagogy would not be interested in creating a safe space.
It would not be interested in protecting categories, borders, genders, or
genres. It would, rather, offer students the chance to write, to be written, to
follow … a text that will blow their minds and, in the process, blow up the
‗order of things‘‖ (Breaking Up 252-53).29
Part of Davis‘ point is that these kinds of explosions are happening anyway. This is
already what readers/writers/speakers do as they explore both how their experiences fit
together and what counts as fitting. Already, we work inside unsafe spaces where ―we
29

For a response to the idea of nondisciplinary rhetoric, see Robert Scott. Though Scott‘s reply is directed
to Vitanza, his warning about bewaring ―the transcendental impulse‖ (236) is also relevant to Davis‘
arguments. Scott urges critics to ―note well the impulse toward transcendence, that is, a justification of
justifications, in this case, the automatic operating of language in itself as inexorable. If we are not careful,
foundationalism …will live again‖ (236).
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both are and are not a function of language,‖ in that ‗we both speak and/but are also
always already spoken …. [E]ven as we speak for free-flowing desire-in-language, it
speaks us. Even as we speak our desires, we are always already subject to the desires of
that speech‖ (Davis Breaking Up 80). ―For language thinks, thinks us and thinks for us at
least as much as we think through it‖ (Baudrillard Passwords xii). Cary‘s tragedy is
remarkable in that it does not flee from this ―paradoxical space between doing and being
done, speaking and being spoken‖ (Breaking Up 71). Cary writes with unflinching
attention the windfalls and the catastrophes that occur simultaneously inside this space,
where characters prove to be most active, most memorable, most intimidating, most
dangerous, when they are most uncertain, when they speak less as single subjects
inhabiting a single site than as fluid, multiplicitous (over)flows that occupy several
positions at once. Salome is the best example, but Herod too inaugurates an active and
ominous uncertainty. Even before Salome works him over,30 Herod exhibits a longing for
mystification in his compulsive need to see Mariam as a figure both sacred and secular,
public and private. She is at once a ―rare creature‖ (IV.i.10) with the miraculous power to
―make the day more bright‖ (11), to ―make months minutes, days of weeks‖ (18), and she
is Herod‘s own ―best and dearest half‖ (IV.iii.2) who disappoints him with her ―dusky
habits‖ (4) and undutiful, ―froward humor‖ (53). ―Even for love of thee / I do profoundly
hate thee,‖ Herod says after accusing Mariam of planning his murder (iv.42-43). Unable
to decide her punishment, Herod can only conclude, ―Without her I most miserable am. /

30

Boyd Berry, in fact, downplays Salome‘s role entirely when he asserts that ―the play has no Iago‖ to
tempt Herod and thus ―rationalize‖ his ―rapid swings in mood‖ and general errant behavior (258).
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And with her more than most‖ (92-93).31 The last example illustrates how, by deferring
one consistent portrait of his wife, Herod defers a clear picture of himself as well. His
bewildered, ambivalent effusions over Mariam are another example of a discourse that
welcomes mystification, that resists closure. And yet, Mariam is killed, and her death
marks an undeniable closing off, a break in at least one flow that will not and cannot
resume, despite Herod‘s insistence on the possibility of reviving Mariam‘s decapitated
body: ―Why, yet methinks there might be found by art / Strange ways of cure, ‗tis sure
rare things are done / By an inventive head and willing heart‖ (V.i.91-93).
Herod‘s emphasis is on strangeness, rarity, invention, art—all of which are
emphasized throughout the play as being inexorable.32 If having Mariam killed was
Herod‘s desperate, conscious or unconscious attempt to declare his own strange,
inventive, ambivalent habits of thought impossible, the same habits return with a
vengeance, as Herod‘s rhetoric after Mariam‘s execution is just as scattered and
vulnerable as it was before.33 The difference is, we now have a dead body on our hands.
We now have a tragedy, which the text urges us to remember; even as it makes it

31

Here again is Berry: Herod‘s ―ramblings … are hard not to read as laughable. In love with a person
whom he constructs, almost superstitiously, as a miracle, then as a whore, he infects both the actions of
other characters and the rhythm of the play, rendering it as abrupt and jerky as his emotional swings‖ (259).
I would agree, other than to point out that the play‘s rhythm is established long before Herod the lunatic
patriarch arrives, physically, on the scene. He establishes nothing; he goes with the flow(s).
32
Rosemary Kegl suggests that ―within the logic‖ of the text, ―it is not entirely fanciful to imagine that
Mariam‘s fate might have repeated that of Herod‖ (147), who is, as Pheroras says in Act III, ―reviv‘d from
certain death‖ (ii.41)
33
Mariam is linked with Abraham (V.i.96), Abel (139), and her own grandfather (190); she is ―one
inestimable jewel‖ (119) smashed ―all to pieces‖ (129), then again she is Herod‘s ―better half‖ (134); she is
the crown of her sex (163-64), the ―best birth‖ of Jewry (202); she is the pride and joy of all the Greek
gods, who mourn her death (208-26), except that they hate her and in fact rejoice at her fall (227-34), or
they would if they were not mere ―fictions … void of sense … dreaming falsehoods‖ (235-36). Herod
displays what Avital Ronell calls ―writing on the loose, running around without a proper route …
return[ing] only to haunt itself, refusing to bond with community or affirm its health and value—
consistently reflect[ing] a situation of depropriation, a loss of the proper‖ (qtd. in Davis 238).

179

―possible and desirable to produce both a ‗tragic‘ Herod and a comic Herod … the
situation of Mariam is never comic‖ (Berry 270). Cary‘s rhetorics of fluidity and struggle
are by no means apolitical, amoral or nihilistic, because, for one thing, they still provoke
the question: how, once authority is revealed as constantly unsettled, can it still be
grasped and wielded, to devastating effect, by the abusive and tyrannical?
Deleuze and Guattari offer one explanation: when it comes to those excessive
flows that cannot be contained, that are always doing the work of deterritorialization, that
work is always ―accompanied by … reterritorializations, reterritorializations that always
reconstitute shores of representation. What is more, the force and the obstinacy of a
deterritorialization can only be evaluated through the types of reterritorialization that
represent it; the one is the reverse side of the other‖ (316). ―In reality, everything
coexists‖ (377), the authors continue; ―everything happens at the same time‖ in a
―process that is always and already complete as it proceeds, and as long as it proceeds‖
(381-82)—de-familiarizations and re-familiarizations; de-codings and re-codings; deauthorizations and re-authorizations. Investment in the social field guarantees that ―the
movement of deterritorialization can only be grasped as the reverse side of territorialities‖
(369). This does not mean that escape or revolution is impossible, but the coexistence of
―the most varied kinds of investments‖ (378) does mean that revolutionary groups can
easily reassume the form of subjugated or reactionary groups: ―they mobilize desire,‖ but
―they are also continually closing up again‖ (349), so that creating new land means ―we
must go back by way of old lands …‖ (318). Still, Deleuze and Guattari emphasize
breakthroughs rather than breakdowns, urging us to remember that ―at least something
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arose whose force fractured the codes, undid the signifiers, passed under the structures,
set the flows in motion, and effected breaks at the limits of desire: a breakthrough‖ (369).
Several such breakthroughs are effected in Mariam, and they do not lose their
status as breakthroughs despite their contribution to the system of subjugation that
reasserts itself with the death of the heroine. Salome‘s breakthroughs, for example, the
flows she sets in motion to destabilize her identity, pour into the re-authorization of
Herod‘s identity quite readily. Cary primes us to perceive these mystifying relationships
between processes and tendencies that should be contradictory—but are not. One
wonders if this is what Cary had learned to expect from authorities: a bewildering and
often reckless inclination to mystify and unsettle combined with a conflicting insistence
on the necessity of single positions. Though it would be years after writing her tragedy
that she finally converted to Catholicism and separated from her husband, she was
perhaps already experienced in the discursive strategies utilized by those who would
continue to presume authority over her faith and her person.34 Again, what was the oath

34

Zimmerman relates the story of a young Elizabeth Cary‘s intervention in a witchcraft trial: the wrongly
accused woman had been urged to confess to crimes she hadn‘t committed. Realizing this, the child Cary
―devises a plan (which she whispers into her father's ear) whereby this supposed witch is led to confess to
the murder of a man who, unbeknownst to the accused, is one of the living bystanders—a confession of
guilt that instantly establishes the woman's innocence‖ (559). Yes, but it is an innocence necessarily
mystified by the contagious ambivalence of the entire proceedings. Lying, the accused is assured, will
mean mercy. Cary then leads the woman to hyperconform to this advice (as the friar leads Hero in Much
Ado), such that the woman‘s dissembling confession—a different guilt than the guilt she confesses—is
made to appear side by side with the proof of her innocence. She must embrace the lie in order to reach the
truth, but what happens to truth and innocence once they are brought into such close contact with their
supposed opposites? At a very young age, according to Cary‘s biographer, she proved capable of not just
making transparent the less than straightforward strategies used by the courtroom‘s presiding authorities,
but of responding in kind with a device of her own. Her response to the discovery of these less than
reputable habits of thought is similar to the response Haraway discusses when she suggests that ―noticing
the trouble of a certain way of making meanings is not a justification for not doing it that way. What it is is
a reminder, a thorn, not to try to hide the trouble.‖ Our obligation, Haraway suggests, ―having inherited
what we have in terms of knowing about how meanings work … is to remember that you do know about
these things and that while you‘re engaging in meaning-making with others, you at least at some point in
your project deliberately stutter, deliberately trip; you don‘t try to smooth out the trouble. The tripping and
stuttering … is a kind of precious moment that blocks idolatry.‖

181

of allegiance if not a directive that encouraged indistinction even as it demanded
transparency? It performs a particular kind of rhetorical work that, if Questier is correct,
achieved a rather diabolical success in disrupting the certainty of its target group. Cary
experiments in mimicking this kind of rhetorical strategy, welcoming its mystification—
partly to mock it, perhaps, but also to deconstruct it with the most serious, solemn
attention. Her characters live in a fraught world and so engage in habits of expression that
are equally fraught. So many of their speeches provide experimental models for the kind
of ruptured writing that ―open[s] toward unprecedented things‖ (Davis Breaking Up 13).
In addition to these models, what teachers of writing might take from Cary is the
possibility that, when we urge student writers to ―reign in their own multiplicitous sites of
exploration in the name of The authoritative voice‖ (Davis Breaking Up 17), we are not
doing them any favors, because so often ―The authoritative voice‖ is itself
multiplicitous—that‘s how it gets things done.35 The potency of authority, its often
dangerous potency, can lie in its disunity, its excess, its insistence that it constructs itself
and its sheer cheek in letting you watch the process, which quite obviously appears to be
absurdly illogical, destructively short-sighted, or both. Most students already know this.
They‘ve grown up through the search for nonexistent weapons of mass destruction in
Iraq, the bailing out of failing banks ―too big to fail,‖ and the reluctant exoneration of
Wall Street traders whose dubiously legal, fiscally and ethically toxic financial deals
caused the housing market to collapse and the economy to tank. They‘ve watched the rise
of increasingly bewildering fringe-politics on thriving 24-hour ―news‖ programs
35

We might add here Haraway‘s thoughts on agency, which she explores as ―a material effect of our
practices of working. It is not something you have and then go out and use. It‘s a verb, not a thing that you
either possess or don‘t possess. So this business of being multiplicitous is not about having so many pieces
that never come together that you can‘t do anything because you‘re never one enough to do it.… Agencies
are about the potency to make something of the world.‖
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operating by likewise increasingly bewildering standards of journalism. We ought to do
them the courtesy of dropping the charade that reason and logic will always win the
day.36 Writing courses can and should keep practicing an investment in sociopolitical
culture, of course, but Davis is on to something when she suggests that we begin to put
ourselves ―in the service of writing rather than the other way around‖ (Breaking Up 235).
What would happen, she asks, if we were to teach ―writing for writings sake? Writing as
a pressing of the limits of discourse? Not a writing that stabilizes identities but one that bl-o-w-s minds?… A writing that costs us a myth … but grants us [a] life?‖ (Breaking Up
235, all Davis‘ emphasis). Couldn‘t such a nondisciplined approach to a nondisciplined
rhetoric have more to say about a world that has so often proved so defiantly
undisciplined itself? Couldn‘t it remind us of the ways we actually fit together, rather
than (or perhaps in addition to) the ways we pretend we do? Couldn‘t it, as the chorus
says of Cary‘s play, bereave from us all certainty and yet still call itself a ―school of
wisdom?‖

36

As Baudrillard says, if ―the state of the world is paradoxical—ambiguous, uncertain, random or
reversible—we have to find a thought that is itself paradoxical. If it wishes to make an impact in the world,
thought must be in the world‘s image‖ (Passwords 86).
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Chapter Five
Now You Don’t See it, Now You Don’t: Annihilation, Virtuality and Oblivion in
Marvell‘s ―Upon Appleton House‖
―For ‗tis better that evil Men should be left in an undisturbed
possession of their repute, how unjustly soever they may have
acquired it, then that the Exchange and Credit of Mankind should be
universally shaken, wherein the best too will suffer and be involved. It
is one thing to do that which is justifiable, but another that which is
commendable; and I suppose every prudent Writer aims at both …‖
(The Rehearsal Transpros’d: The Second Part 237)

1. The Influence of Excess
Spenser exits book VI of The Faerie Queene in bitterness over the inevitability of
the Blatant Beast‘s rhetorical outmaneuvering. He leaves behind a sense of dejection at
the realization that the false can say as much as the true, or that the false and the true can
be reported together without contradiction. The same realization translates to bewildered
celebration in Much Ado About Nothing, to a lunatic and lonely mourning in the Tragedy
of Mariam. Marvell‘s poetry, also coming to this realization, takes us to less easily
identifiable conclusions. Countless scholars have commented on the impossible
ambiguity of Marvell‘s work. 1 ―It has not seemed possible,‖ says Annabel Patterson, ―to
make a completely whole man out of this poet with too many personae … except by
excluding what will not fit our immediate focus‖ (Civic Crown 5). His poems ―do not
show consistency,‖ says David Norbrook; ―with great force, they make incompatible
utterances‖ (Writing 244). Rosalie Colie notes ―the elusiveness and mysteriousness at
variance with the apparent precision of [Marvell‘s] language‖ (3). Blair Worden
describes Marvell as ―a man … who can inhabit a range of voices, each of them authentic
1

See John Klause for comments on this trend in Marvell criticism.
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at the moment of delivery‖ (150). Pairing Marvell with Donne, Joseph Summers remarks
on these poets‘ ―occasional approach to poetry‖ and suggests ―[t]hey could imagine an
attitude which they themselves or someone else had felt or might feel, and they could
write a poem embodying it without permanently committing themselves to it. They …
could exaggerate the claims of something they did approve to the point that the very
exaggeration indicated the limitations of the claims‖ (161). Andrew Barnaby suggests an
explanation for Marvell‘s elusiveness when he argues that his poetry responds ―to midcentury English culture's anxiety over a lost discursive community;‖ he produces ―his
own peculiarly ‗metaphysical style‘ precisely as a rhetoric by which to measure, if never
finally overcome, the epistemological distance that makes private knowing a world unto
itself‖ (Barnaby 335).
Certainly the settings of some of Marvell‘s most famous poems can best be
described as epistemological; they provide space for cognitive activity and they can
furthermore be said to represent that activity. Their speakers attempt to validate their
rhetorical processes—ways of delivering information—by exploring the questionable
ways in which rhetorical processes are validated. This is close to what Barnaby means
when he notes that, because words were considered ―the most dangerous contagion of
all‖ in mid-century England, Marvell‘s ―very efforts to elude the public disease through
writing were necessarily part of what he was seeking to inoculate himself against‖ (335).
So the private worlds Marvell constructs in his poems are hardly private, and even as they
insist on journalistic detachment they move closer to the inevitable implosion Baudrillard
argues is the result of any ―excess of information‖ when ―[i]t is information itself which
produces uncertainty‖ (―The Masses‖ 580).
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The experience of excess information was emergent but influential in the
developing public sphere of mid-century England.2 ―The sinews of communication made
the Civil War possible,‖ states Nigel Smith, and ―communication and authority were
fought over and disputed until the end of the century‖ (1). ―From the outbreak of
hostilities between King and Parliament,‖ says Sharon Achinstein, ―the press was
instrumental in the conflict;‖ printing, both authorized and unauthorized, provided ―a
public forum in which political debate over vital issues could be conducted,‖ enabled the
―development of a political culture that extended far beyond the perimeters of the court
and the royal household,‖ and ultimately ―refashioned political consciousness‖ (51).
Norbrook agrees that ―the widening of the public sphere‖ encouraged people ―to look on
themselves as agents in making and writing history‖ (―English Revolution‖ 235). More
than a few took on the burden of speaking for a particular interest, even as it became
more difficult to identify the major principles of any one cause. 3 Protestantism,
Republicanism, Constitutionalism: ―[t]his was a period when institutions were fragile,
and ideas powerful …‖ (Scott 24). Martin Dzelzainis points to the ―constant ideological
repositioning‖ which makes the conflict of the war ―more complicated than is often
supposed‖ (38). ―At the level of ideology,‖ he argues, ―the conflict between
Parliamentarians and Royalists appears to be replicated several times over in the
opposition between Calvinists and Arminians, constitutionalists and absolutists, and
republicans and monarchists. In each case, it seems, we find progressives and
reactionaries squaring up to each other,‖ though ―the categories of progressive and
2

See Peter Lake & Steve Pincus; Steven Zwicker; Joad Raymond; Nigel Smith.

3

For an examination of this difficulty inside the republican experiment in particular, see David Norbrook,
Writing the English Republic: Poetry, Rhetoric and Politics, 1627-1660.
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reactionary simply fail to work out as expected‖ (35-36). He gives the example of the
Ship Money trial of John Hampden in 1637, prosecuted by ―those who attributed to the
royal prerogative the authority to dispense with the law,‖ defended by ―those upholding
the rights and liberties of the subject …‖ (36).
By 1642, however, and the time of the militia controversy over who
controlled the raising of the troops in the counties, the positions had been
reversed. Now it was the two Houses and their apologists who used
arguments from necessity to justify overriding the letter of the law, while
the King‘s propagandists condemned these arbitrary doctrines and
declared their allegiance to the known laws. Thus not all absolutism was
Royalist. (36)
Other examples can be found in the arena of religious toleration. Groups that aligned
themselves against the inflexible uniformity of the Presbyterians could find themselves
opening doors to uncomfortably radical positions (such as those of the Ranters)
impossible to exclude without undermining their original case for increased acceptance
(Dzelzainis 44). The press could exacerbate any of these isolated disputes by providing
the means for expression and dissemination unburdened by any ―standards of
impersonality or ‗equal time‘ for a balanced view of events‖ (Achinstein 58). Lois Potter
observes that ―[h]aving more news meant, for many, not more but less truth,‖ for ―the
unprecedented nature of the things that really were taking place in public life made it
possible for the wildest statements of the press to win belief‖ (5-6). Smith elaborates:
[T]he notion of a consensus of meaning in available public languages had
disappeared for many. Viewed objectively, what was understood as
enormity or anarchy was really the multiple capturing in words of the
same events; many differing narratives being produced simultaneously to
explain one single set of occurrences, and the repetition of these textual
simultaneities over and over again for successive events. Familiar enough
to us, but not to them. The witnesses to this inflated repetition seem to be
telling us that it caused a social trauma. (Literature and Revolution 25)
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Jonathan Scott quotes Marvell himself on the subject of print culture: ―O Printing! how
hast thou disturbed the Peace of Mankind! that Lead, when moulded into Bullets, is not
so mortal as when founded into Letters‖ (51).
In addition to giving birth to, or at the least lending vitality to, public opinion and
public participation, the amplified access to and concern with the circulation of ideas
creates a situation in which it is less and less possible ―to isolate reality or human nature
as a fundamental variable. The result is therefore not at all any additional information or
any light on reality, but on the contrary, … a state of suspense and of definitive
uncertainty about reality‖ (Baudrillard ―The Masses‖ 579-80).4
When Marvell‘s poems collapse—and many of them do, more than once—they
collapse inward, in recognition of their own definitive uncertainty about the very realities
they describe. Destruction, even annihilation, are essential themes of Marvell‘s work, as
is suspense, but he distinguishes himself in including images of annihilation that
consistently fail to annihilate. Rather, just as Nature in the ―Horatian Ode‖ accommodates
Cromwell‘s greater spirit (44), Marvell‘s poems carry themselves through and past their
own ruin, making room for the very excess that threatens their collapse. Said in the Ode
to hate both emptiness and overlap (41-42), Nature responds to the conflict between the
two not by choosing but by making room. So Marvell makes room in his poems for
contradictions that should, but do not, contradict. And his speakers, who are intent—
perhaps to a fault—on recording experience, rely on an erratic, meandering commentary
4

One of the most passionate antagonists of such uncertainty was Thomas Hobbes, whose Leviathan seeks
in large part to identify the fundamental variables or humanity and so establish ―the constitution of man‘s
nature‖ (273). Hobbes locates the seed of the rebellion against the monarchy in the emerging public sphere,
specifically in the reading of classical texts; he concludes that there is nothing ―more prejudicial to a
monarchy than the allowing of such books to be publicly read, without present applying such correctives of
discreet masters as are fit to take away their venom: which venom I will not doubt to compare to the biting
of a mad dog …‖ (273).
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that surrenders the closure of a single perspective, yet without sacrificing the curious
shelter that results from their unique commitment to provide such multifaceted views.
―The beasts are by their dens exprest,‖ the speaker tells us in stanza two of ―Upon
Appleton House.‖ Likewise the structure of this poem will assume an instinctive capacity
to speak, not only for Fairfax, but for us; it will express the exploratory nature of ―man
unruled‖ (9); it will ―measure out,‖ at what turns out to be great and bewildering length,
our ―place‖ (16).
The speaker begins by making promises about what we will see: ―all things are
composed here / Like Nature, orderly and near;‖ the lines are admirable, the mathematics
holy; he predicts future pilgrimages to what must become a sacred place, though for now
it remains ―clownishly‖ humble, only ―a mark of grace‖ and ―an inn to entertain / Its
Lord a while, but not remain‖ (25-26; 42; 47; 35; 60; 70-72). Careful as he is to
accommodate this dual perspective coherently, the speaker threatens to rupture his
traditionally epideictic strain quite early on, when he imagines Fairfax‘s entrance into the
―swelling hall,‖ which ―[s]tirs, and the square grows spherical; / More by his magnitude
distressed, / Than he is by its straitness pressed‖ (51-54). This is a vision we might better
expect from Spenser‘s Scudamore, narrating his journey through the magical, wishfulfilling Temple of Venus. How does this swelling, eagerly accommodating hall
(re)square with the speaker‘s earlier image of sober-minded men ―practicing, in doors so
strait, / To strain themselves through Heaven‘s Gate‖ (31-32)? Already we sense our
tour-guide‘s ambiguous perception, and we can expect more excuses disguised as nonexcuses for his untethered impressions, like the one that begins line 61: ―And yet what
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needs there here excuse, / Where ev‘ry thing does answer use?‖ The exact nature of that
―use‖ is already ambiguous. 5
Like Scudamore, our speaker appears faced with the task of not simply recording
but selling us on an experience, and he chooses, initially, to oversell. Once again we
confront the possibility of seduction by weakness, by hyperreal descriptions that lack any
referent, and by a narrative that, despite its supposedly extemporaneous flights of fancy,
reveals itself to be already reproduced. ―We opportunely may relate / The progress of this
house‘s fate‖ (83-84, my emphasis), the speaker tells us, as if by chance, and what
follows is what should be a familiarly suspicious account of a silent virgin‘s bold
abduction from the center of a circle of vaguely threatening women. 6 The parallels
between Isabel Thwaites and Spenser‘s Amoret are obvious, and though Scudamore
rehearses his own supposed adventure while Marvell‘s speaker narrates from a greater
distance the prowess of William Fairfax, at stake for both speakers is the same
opportunity: to shape, with perfect freedom, an unexperienced experience. It is an
opportunity that proves irresistible to these storytellers without (real) stories, despite the
risk that, if found out, they might invalidate both the experience and the shaping of it. But
as Chapter 2 discussed, there are degrees of invalidation, and not every liar can (or
should) be so easily abandoned by an audience made wise to his lie. More artful by far
than the self-interested Scudamore, Marvell‘s speaker exposes himself even as he appears
to relinquish the spotlight by ventriloquizing the ―subtle nuns‖ (94). As Sarah Monette
points out, our suspicion is in fact ―encouraged by the indications of the nun‘s guile: she
5

For notes on how the poem ―swerves from the anticipated path of country-house discourse‖ (104), see
Anne Cotterril.
6
Sarah Monette suggests that ―Marvell deploys the women in the poem to show ruptures between history
and poetry, and between the historical poet and the poetic speaker‖ (155), and indeed it seems necessary to
separate poet from speaker at this point in our exploration of the poem.
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speaks to Thwaites as if by chance. Like the language of ‗Upon Appleton House,‘ her
speech may seem careless, but it has been carefully thought out. The speaker has figured
the nun's speech in such a way as to make his own speaking look more innocent,‖ though
he ultimately ―exposes, by the very act of concealment, the deceit [he] wishes to
conceal‖—that is, his own deceit (Monette 158-59, my emphasis).7 We discern his voice
in the nun‘s double-voicedness. If in book IV of the Faerie Queene the silence of Venus
was meant to work in Scudamore‘s favor, here the opposite is true: it is necessary that the
speaker highlight the subtle nun‘s careful flattery of Thwaites, her insinuating
disparagement of Fairfax, along with the popish practices of the nunnery itself (―When
we have prayed all our beads, / Some one the holy Legend reads; / While all the rest with
needles paint / The face and graces of the Saint‖), so that when Fairfax arrives, we are
prepared to recognize the terrible difficulty of his position, outmaneuvered as he is by
these ―[h]ypocrite witches,‖ these smooth-tongued thieves hiding behind their ambiguous
religion (121-24; 205; 200; 207; 224-25).
But a problem arises when, after the skillful set-up of this epic battle, the two
sides primed to clash, the confrontation itself turns out to be far from satisfying. As
Fairfax pushes his way to the altar (through such ineffectual obstacles as ―Wooden
Saints,‖ an ―old holy-water brush‖ and ―the disjointed Abbess thread[ing] / The jingling
chain-shot of her beads‖ [250; 242; 253-54]), we are told that the nuns‘ ―loud‘st cannon
were their lungs; / And sharpest weapons were their tongues‖ (255-56). But it appears to
7

Anne Cotterill further links the speaker‘s digression on the nunnery with the rest of the poem when she
points out that ―[t]he poem's first words, ‗Within this sober frame,‘ and those of the nun's subtle speech,
‗Within this holy leisure‘ (97), are interesting twins,‖ and suggests that ―in stanza 13 we begin the poem
again but on a deeper note‖ (110). Michael Schoenfeldt‘s interpretation goes in a different direction: he
argues that Marvell ―makes so much of the estate‘s origins in a convent … because the nuns‘ desire for
religious retirement and internal freedom is so uncomfortably close to his own‖ (245).
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be less convenient now to make room in the narrative for the nuns‘ most memorably
intimidating weapon. Whatever and however much they say, Fairfax waves all aside ―like
flies‖ (257), arriving at the altar and his weeping Thwaites. Powerless and beaten, the
women ―guiltily their prize bemoan‖ (267), before the speaker, overzealously committed
to his villainous illustration of nun and nunnery but undecided how best to describe their
downfall, imagines the cloister vanished (270), then wasted (271), dispossessed (272),
and finally demolished (273).
Out of this overkill comes Fairfax the war hero. Great battles, we are clearly
meant to believe, are his legacy, but the poem fails to deliver a believably detailed
account of the reality of these battles;8 we must settle for the speaker‘s suspicious
reportage, which in fact stops short of a narrative and relies instead on pre-constructed
and disconnected sketches: the subtle nun, the indomitable fiancé, the weeping virgin.
History is not deformed; it is absent, and the scene takes on its own reality. Here
Barnaby‘s theories can help us. He suggests that Marvell‘s rhetoric ―perversely enacts‖
the ―crisis of linguistic confidence‖ in mid-century English society (334-35). Poems like
―Upon Appleton House‖ imagine a private world which, while it can provide ―a much
needed respite from the cacophony of culture,‖ can also become ―a site of struggle for
Marvell‘s speakers, a struggle less to locate positions from which to speak for themselves
than to imagine a public space in which meanings might be shared at all‖ (335). These
speakers register the ―impossibility of ever bridging the gaps of representation: between
self and other, signifier and signified‖ (339). ―[B]ecause there is no escape from
8

Nor are the details that are included historically accurate. Brian Patton remarks on Marvell‘s impossible
attempt to ―balance the demands of the historical record with those of a desirable notion of history as a
process that is both teleological and comprehensible‖ (829). The actual, and verifiable, history of the
property reveals William Fairfax as a Catholic who disinherited his eldest sons, facts which sully the
poem‘s dramatic ―founding of a dynasty‖ (829).
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representation, one must always test how the mind actively (re)constructs experience as
artifice‖ (339), and Marvell‘s poems are these tests. However, they spotlight not
reconstruction as much as pre-construction. Experience is not in fact available as a
touchstone, not when the artifice comes first. We are back in Baudrillard‘s territory, for
this is the definition of fourth-order simulation, in which signs become simulacra:
simulations without referents. They bear no relation to reality.9

2. (Anti)Annihilation and Preventive Accumulation: Reality Deterred
For a briefer example of a speaker‘s reliance on pre-construction, we may
consider the poem ―The Mower‘s Song,‖ which begins tellingly:
My mind was once the true survey
Of all these meadows fresh and gay,
And in the greenness of the grass
Did see its hopes as in a glass. (1-4)
Christopher Ricks has remarked that ―[a] characteristic figure of speech in Marvell is that
which goes beyond saying of something that it finds its own resemblance, and says
instead, more wittily and mysteriously, that something is its own resemblance‖ (34). The
speaker in ―The Mower‘s Song‖ tells us his mind is not the surveyor but the survey, the
comprehensive view, of the meadows; the poem‘s setting, then, is not the meadow but the
speaker‘s mind as the meadow‘s simulation. Before we can begin to get comfortable with
this image, however, the speaker adds that his mind also sees in the meadow, or the
simulation of the meadow, its hopes, as in a glass. This glass is a reflecting surface added,
in what seems a superfluous or excessive gesture, to the virtual surface. The speaker‘s
mind as sign, in other words, sees the green grass as a reflection, a copy of itself. The first
9

See Baudrillard‘s Selected Writings, chapter 7, esp. page 170.

193

four lines of the poem thus remove us from any real meadow and situate us in the
speaker‘s mind; and they make the mind both object and agent, engaging in these
somersaulting feats of perception, transforming itself into a reflection so that it may have
a reflection. Here again is Ricks on this ―self-inwoven simile … a figure which both
reconciles and opposes, in that it describes something both as itself and as something
external to it which it could not possibly be. In one of its most teasing forms, something
finds itself compared to both of the terms within a comparison‖ (34). The mind is the
meadow; the meadow is a glass; the mind is the glass. But the survey comes first, and
ultimately both grass and glass must conform to it. Enter Juliana: ―and she, / What I do to
the grass, does to my thoughts and me‖ (6). The refrain should read fairly
straightforwardly: the speaker is a mower, what he does to the grass is cut it, so Juliana
cuts down his thoughts and him. But the first four lines tell us that mower and meadow
enjoy a much more complicated relationship. Forget any literal mowing; the speaker‘s
concern is to make the meadow coincide with his mind.
Juliana‘s entrance in the refrain, then, means one of two things: either she is an
external agent looming over the poem‘s scene, threatening to interrupt the speaker‘s selfabsorption, or she is in fact another of the speaker‘s mirror images. After all, if Juliana
does what the mower does, then the threat she represents cannot be interruption but must
be repetition, even redundancy. According to the speaker‘s formulation, Juliana must be
as desperate to make of the speaker something she can recognize as coextensive with
herself as he is desperate to make the meadow coincide with his mind as pre-constructed
survey: she must simulate the simulation. If Juliana is not the agent of Reality but another
reflection in search of a reflection, then the poem becomes a mobius strip, an ouroboros
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continually recreating its own energetic artificiality, immune to the interruption of reality
because unrelated to it. Juliana‘s threat thus signifies not any straightforward chopping
but the destabilizing of any idea that the speaker has an identity apart from hers (as the
meadow has no identity apart from the speaker). The poem enacts such destabilization:
―But these‖ (7), the mower begins the next stanza. These what? The grass? His thoughts?
The hopes of line four? All of the above? The ―I‖ that pines with sorrow is hopelessly
entangled with the growing blades of grass, even as it is pulled away from the meadow
by Juliana‘s similar efforts to entangle the speaker in her own simulacral relationship.
Knowing the meadow not as a literal meadow but as simulation, we can never fully
separate grass from thought, object of perception from perception itself. So when the
speaker scolds the ―unthankful meadows‖ (13), as if from a distance, for foregoing a
―fellowship so true‖ (14), he is simultaneously as close as ever to the meadow that is his
mind, despite his sense of oppression under Juliana‘s invisible but competing effort to
turn his mind to a new direction, a new sign. The speaker‘s mind threatens to divorce
itself at the same time as it begs to reconcile itself with itself.
Stanza five provides the climax to this perplexity, as the speaker becomes
iconoclast and Juliana moves to the present tense. He will take revenge on the meadow
for its lack of compassion, which is really his mind‘s own metamorphosis, ―And flowers,
and grass, and I, and all, / Will in one common ruin fall‖ (21-22). The mower promises
annihilation as a potential escape from the cycle of reflexivity. It is no coincidence that
this is the moment when Juliana ―comes‖ (23), when she finally arrives to close the
distance between herself and the speaker-as-reflection of whatever she has made of
herself. Inevitably this means the ruin of the mower‘s mind as meadow‘s simulation. That
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image violently shatters as both preparation and repudiation for whatever Juliana has
prepared. Apocalypse turns out to be the poem‘s only hope of escaping redundancy.
And Apocalypse fails. The refrain of stanza five repeats itself with an almost
tragic perfunctoriness. Still the mower speaks of ―what I do to the grass,‖ and still the
correlation exists between his action and Juliana‘s. Not even the poem‘s apocalypse can
break its rhythm, which is reinforced not only by one more refrain but also the addition of
an entire stanza. ―The Mower‘s Song‖ trudges into this bittersweet realization: Marvell
can bring his poem to annihilation, but he cannot make it stick. The artificial reasserts
itself, and with seemingly no inventive assistance from any mindful party. The refrain
becomes automatic, involuntary, habitual. It is difficult to celebrate such mechanical
success, harder still to try to conceive of the poem‘s phony catastrophe. Annihilation that
doesn‘t annihilate? This is easily as absurd as a knight of love who fails at loving. But
Marvell implies more than the ironic absurdity of Scudamore‘s absent love story; the
incongruity here is so much larger, enclosing a worldview, and then a world, that fails to
be real enough to be destroyed. Baudrillard has argued that ―[t]he most widespread belief
is in a logical progression from virtual to actual,‖ and this is definitely a movement that
―The Mower‘s Song,‖ with its inclusion of apocalypse, attempts to achieve: it will
explode itself out of its pure cognition and into the real and fallen world, resituating us,
perhaps, in a real meadow. But once the virtual has overtaken the actual, Baudrillard
explains, ―we must be content with this extreme virtuality which … deters any passage to
action. We are no longer in a logic of the passage from virtual to actual but in a
hyperrealist logic of the deterrence of the real by the virtual‖ (Gulf 27).
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―The Mower‘s Song,‖ then, contains no mowing, no meadow even, the latter
disappeared along with the rest of reality. For a poem that uses such earthy images, we
are nowhere grounded, not, perhaps, until the last stanza. Here the poem essentially digs
its own grave, as the speaker invites the meadows to become ―the heraldry … With which
I shall adorn my tomb‖ (27-28). Again we sense the irony in celebrating surviving the
apocalypse with a funeral, but more than this we are left with the question of what death
can possibly mean for a speaker who has already survived ultimate ruin? What is mere
death post-annihilation? The space by which this funeral is so claustrophobically
encapsulated robs it of its affective properties, as the redundant refrain proves in its final
sapping of the poem‘s energy. This is not closure but enclosure, not an end but certainly a
defeat, in the sense that the first stanzas of ―The Mower‘s Song,‖ helped along by an
anticipation-generating refrain, promise and report on a rich, if entirely hyperrealistic,
conflict—mower vs. Juliana, mind vs. mind—but ultimately can deliver nothing but that
pre-packaged refrain, a redundancy impossible, thanks to the fourth stanza, to find
credible or meaningful, but as impossible to dislodge and replace more satisfactorily. So
the poem must persist in eating its own tail, as Juliana and Mower are locked into their
mimicry by stanza five‘s refrain, the tool of the poem‘s stalling movement. ―This is the
problem with anticipation,‖ writes Baudrillard. ―Is there still a chance that something
which has been meticulously programmed will occur? Does a truth which has been
meticulously demonstrated still have a chance of being true? When too many things point
in the same direction, when the objective reasons pile up, … [f]ar from reinforcing the
probability of the conflict, these function as a preventative accumulation…‖ (Gulf 36).
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This is the technique we will continue to see in ―Upon Appleton House:‖
preventive accumulation will destroy the possible referentiality of Appleton House as it
destroys the referentiality of the mower‘s meadow, enclosing the poem by those piling
details that must ultimately materialize as no ordered tour but a rude heap, an unlivable
habitation in which we will then be invited to live.

3. Extreme Virtualities
The first sections of ―Upon Appleton House,‖ which rehearse the history of the
residence, deal in pre-constructed, incredible images that, if they cohere at all, do so in
service to what Baudrillard calls an ―extreme virtuality‖ that may deter the real (Gulf 27),
in the sense that Baudrillard‘s virtualities are never simply false representations of real
events but are themselves different kinds of events. 10 Already we are wise to the liberties
taken by our speaker, but he is still the only guide we have. As the tour of the house
resumes, the narrative continues its ―frankly irregular‖ pace, ―flaunt[ing] its own seams,
point[ing] to its own joinery, publiciz[ing] its own gaps‖ (Colie 181). This is the speaker
doubling his efforts at deterrence, continuing, less and less apologetically, to draw
attention to his own exertion and so to invite our skepticism. We are told that, because
Fairfax ―could not cease‖ his ―warlike studies‖ (284), he laid out his gardens in ―the just
figure of a fort‖ (286). The speaker energetically pursues the metaphor, enlarging it to
include England itself as ―the garden of the world‖ (322). Fairfax‘s eccentric inability to
retreat fully from the world of war appears at once as an idiosyncratic design choice and a
microcosm of a purer England—except that ambiguity enters in again. It is unclear

10

See Paul Patton‘s introduction to The Gulf War did not Take Place, p. 16.
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whether the speaker is using the garden-as-fort metaphor as a means of transitioning to a
nostalgic tribute to England‘s unadulterated past (moving from point A to B), or whether
he intends for the metaphor to function equally as the description of both Fairfax‘s garden
and England‘s past (point A is point B):
Unhappy! shall we never more
That sweet Militia restore,
When gardens only had their tow‘rs,
And all the garrisons were flow‘rs;
When roses only arms might bear,
And men did rosy garlands wear?
Tulips, in several colors barred,
Were then the Switzers of our Guard. (329-336)
War in this interlude is ultimately condemned as an intrusive and corrupting influence
which, the speaker laments, ―all this doth overgrow‖ (343). But what can the word ―this‖
possibly conjure? Overgrowth is, so far, all there is to see, for Paradise, in the speaker‘s
description above, is never unassociated with war. In his construction of ―that dear and
happy isle‖ (321), every feature is imagined in terms of battle, so that ―war‖ must
function as both metaphor and referent, a reflection of itself.11 Just As in ―The Mower‘s
Song,‖ the artifice comes first; roses have always been arms, and England has always
been prepared for war. This guarantees the ambiguity of stanza 44, in which the speaker
half-accusingly asserts that Fairfax
Might once have made our gardens spring
Fresh as his own and flourishing.
But he preferred to the Cinque Ports
These five imaginary forts. (347-50)
We might legitimately ask the speaker what, at this point, is the difference between
artificial forts and real ones. Given that he has expended every effort to sell Appleton
11

―[I]s war only gardening or is gardening actually war?‖ asks Leah Marcus, who also comments on how,
in ―Upon Appleton House, ―metaphors have a way of undoing themselves‖ (Politics 244).
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House as a battle ground, his attempt in the above stanza to represent it as a mere
metaphor, to draw a solid line between real war and the mere overlay of war, is
unexpected and disorienting—even to an audience already prepared not to take this
speaker at his word.
Monette suggests that such a gesture is typical of Marvell, who habitually ―turns
his metaphors against himself‖ (164). For an additional example, she concentrates on
Thestylis from stanza 51, who, in crying out that ―he called us Israelites‖ (406),
―expresses her awareness of the poet and the poem‖ and so crosses ―from the poem into a
kind of metatextual existence that, rather than literally allowing [her] to escape from the
poem into life, forces the poem backwards into a space where fiction cannot pretend not
to know that it is fiction‖ (164). Her cry signals, more forcefully than anything in the
poem, that the experience being narrated is the poem, and not the tour. The drama lies in
the speaker‘s ambiguous and suspicious articulations about what he wants us to see,
rather than what is there to see. Thestylis thus denies neither fiction nor reality, but in
entangling the two she deters both from asserting any final prominence. Like Spenser,
Marvell gives his readers the opportunity for another response beyond the easy dismissal
of a discourse that has revealed itself to be an unconvincing representation of reality.
Reality, we come to realize, has nothing to do with this poem, so to dismiss the latter in
allegiance to the former will get us nowhere. Once again we are seduced by a narrative
that does not want ―to get beyond appearances‖ because it recognizes that ―getting
beyond appearances is an impossible task: inevitably every discourse is revealed in its
own appearance, and is hence subject to the stakes imposed by seduction, and
consequently to its own failure as discourse‖ (Baudrillard Selected Writings 150), a
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failure that introduces the ―abyss of language‖ (Baudrillard Selected Writings 152).
Marvell primes us to confront this abyss when his speaker uses the very word to describe
the meadow: ―And now to the abyss I pass / Of that unfathomable grass‖ (369-70). And
he seems to invite us to decide, along with his speaker and others who inhabit the poem,
whether we ―fall through it or go‖ (380). The speaker decides on the latter: he is like one
of the mariners who ―bring up flow‘rs so to be seen, / And prove they‘ve at the bottom
been‖ (383-84). Each of his stanzas, which continue to progress by means of war
imagery, functions as a flower of proof, carried up from the bottom of the abyss in order
to make sense of it, to fathom what he himself has dubbed unfathomable. Thestylis,
however, handily exposes this containment effort as fiction or wish-fulfillment; her cry
reinforces the unfathomable and deprives the speaker, and his audience, of the choice to
move through the poem‘s abyss willingly and willfully. It can only be fallen through.
Knowing this, we might find it easier to bestow a condescending admiration on
the speaker‘s tenacious efforts to continue what Patterson calls ―this frivolity of the
imagination‖ (Civic Crown 104); refusing to abandon his original sketch, he describes the
mowed plain as a ―camp of battle … quilted o‘er with bodies slain‖ (420, 422), and
imagines every mower as an Alexander (428). But tenacity translates soon enough into a
kind of obsessive denial. Stanzas 55 and 56 mark the speaker‘s attempt to reassert an
authority, in the face of the unfathomable, that we can hardly find credible. Thestylis may
have prevented him from reaching the bottom of the poem‘s abyss, but his response is
simply to head for the top: stanza 54 describes the freshly mowed meadow, piled with
bundled hay, as ―a calm sea‖ that ―shows the rocks‖ (434). The speaker is careful to
illustrate the hay bales as protrusions on a surface that can be viewed only from a position
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of firm footing—his own. Stanza 56 repeats the assertion, though with more audacity. We
are told that the ―Scene‖ withdraws—though it is the speaker, still half-committed to his
tour-guide role, who withdraws it—bringing ―[a] new and empty face of things‖ (442), a
―leveled space … smooth and plain‖ (443), a ―table rase and pure‖ (446). There is
nothing unfathomable about this space itself, only the path by which we arrived in it.
Unapologetic as ever, the speaker hurries to fill his blank slate with villagers and cattle,
and in a grand attempt to show off his clear-sightedness from any depth or height,
through any optical obstacle or shift in perception, he imagines the simple pasture scene
as a landscape reflected in a glass, the cows shrunk to spots and then fleas, appearing in
the distance to ―feed so wide, so slowly move, / As Constellations do above‖ (463-64).
Cows of unintimidating size have replaced the giant grasshoppers of the unfathomable
meadow, and our speaker seems much more secure as the pilot of these shifting scenes
than as the fellow passenger whom Thestylis accused him of being. 12
From the reader‘s perspective, however, security reads as overconfidence, even
before the overkill of stanza 59. Here the cataracts of neighboring Denton open, and the
flood, the speaker tells us, ―makes the meadow truly be / (What it but seemed before) a
sea‖ (467-68). Again we must feel compelled to ask our too-careless guide, what is the
difference? His scene change is truly a sea change, but what proof can he possibly offer
that both seas are not seeming seas? This flood, after all, is redundant; a few short stanzas
ago we were already inside the unfathomable, and it is only on the speaker‘s word that
we ever escaped, first to the abyss‘s surface, then to the blank plain. Now we find we
―escaped‖ only to be inundated again. Like the mower of ―The Mower‘s Song,‖ who adds

12

See Marcus, Politics 253.
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a glass atop the simulation of the meadow, our speaker adds a flood on top of an abyss,
adds the unfathomable to the unfathomable. For what purpose would he do this, unless it
were to draw more attention to his unbelievably casual decision, in stanza 61, to ―retir[e]
from the flood‖ and ―[t]ake sanctuary in the wood‖ (481-82). In other words, not only
does our speaker manage to escape a sea on top of a sea, but he also describes it as if it is
not an escape at all—just the next portion of the tour.
―Marvell‘s way with this standard topos for inversion should give us pause,‖
Rosalie Colie says (202), but pausing is difficult in the wake of a speaker bent on
following ―the contours of the Fairfax estate,‖ despite having revealed more than once
that ―the poem's deepest and most coherent landscape … extend[s] not in a linear fashion
but in a vertical dive whose lifeline is not genealogical but poetic and psychological‖
(Cotterill 123).13 Our ground is neither solid nor literal but fluid and imagined, yet still
the speaker persists in selling the experience of the tour as a real going rather than a
falling through, and as Colie notes, ―although the imagery inverts so much, … the man in
the poem is in fact never turned upside down: he stays upright through everything‖ (203).
The inevitable but invisible exertion this implies makes our speaker more overbold than
any Scudamore, whose overconfidence grated largely because the dangers he described
provided no impressive obstacle. Marvell‘s speaker, by contrast, narrates scenes of nearcatastrophe that are truly intimidating. These are dangers that actually would feel
dangerous to a mid-century English audience: a deceptive and seductive alternative
religion, an England increasingly intertwined with violence and perhaps unrecognizable
13

Cotterill has much to say about Marvell‘s extended metaphors of flooding and drowning: ―Behind the
celebration of lineal descent, the poem contains a chaotic plummet, a descent which sounds ‗within.‘ The
Marvellian line plumbs‖ (123). She toys with the idea of strategic indifference, argued for below, when she
concludes that ―finally the poet can reverse gravity with a mocking twang of an angler's line as if nothing
had happened‖ (123).
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apart from it, unpredictable and disorienting shifts in perception, movement that feels like
swimming, living that feels like drowning. These threats grow more abstract as they are
introduced, but they also feel more encompassing and personally inescapable.
Annihilation is as present in this poem as in ―The Mower‘s Song.‖ Once again, however,
it fails to annihilate, leaving us more skeptical about our and the speaker‘s deliverance,
unsure, in fact, whether deliverance is the appropriate term. Can one be delivered from a
threat inverted inexplicably into safety? Is it rescue we witness or a tacky brand of magic:
now you see disaster, now you don’t?14 With every phony annihilation, Marvell threatens
to reduce his strongest metaphors to glib ironies. If Appleton House is to be sold as a
sanctuary from the potentially crushing babble of the rest of the rude world, then, when
such rudeness intrudes upon the poem—through the conniving nuns, the unflagging war
imagery, the disorienting abyss, and finally the flood—it must be faced and faced down.
But the speaker‘s strategic response to such dangers consists primarily of indifference.
He ignores. He withdraws. He retires. It is not as if he provides no commentary on each
of these diversions from the structured tour, but his commentary cannot be trusted; indeed
it seems to bear less and less relation to the conditions evoked by the poem‘s language.
War imagery evokes war, in other words, and a flood evokes apocalypse, but these
associations are welcomed into the poem only to be dismissed, as the speaker confuses,

14

Unlike the refrain in ―The Mower‘s Song,‖ which mechanically reasserts itself, as if guided by no hand,
the speaker‘s discourse in ―Upon Appleton House‖ maintains a strained connection with its discourser. It is
the connection to the audience that threatens to sever. Where Spenser gave his readers enough breathing
room to allow them the opportunity to participate in the meaning-making of his poem, Marvell has created
a speaker so intent on the hurried accumulation of various scenarios that he hampers the meaningful
experience of any one event. As readers we may still want to participate, but intervention seems impossible
in a narrative so entirely diversionary. We are perpetual spectators of a discourse entirely taken over by
artifice, one that perpetually deters the real. Still, we are curious spectators, seduced enough to want to see
how far this brash speaker will go to sell us on his sanctuary. But we must devote more effort to construct
an invitation into a discourse that works harder than even Scudamore worked to put us off.
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abandons, or refuses to participate in the very substance of the language he himself
chooses.15 We witness a curious strategy of communication, a method of participation in
language that more and more resembles its opposite. We see in the speaker what
Baudrillard might describe as an ―extreme form of non-participation‖ (Silent Majorities
48), in which the power of catastrophe—brought on by competing ideologies, civil
conflicts, even natural phenomena—is neutralized by, of all things, indifference. So when
the nuns fire their voice cannons, the speaker silences them with his own silence about
what it is they say; when war overruns England such that war imagery dominates all
description of the country, past and present, the speaker continues to assert that the
gardens of Appleton House are unique in their design; when the already inundated
meadows are inundated again by a second flood, the speaker finds footing where there is
none, and calmly retires from cataclysm. The imposition of whatever antagonistic or
restrictive power is met with nothing like subversion. The speaker‘s strategy is much
closer to that of Baudrillard‘s silent majorities, his evilly genius masses, who ―up a bid of
neutralization with more neutralization. So it becomes a game, at this point, it‘s become
something else. It is no longer exactly a historical or political space‖ (―Interview‖ 30910). Like ―The Mower‘s Song,‖ ―Upon Appleton House‖ traces a conceptual space, a
private cognition infiltrated by those permeating threats that still only resemble the real,
and so cannot be responded to as if they are really real. The poem increasingly appears as
both an example of, and a response to, the kind of communication that relies on the
accumulation of meticulously gathered but ultimately insignificant, diversionary

15

For an alternate reading, see Margarita Stocker‘s Apocalyptic Marvell: the Second Coming in
Seventeenth Century Poetry. Nature in the poem, ―like the nation, is out of joint,‖ Stocker says, and
―natural categories are confused…. Such disarray … was characteristic of the Latter Days‖ (57).
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details—details that do not represent reality but deter it, distract from it, even erase it.
Now you don’t see it, now you don’t.
Baudrillard‘s infamous example of this kind of discourse is the media coverage of
the first Gulf war. Writing first in January 1991, Baudrillard argued that, based on ―the
available evidence (absence of images and profusion of commentary),‖ the war would be
―pure and speculative, to the extent that we do not see the real event that it could be or
that it would signify‖ (29). What viewers did see was a virtualization of war ―which is
like a surgical operation, the aim of which is to present a face-lifted war, the cosmetically
treated spectre of its death…‖ (28). In finally asserting, after the end of hostilities in
February, that the Gulf War did not take place, Baudrillard expresses ―not irony so much
as the kind of black humour which seeks to subvert what is being said by pursuing its
implicit logic to extremes: so you want us to believe that this was a clean, minimalist war,
with little collateral damage and few Allied casualties. Why stop there: war? what war?‖
(P. Patton 7). We can attach such black humor easily enough to Marvell‘s work: so
Appleton House and its vast grounds can provide sanctuary from disorder and
catastrophe? What disorder? What catastrophe? What subtle nuns? What war? What
abyss? What flood? Marvell‘s mockery is thus double-edged: in part he scorns the very
possibility of locating or constructing orderliness in an England overrun by war and war‘s
aftermath, but he also locates the absurdity in the idea of articulating safety or retreat
from a threat to which one simultaneously strives to be indifferent.
That Marvell would experiment with habituating such absurd insensitivity is not
inconceivable, even if we assume the poem‘s early composition in 1951, nine years
before the Act of Indemnity and Oblivion in 1660, after which, as Norbrook points out,
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―[f]orgetting was officially sanctioned‖ (Writing 1), subjects encouraged by decree to
train themselves towards a necessary amnesia and a careful silence that, if objectively
observed, could resemble indifference.16 Barnaby suggests that ―the Act merely codified
what had already come to be understood: that the forces of revolution were as much
rhetorical as military and political‖ (332). According to Stephen Zwicker, ―the memory
of that lamented translation from language to arms remained vivid and potent throughout
the rest of the century. Civil war was an event that changed the conditions of public
utterance …‖ (9).17 But also changed were the conditions of memory. ―Different kinds of
forgetting and remembrance were implicit in the new law‘s status as an act at once of
oblivion and of pardon,‖ explains Paulina Kewes; ―[a]n act of oblivion ostensibly
indicates an intentional disregard or an arranged state of having been forgetten, while a
pardon seems to be an intentional remembrance of an act only to excuse or forgive it‖
(113). However, ―[g]ood memories were hard to separate from bad ones, and the arbitrary
nature of selective forgetting and selective remembering was obvious to everyone‖
(Kewes 113). Here was ―a period uniquely under the shadow of its past. Like a road
accident victim, this generation remained susceptible to both nostalgia on the one hand,
and nightmares on the other‖ (Scott 26). ―[F]or good or ill,‖ says Scott, ―the nation
remained a prisoner of memory‖ after 1660.
But Marvell‘s poem suggests that, even before the Restoration proper, survivors
of the war and regicide may have spent the years before 1660 experimenting with the

16

The Act established legal consequences for anyone who would ―presume malitiously to call or alledge of,
or object against any other person or persons any name or names, or other words of reproach any way
tending to revive the memory of the late Differences or the occasions thereof.‖ Excluded were a specified
few who participated directly in the execution of Charles I.
17
See also David Cressy.
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strategy of forgetting. Certainly Fairfax did. His commonplace book contains the
following lament on the regicide:
Oh Lett that Day from time be blotted quitt
And lett beleffe of‘t in next Age be waved
In deeper silence th‘Act Concealed might
Soe that the King-doms Credit might be save‘d
(qtd. in Patterson, 97)
For Fairfax, retreat to his country estate was a means of forgetting. Indeed, a practiced
non-commitment to one‘s own experience may have been the most attractive habit to
cultivate, which is not to say that it was easy. The several examples of post-Restoration
anti-republican violence Norbrook lists suggest that ―forgetting would not happen of its
own accord, the evidence must be actively erased‖ (Writing 3). There is no reason to
suppose that forgetting was any easier before 1660, when the republican experiment was
just beginning in the immediate aftermath of the regicide. In any case, ―Upon Appleton
House‖ may certainly be said to attempt to enact an active erasure through the strategy of
neutralizing indifference, extreme non-participation. The speaker models perfectly the
simultaneous indifference and hyper-vigilance the Act of Oblivion would later attempt to
codify.18 Over and over again ―Upon Appleton House‖ thrusts its dangerous, worlddestroying/world-inverting imagery before our eyes and then insists, as we are looking,
that we not look, that there is nothing much, after all, to see. But it is ―not as comforting
as it ought to be that most of the things inverted in this poem are not in fact inverted‖
(Colie 204), and it is even ―disturbing to realize that all this is not crucial, or that our

18

Such a pairing is not identical to, but is perhaps akin to, the ―alliance of levity and seriousness‖ that T.S.
Eliot identified as a characteristic of Marvell‘s wit (104). Jonathan Goldberg points to a joining of ―creative
energy to annihilative loss. [Marvell‘s] poems are replete with emblematic moments of creative
annihilation …‖ (14).Compare also Patterson‘s assertion that Marvell ―was a man in whom discretion and
indiscretion, detachment and involvement, were so inscrutably mixed that … he became, finally, a politic
irony, a figure of speech‖ (48).
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emotional reactions to the evident meaning of the words used are continually undercut
and undermined by what the [speaker] does next …‖ (Colie 205). What collapses in this
inconsistently traumatic exhibition is any understanding of the aims of information, as the
speaker‘s commentary ―loses itself in a completely unreal space‖ (Baudrillard Gulf 31)
and his audience is ―amnestied by the ultra-rapid succession of phony events and phony
discourses …‖ (Baudrillard Gulf 51). We can neither fall through the abyss(es) nor go,
stunned as we are not by the force of Marvell‘s images but by their ―sinister
insignificance‖ (Baudrillard Gulf 51).19
The last section of the poem is Marvell‘s attempt to shake us from our stupor by
illustrating the ideal citizen in a territory willing to risk everything for shelter from its
own bad memories. Maria is the product of the speaker‘s process of extreme nonparticipation. She is also the price of it.

4. “Nothing that is So is So”: Reality Reflected
The entrance of Maria is the most significant feature of the final portions of
Marvell‘s poem. Her accomplishments, rehearsed below, are many, but gifted as she is, it
is Maria who finally offers us a way into the poem‘s exclusionary discourse. Her name
calls forth literal associations between Mary Fairfax and Marvell, her tutor, and indeed it
seems possible to begin closing the gap between poet and speaker, who come together as
we are encouraged to see the latter as no longer a mere tour-guide, but a teacher.

19

We might compare this to Victoria Silver‘s conclusion that ―in Marvell's pastorals, the artistic works not
to incite or fulfill but rather to extinguish desire, as the driving problematic of the human condition. For
once things become artificial, they become peculiarly quiescent, memorial, and anaesthetized … in the
sense of dead to the pain of living in this world‖ (41).
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Before Maria arrives, however, our speaker continues to enjoy his privileged
exclusion. His initial description of the wood as an ark half-functions as an explanation
for his easy retirement from the flood, except that this ark is ―yet green, yet growing‖
(484)—not even constructed yet. The speaker simply assumes rescue like he assumes the
―easy‖ philosophizing (561) he shares in the following stanzas, which culminate in his
assertion that
I, easy Philosopher,
Among the Birds and Trees confer;
And little now to make me, wants
Or of the Fowls, or of the Plants.
Give me but wings as they, and I
Straight floating on the air shall fly:
Or turn me but, and you shall see
I was but an inverted tree. (561-568)
Things progress quickly after the affirmations of stanza 71. Following his declaration of
his essential affinity with Nature, the speaker claims fluency in the wood‘s ―most learned
original‖ language (570). Language he links to prophecy—weaving Sibylline messages
out of ―scattered … [l]eaves‖ (577). Prophecy he links to history—reading all the
discourses of East and West ―in this light Mosaic‖ (582), ―Nature‘s mystic Book‖ (584).
And history he links to theology—moving through the trees ―[l]ike some great Prelate of
the Grove‖ (592). Surprisingly, such responsibilities provoke no anxieties. Our speaker
―languish[es] with ease‖ (593), resting on moss while ―the wind, cooling through the
boughs, / Flatters with air my panting brows‖ (595-96). The scene is set for ease and
safety, and as before, when he oversaw the filling of his tabula rasa, the speaker seems to
be just where he wants to be. He goes so far as to ask the ―courteous Briars‖ (616) to
chain and nail him to this spot—a brutal and threatening image that, as Marcus points
out, is ―utterly characteristic of [the speaker] and of the topsy-turvy logic of his poem‖
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(Politics 259). This too turns out to be a (non)threat that passes as easily as the
(non)threat of the flood: ―For now the waves are fall‘n and dried, / And now the
meadows fresher dyed‖ (625-26).
But just as the speaker seems content in his perfect ambiguity, contemplating the
meadow as ―a crystal mirror slick; / Where all things gaze themselves, and doubt / If they
be in it or without‖ (636-38), he once again resorts to overselling. ―The young Maria‖
(651) enters, and though the speaker makes every effort to build her up as a fantastic
phenomenon, superior to anything encountered in the poem so far, she is in large part just
as redundant as the poem‘s second flood—impressively redundant, but redundant
nonetheless. Maria is special, we are told, because she enjoys an affinity with Nature, but
then again so does the speaker. Nature‘s hushed, reverent admiration at Maria‘s entrance
is a more enhanced but certainly still comparable response to the leaves and ivy which
earlier embroidered, with similar reverence, a vestment for their speaker/prelate. Next,
Maria is said to ―converse in all the languages as hers‖ (708), but the speaker has already
claimed a similar adeptness in the signs and speech of the woods. Maria is also safe from
the ―ambush‖ (719) of courtship, but no safer than the speaker, ―encamped … [w]here
Beauty, aiming at the heart, / Bends in some tree its useless dart‖ (602-604). Finally, both
Maria and the speaker must admit an unfortunately tenuous connection to the spaces of
the poem: Maria hangs on ―like a sprig of mistletoe‖ destined to be cut by the priest who
marries her (739, 742), while the speaker anticipates his own detachment enough to ask
the woods to ―stake [him] down‖ (624).
All this is not to say that the speaker‘s praise of Maria is necessarily insincere,
just that he conjures her presence for additional reasons beyond the opportunity to
211

compliment her. That Marvell was Mary Fairfax‘s tutor is a fact impossible not to
consider once we see how much the poem‘s Maria seems made in the image of the
speaker—all her special features he has already enjoyed. In relinquishing control of the
poem to her, the speaker essentially awards the authority he has clenched so tight-fistedly
to his own reflection. The poem then follows all her movements and all her orders:
Tis she that to these gardens gave
That wondrous beauty which they have;
She straightness on the woods bestows;
To her the meadow sweetness owes;
Nothing could make the river be
So crystal-pure but only she;
She yet more pure, sweet, straight, and fair,
Than gardens, woods, meads, rivers are. (689-96)
Despite her hyperreal capacity for control, Maria obviously appears as the product of an
educative process. She is the speaker‘s means of not only claiming the poem but
rewriting it, further deterring the referents to reality we may have suspected Maria, as
Mary, to restore. Instead, she is granted the authority to grant retroactive integrity to the
muddled descriptions of garden, wood, meadow and river we have only just witnessed.
No mention is made of the overlay of war on garden or meadow; the latter is sweet rather
than bloody; the river is crystal-pure rather than swimming with astonished cows (472)
and eel-invaded oxen (474). Maria gathers together all the rude heaps of images the poem
has accumulated and by giving orders, restores order. She is more than a good student.
She proves what the best forgetting can do.20

20

She also proves its limitations. Brian Patton points out that, in his allusions to Maria‘s marriage—―And
find a Fairfax for our Thwaites‖ (748)—―Marvell‘s equation of Mary Fairfax with Isabel Thwaites is a
witty one, but it is subtly misleading: if there is to be a ‗Fairfax‘ involved …, surely it would have to be
Mary herself … [but] Mary‘s husband cannot be a Fairfax. In the present moment of the poem, then, the
house of Fairfax is facing a dynastic crisis‖ (833). Monette points to ―Maria's lack of involvement in the
metaphorically violent process she is undergoing…. [S]he becomes first an object, passive and victimized,
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In a way ―Upon Appleton House‖ simply demonstrates what is most obvious
about acts of oblivion: they require action—specifically the energetic and creative
commitment to non-commitment that a strategy of forgetting requires. That energy we
see in our speaker‘s endless restlessness as he conducts his tour; his creativity we see in
Maria herself. As the speaker‘s finished product, Maria is proof that forgetting is not a
matter of delusion but of design.21 She is wholly objectified, the speaker‘s bad habits
given form and flesh and finally power, an avatar picked to live in this artificial present
now denuded of its equally artificial past. Lest we forget, the entirety of the poem is
already an experiment in hyperreality; the speaker‘s rhetorical habits—a reliance on
preventative accumulation, the absence of fundamental variables, the dependence on
language that is already reproduced—have landed him in this extreme virtuality, making
Maria an artifice added to the artifice that has always come first. Reality is still deterred.
Action is not.22 Marvell illustrates here, as he does in ―The Mower‘s Song,‖ how much
work there is still to be done even inside the hyperreal. And as in that poem, there is no
retreat from the hyperreal, no escape from these habits that have become habitation.
Ultimately we must see ―Upon Appleton House‖ as both: a place to live and an
ongoing articulation of living, another enclosure without closure. Despite himself the
and then simply erased. Her parents rejoice in her marriage, but Maria herself is not granted an opinion‖
(166).
21
Garrett Sullivan agrees in his study of memory and forgetting in Renaissance drama that forgetting ―is
more than a mere failure of memory‖ (2). It ―has a content—indeed, different contents in different
discursive contexts‖ (134), and it ―aims to prescribe a future‖ (21). Compare also Grant Williams‘ and
Christopher Ivic‘s assertion that ―[t]here is much more to forgetting and conversely much less to memory
than meets the eye…. Memory is not a totalizing field, and forgetting is neither the outside nor a lack
within such an idealized field‖ (1). See their entire edited collection, Forgetting in Early Modern English
Literature and Culture.
22
Here again is Colie, who comments extensively on the poem‘s unreality, which ―give[s] the whole poem
an air of being not totally experienced, not totally grasped. The disjunctions of this world suggest its
habitation by a being distracted, a being whose mind was not wholly free to control and order the
experiences offered him, but who was doing a pretty good job of trying to control them in spite of his own
preoccupations‖ (263).
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speaker has constructed a dwelling ―superfluously spread … / Where Winds as he
themselves may lose‖ (17; 20). This kind of disorientation is the inevitable result of
indifference combined with vigilance. When the speaker lectures the ―fond sex‖ (729) in
stanza 92, mocking their ―useless Study‖ (730) and predicting, ―Yet your own Face shall
at you grin, / Thorough the Black-bag of your Skin‖ (733-34), it is a prophecy he can
already attach to himself. Maria is his reflection, his poem‘s new face, and by the end she
is the one doing all the ordering, all the leading, all the looking, relieving the speaker of
his previous vigilance. However, as her reflexive image—as her—he is of course not
relieved at all.23 ―When we penetrate the surface of things‖ in this poem, ―we uncover yet
another surface‖ (Dolan 253). We go round and back around. Maria replicates and
substantiates the poem‘s major motif: that artifice comes first, reflections create
reflections, and ―all things gaze themselves‖ (637). 24 It is at once absorbing and
liberating, excessive and conservative, brave and irresponsibly superfluous, though in the
end Marvell encourages neither celebration nor despair over this oddly escapist process
of self-reflection. As Ricks explains, such self-infolded imagery is ―apt to civil war. It is
not only a language for civil war (desolatingly two and one), but also, in its strange selfconflict, a civil war of language and the imaginable. The peculiar attraction of the figure,

23

We might compare this to the pattern Patterson locates in Marvell‘s career ―of alternating‖—though a
better word here might be simultaneous—―commitment and retreat, of rash involvement followed by selfdoubt or apology, of changes of mind and direction‖ (10). She also remarks on the ―trick of style in his
personal letters, of speaking of himself in the third person, which is only partly explained by the need for
secrecy‖ (11).
24
Certainly likeness runs the poem, despite the impossibility of locating stable referents. Consider the last
stanza, in which the salmon-fishers, carrying their canoes on their heads, appear as ―Antipodes in shoes‖
(771), who then appear as tortoises (773), whose shape is used to describe the darkening hemisphere
enclosing the estate (775-76). As Colie remarks, ―[t]here are too many possibilities in this image for readers
to keep straight …‖ (204). Marcus agrees that ―the effect is rather to suggest the continuing vitality of an
‗upending,‘ carnivalesque mode of vision‖ (Politics 262).
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though, is that while it acknowledges (as truth must) such a civil war, it can yet at the
same time conceive (as hope must) a healing of such strife‖ (55).
Indeed, the poem tests the notion of healing as it continues its interest in threats
that do not threaten, in disasters which everyone may survive. ―‘Tis not, what once it
was, the World, / But a rude heap together hurled; / All negligently overthrown‖ (76163): the speaker knows this at the same time as he has already forgotten it. It is true that
there is something deeply irresponsible about this kind of knowledge posing as oblivion.
When Baudrillard called out the 1990s news media for its similarly fraudulent
commentary on the war in Iraq, when he came to the only conclusion possible based on
the information made available—that a war which had clearly taken place did not in fact
take place—he articulated the shameful unreliability of the media‘s habits of
superficiality without accountability; news that infolds upon itself is not news. Marvell
exposes a similar failing in his culture‘s developing standards of discourse, 25 but better
than Baudrillard he elucidates their potentially seductive appeal when he projects the
news-givers as themselves self-infolded, already engaged in creative oblivion, such that
every looking out is at once a looking in. Such self-reflection need not be self-defeating.26
The speaker in ―Upon Appleton House‖ asserts that a rude heap can be made legible, can
be put ―in more decent order‖ (766), and he offers the poem itself as incredible,
ostentatious proof. Naturally, we cannot believe the evidence. The speaker‘s order is,
25

See Barnaby as well as his major source material, Richard Kroll‘s The Material Word. Marvell‘s
exploration of the appeal of self-infolded imagery can be compared to the movement Kroll locates in the
Restoration to accept the contingency of knowledge ―as inevitable and desirable‖ (52). Submission to
contingency, according to Kroll, ―achieves the force of ideology‖ in this period, and it is propagated by a
rhetoric ―that enacts its own failures to achieve epistemological certainty and allies that failure to a defined
social ethic‖ (52-53).
26
As Colie says, though ―nothing seems to be itself‖ in this poem, another way of looking at it is that
nothing is ―itself alone‖ (212). The speaker ―uses himself … to call into question the principles of
definition, limitation, and boundary‖ (212).
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after all, still an unfathomable mess. But, disturbingly and also wonderfully, it is
presented as a functional mess, a habitable mess. At the moment of most staggering
disorientation, when the whole world has been negligently overthrown in a heap, the last
stanza urges nothing less than that we make our way ―in‖ (775), to perhaps any one of the
jumbled spaces: house, garden, meadow, flood, woods. The poem flatteringly assumes
that we know the way now, that we have been adequately trained to see doorways into
disaster, to find a home in a heap. The implication that like the speaker we can go
through the necessary and continuous steps to see what we want to see, to erase what we
do not, to make a sanctuary appear in a scene of devastation, is irresistibly if shamefully
satisfying. Marvell‘s purpose is not to condemn this choice—though he leaves that option
open27—but to reveal in as much detail as possible the temptations that position a person
to make this choice, and to articulate the complexity of oblivion, a state of mind so
sublimely multifaceted that people may risk anything for it, even their own integrity, their
own sense that what is so, is so.

27

Indeed, it is not difficult to make the leaps from the narcissism displayed in ―Upon Appleton House‖ to
the conspiratorial and arbitrary government Marvell would write about in his later prose works. See The
Prose Works of Andrew Marvell, eds. Annabel Patterson & Martin Dzelzainis; Marvell and Liberty, eds.
Warren Chernaik & Martin Dzelzainis.
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Chapter Six
Hell is Other People: Dissent and Deterrence in Margaret Cavendish‘s The Blazing World

Studious She is and all Alone
Most visitants, when She has none,
Her Library on which She looks
It is her Head her Thoughts her Books.
Scorninge dead Ashes without fire
For her owne Flames doe her Inspire.
(Frontispiece to Cavendish‘s Philosophical and
Physical Opinions, 1655)

―History is always written from the sedentary point of
view and in the name of a unitary State apparatus, at
least a possible one, even when the topic is nomads.‖
(Deleuze & Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 23)

1. Bad Company: Naiveté, Pride and Dangerous Discourse
―Upon Appleton House‖ is Marvell‘s imaginative defense against the
determinism of apocalyptic events. It suggests that with the right perspective, annihilation
does not have to annihilate. While the healing process Marvell envisions is more than a
little ethically ambiguous, the realistically intimidating features of the dangers he narrates
lend sympathy to his speaker‘s more questionable coping strategies. Margaret Cavendish,
Duchess of Newcastle, is another writer of the early modern period who appears drawn to
the idea of annihilation. This may seem an odd claim to make of the woman who
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imagined ―what severall Worlds might in an Eare-ring bee,‖1 and whose organic
materialism hypothesized the world as a rational, self-generating organism,2 but
Cavendish‘s works prove as concerned with elimination as generation. Indeed, Cavendish
often inserts the experience of multiplicity or multiplication—of worlds, creatures,
opinions, etc.—only to nullify its utilitarian value. In The Blazing World especially,
variety is introduced to be effaced.
Cavendish thus situates herself in opposition to ongoing debates among early
modern intellectuals on the utility of knowledge and the practical possibility of certainty
or consensus arriving directly out of conflict.3 Joanna Picciotto points to Bacon and
Milton as early spokesmen for the paradoxical belief in this era that variety and diversity
of opinion could provide ―a means toward ultimate consensus; opinion was valued as,
and only as, ‗knowledge in the making,‘‖ and collective effort was necessary in ―the
sacred work of truth production‖ (85). Barbara Shapiro outlines the later development in
England‘s Royal Society of a slightly but significantly different view of collaboration, a
―probabilistic view of human knowledge and natural science‖ (15) where ―cooperative,
collective efforts by many investigators, over time, would achieve relatively error-free
findings that, if not ‗certain‘ in the old sense, would at least attain to the highest level of
the probable‖ (4-5). ―Trust thus stood at the nexus of knowledge and social order,‖ says
Adrian Johns; ―only with trust in people could come credibility for their observations and
theories‖ (1128). This trust derived in large part from the belief in a gentlemanly
disinterest. Gentleman witnesses would contribute ―through etiquette-based processes of

1

From the poem ―Of Many Worlds in this World,‖ in Poems and Fancies (1653), 45.
See Lisa T. Sarasohn.
3
See Peter Harrison.
2
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mutual dependency‖ to the constitution of ―matters of fact,‖ which Mario Biagioli calls
―disciplined (one might say choreographed) form[s] of evidence‖ (210, 236). Steven
Shapin elaborates on this ―more decorous and reserved way of speaking about‖ reality
(309):
A consequential distinction was commonly made between the scholar‘s
goal of rigorously attaining and securing formal knowledge and the
gentleman‘s more disengaged and pragmatic attitude towards the truth and
certainty of knowledge…. To require very great rigor, precision, and
certainty might be to put too great a strain upon conversation; it was to
endanger its continuance. Certain conceptions of truth and precision were
not worth that price. They ought to be civically bounded. (351)
The Royal Society thus re-examined the concept of certainty: ―[l]owered expectations of
philosophical accuracy, a more reserved way of speaking, a less passionate attempt to
claim exact truth for one‘s claims were justified on explicitly epistemic as well as
explicitly moral grounds‖ (Shapin 309). Still, the Royal Society did adopt a Baconion
method of research, and according to Shapiro certain members, for example Robert
Hooke, retained aspirations towards Baconian certitude, such that ―[t]he line between
universally true generalization derived by the Baconian method, and propositions that
were so highly probably or morally certain that one should treat them as if they were
universal generalizations, is … not always easy to draw‖ (35).
From Margaret Cavendish‘s perspective, probability and certainty are equally
dubious aspirations, and all the Royal Society had really managed to do was establish a
means by which it ―did not have to look outside itself to confirm its authority‖ (Sarasohn
155). Though in her early Poems and Fancies she celebrates the movement in Nature
from diversity to harmony as an imitable process, claiming in ―Dialogue betwixt Wit, and
Beauty‖ that ―I can the work of Nature imitate‖ (51), in her later work she registers much
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more skepticism about flawed humanity‘s capacity to reproduce the workings of the
natural world. Lisa Sarasohn explains that ―in Cavendish‘s eyes, by trying to make
themselves the ultimate arbiters of natural philosophy, society members were not only
irreverent to authority but also in rebellion against it. They were introducing civil war
into the society of the learned …‖ (155). Provoked by the Society‘s presumptuous selfsufficiency, Cavendish promotes a much less optimistic view of variety‘s potential to
lead to consensus through discourse, and she refuses to locate virtue in dissent to the
extent that does the Royal Society. Cavendish easily mistrusts words as much as Andrew
Marvell: discourse, she comes to believe, is always an artificial, and thus unreliable and
potentially damaging, construct.4 Her concern in The Blazing World is to spotlight what
is untenable and naive in a theory that links dissent, however good-natured, to order.5
This is not to say that either dissent or uniformity have a more prominent place in
Cavendish‘s writing. In fact, she makes equal room for both. Critics have brought much
attention to the contradictions, fragmentations and ambiguities in Cavendish‘s work, 6 all

4

See Christine Mason Sutherland for a discussion of Cavendish‘s ―anomalous position vis-à-vis the
rhetorical tradition‖ (260). Sutherland highlights not distrust of language so much as indecisiveness:
Cavendish found herself caught uneasily between proponents of the plain style and of the grand style, and
her lack of formal education exacerbated her discomfort. Sutherland identifies works by Cavendish that
seem to ―disvalu[e] the rhetorical tradition that excludes her‖ alongside works that express a ―manifest
regard‖ for the same traditions (262).
5
See Peter Lake and Steve Pincus. They discuss the development of the public sphere in England from the
post-Reformation to the post-Revolutionary period, and suggest that while many ―political actors
understood relatively unfettered public discussion to be normatively desirable‖ (290), others continued to
see public discussion as a threatening ―form of ‗popularity,‘ a dangerously seditious appeal to the people
inimical to good order and monarchical rule‖ (277). Cavendish‘s skepticism corresponds to the latter
camp‘s apprehension about ―deliberatively discovered truth‖ (284).
6
She is ―anything but methodical,‖ says Sutherland, and ―she disliked the constraint of following a set
program, particularly one not designed by herself‖ (268). ―Her ambivalent stance as author and fluctuating
awareness of selfhood points towards a fundamental amorphousness that resists any straightforward
modern categorization,‖ says Mami Adachi (70). Judith Kegan Gardiner comments on Cavendish‘s
―narcissistic philosophy of self-generated pleasure,‖ a program she suggests can shed light on ―one of the
distinctive characteristics of Cavendish's self-presentations, the paradoxical figure of the bashful
exhibitionist.‖ See also Angus Fletcher for comments on the relationship in Cavendish‘s work between
irregularity and hierarchy.

220

of them in uneasy juxtaposition to her staunchly royalist sympathies and personal
devotion to rigid hierarchies of class. But amidst the indecipherable wavering of her texts
we can locate an attitude towards the nature of dissent that appears uncompromising:
dissent is dissent, and no matter how polite, it cannot translate to consensus of any kind,
especially not the pure consensus achieved through Nature‘s mysterious reconciling of
diversity. Inside the laboratory, dissent and consensus are just two artificial rhetorical
activities that also happen to be contrary and thus uncooperative. Cavendish‘s skepticism
works on two levels then: she questions both the Society‘s naiveté—its belief that dissent
will translate to consensus—and its pride—that the consensus it manages to achieve will
contribute legitimate insight on, rather than destructive uncertainty about, the natural
world.
Cavendish‘s cynicism can be explained in part by her early attraction to atomism,
a theory of matter that assumes the fallibility of the senses and rejects the possibility of
stability. Anna Battigelli explains that, while Cavendish dropped atomism as a theory in
1655, she retained it ―as a metaphor for the brutal and frightening clash of conflicting
certainties‖ and ―as the basis for her understanding of the instability of political
institutions‖ (Exiles 57). ―If she was sure of anything,‖ says Battigelli, ―she seems to
have been sure of the ease with which society could dissolve into social and political
chaos‖ (Exiles 57). The Royal Society, from Cavendish‘s point of view, irresponsibly
whitewashes this ease. The Blazing World is her attempt to articulate what is most naïve
about its research methods and its very philosophy, one that makes a virtue out of variety
by denying its essential variousness. The only way the Society‘s particular brand of
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dissent can lead to consensus, Cavendish concludes, is if it was never really dissent in the
first place. And the only way consensus can provide insight into Nature is if it imitates
Nature with perfect faithfulness—a too tall order that none of the characters in The
Blazing World can fulfill.
To best expose the Royal Society‘s naïve optimism, it is their dissent-less dissent
that Cavendish incorporates into her own work, immersing her text in the probabilityestablishing process espoused by the Society by creating a protagonist who falls victim to
its seduction. The Blazing World redefines variety according to Cavendish‘s
interpretation of the Society‘s vaguely articulated standards: variety as dissent-less
dissent, not quite akin to agreement, but best understood as disagreement without any
stakes, without the atomistic potential to incite chaos. Cavendish carries the Society‘s
logic to its extreme, removing the variousness from variety, but in doing so she also gains
the opportunity to argue the merits of her own philosophy of retreat, what Battigelli calls
her exiles of the mind. Her work of fantasy, The Blazing World, is designed to spotlight
―the subjectivity in which our inquiry into the world is … inevitably trapped‖ (Battigelli
104). To ignore this is to live in a dangerous, albeit seductive, denial, and Cavendish goes
to great lengths to display both the dangers and the seductions of the Blazing World. It is
a paradise built on wholly untrustworthy ground.
Consider the introduction, in which Cavendish seems to provide permission for
anarchy when she encourages her readers to ―create worlds of their own and govern
themselves as they please‖ (109). What she actually promotes is neither a recipe for
anarchism nor a reconciliation of collective and individual creative potential. The power
to create worlds belongs to everyone, but Cavendish will make it increasingly clear as her
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narrative moves forward that none of these newly created worlds may combine
meaningfully, usefully, or even threateningly; they belong as private possessions to their
singular creators. Communal world-making turns out to be entirely coincidental, neither
collective gesture nor cooperative effort, but almost the opposite—separate incidences of
detached self-aggrandizement. Cavendish admits in her preface to The Blazing World that
she herself is
as ambitious as ever any of my sex was, or can be, which makes that
though I cannot be Henry the Fifth or Charles the Second, yet I endeavour
to be Margaret the First, and although I have neither power, time nor
occasion to conquer the world as Alexander and Caesar did, yet rather
than not to be mistress of one, since fortune and the fates would give me
none, I have made a world of my own, for which it is in everyone‘s power
to do the like. (6)
Ambition drives the Duchess of Newcastle to world-making, and her provoking
references to Charles, Caesar and Alexander seem designed to lend a menacing intensity
to her determination, an intensity that is immediately undercut by her concession to
everyone else‘s power ―to do the like‖ inside worlds of their own. Certainly Cavendish
flaunts her own egoism here,7 but as Battigelli explains, her ambition can also be read ―as
a philosophical positioning of the ‗self‘ that allows for an exploration of the problem of
subjectivity‖ (Exiles 105). She implies that every person has the same capacity for the
same arrogance, but by internalizing her own arrogance she eliminates its confrontational
potential. Already we can draw the crucial conclusion that the only way to deactivate the
corrosive power of a collective creative faculty is immediately to deny its collectiveness.

7

Gardiner, for example, reads Cavendish‘s ambition entirely in the context of her self-absorption;
Cavendish is ―a narcissist who seeks to substitute stable self-mirroring for reliance on the fickle regard of
others.‖
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The ideology Cavendish delivers is curiously contradictory: a celebration of
limitless and potentially conflicting imaginative enterprise must be quickly subsumed by
a relentless interest in (re)establishing limits—restrictions that make shared capacities
impossible actually to share. Such limits are echoed in the first descriptions of the
Blazing World. Vast as it apparently is, it has but one emperor, one language, one
religion—even its entrances and exits are limited.8 Habitually, uncomfortably, Cavendish
reduces the vastness she imagines, renders it as monotonous and mundane as it is infinite.
This is best seen in her endless depiction of the various hybrid creatures and their
particular means of conveyance through the waters of the Blazing World. Rescued from
her corpse-laden vessel by the bear-men, and then conveyed out of their territory to that
of the fox-men,
after she had made some short stay in the same place, they brought her
cross that island to a large river, whose stream ran smooth and clear, like
crystal; in which were numerous boats, much like our foxtraps; in one
whereof she was carried, some of the bear- and fox-men waiting on her;
and as soon as they had crossed the river, they came into an island where
there were men which had heads, beaks and feathers, like wild-geese…;
and after the bear- and fox-men had declared their intention and design to
their neighbours, the geese- or bird-men, some of them joined to the rest,
and attended the Lady through that island, till they came to another great
and large river, where there was a preparation made of many boats, much
like birds‘ nests, only of a bigger size; and having crossed that river, they
arrived into another island, which was of a pleasant and mild temper, full
of woods, and the inhabitants thereof were satyrs, who received both the
bear-, fox- and bird-men, with all respect and civility; and … some chief
of the Satyrs joining to them, accompanied the Lady out of that island to
another river, wherein were many handsome and commodious barges; and
having crossed that river, they entered into a large and spacious kingdom,
the men whereof were of a grass-green complexion, who entertained them
very kindly, and provided all conveniences for their further voyage ….
(10)
8

―[A]s their Blazing World had but one Emperor, one government, one religion, and one language, so there
was but one passage into that world, which was so little, that no vessel bigger than a packet-boat could go
through; neither was that passage always open, but sometimes quite frozen up‖ (BW 91-92).
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Angus Fletcher explains how ―in a shallow sense, all of the people that the empress
encounters are different,‖ but their distinctions are purely superficial, and ―the
overwhelming feeling conveyed by this passage [above] is movement for the sake of
movement,‖ with no effort to ―explore the unique perspectives afforded by this variety of
peoples‖ (136). Fletcher goes on to comment on ―[t]he frequency with which
[Cavendish‘s] writing becomes a list of details, none of which is significant enough to
hold her attention more than momentarily,‖ a seeming negligence which ―often turns the
experience of reading into a forced march to no-where. As each new discovery proves as
absent of satisfaction as the last, any readerly sense of curiosity is replaced with the
frustrating experience of being willfully dragged by the author through an unending
sequence of observations …‖ (136-37).9 The variety of the Blazing World is essentially
unvarious, and Fletcher is correct that the reader experiences not diversity but a
monotonous inventory that annihilates its own multiformity as it is introduced.
But Cavendish‘s lack of curiosity is strategic, as is her Empress-protagonist‘s.
That diversity as diversity cannot be experienced in the Blazing World is Cavendish‘s
means of commenting on Royal Society members‘ impossible construal of dissent in their
own organization. This is what difference without any stakes looks like. The Empress
enacts the same stingy concentration on variety after she makes the mistake of founding
several societies to house the intellectual efforts of her various subjects‘ various
professions, and she supplies specific reasons for such sparing interest. First come the
9

Perhaps this stylistic device worked more effectively in Cavendish‘s poetry. Hero Chalmers tells us that
―[t]hroughout Poems and Fancies, Cavendish favors rhetorical structures that create a list-like effect
imitative of her vision of the flickering diversity of Nature that must animate poetry‖ (128). But in the
prose of The Blazing World this ―breathless account of the multiplicity of Nature‖ (128) is replaced by a
tedious, plodding testimony.
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bear-men, dubbed experimental philosophers by the Empress, who are called in after a
confusing exchange between the Empress and the bird-men regarding ―the nature of
thunder and lightning‖ (26). In order to ―avoid hereafter tedious disputes, and have the
truth of the phaenomenas of celestial bodies more exactly known‖ (26), the Empress
commands the bear-men to observe these bodies through their telescopes. To her
disappointment, the bear-men can present only divided conclusions. Cavendish writes
that the use of the telescopes provokes such ―differences and divisions amongst them‖
that ―the Empress began to grow angry at their telescopes, that they could give no better
intelligence. ‗For,‘ said she, ‗now I do plainly perceive that your glasses are false
informers and instead of discovering the truth, delude your senses; wherefore I command
you to break them …‖ (27). Cavendish‘s fiction mimics her very real position on Robert
Hooke‘s Micrographia, which celebrated the microscope as an instrument that might
resolve the distortions of the natural senses through the promise of procedural objectivity.
Cavendish, as ever, was skeptical; according to Eve Keller, she saw such ―claims of
methodological rigor, value-neutrality, and objectivity, not as monolithic conduits for
achieving certainty, but as social constructions that are endorsed as much because they
advance the needs of their adherents as because they are deemed to be scientifically
effective or true‖ (451). The bear-men confess to Cavendish‘s worst suspicions.
―[E]xceedingly troubled‖ by the Empress‘s command, they admit that ―we take more
delight in artificial delusions, than in natural truths …; for were there nothing but truth,
and no falsehood, there would be no occasion to dispute, and by this means we should
want the aim and pleasure of our endeavours in confuting and contradicting each other;
neither would one man be thought wiser than another …‖ (28). The bear-men‘s
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confession legitimizes Cavendish‘s ―sense of natural philosophy as a discipline of selfinterested, and even egoistic, construction, rather than one of rational discovery or
passive revelation, as the new scientists had claimed‖ (Keller 456). Still, when the bearmen beg the Empress ―to spare our glasses, which are our only delight, and as dear to us
as our lives‖ (28), she grudgingly relents, ―upon the condition that their disputes and
quarrels should remain within their schools and cause no factions or disturbances in state
or government‖ (28). The logicians are given a similar order to ―confine your
disputations to your schools, lest besides the commonwealth of learning, they disturb also
divinity and policy, religion and laws, and by that means draw an utter ruin and
destruction both upon church and state‖ (48-49). Even more displeased by the lice-men,
the Empress abruptly ―told them that there was neither truth nor justice in their
profession, and so dissolved their society‖ (46).
It is worth emphasizing that the Empress restricts her critique of the bear-men‘s
conclusions to their instruments; she is said to ―grow angry at their telescopes,‖ blames
these ―deluders‖ and ―false informers,‖ and praises the bear-men‘s ―more regular,‖
natural sense and reason (27). Though she reserves even harsher criticism for later
groups—the logicians and mathematicians—both groups also rely on instruments for
their research. The lice-men experiment with weights in order to ―measure all things to a
hair‘s breadth‖ (46), although these weights, we are told, ―would seldom agree‖ (46). The
logicians can also be said to use a tool in their art of disputation—the syllogism. They
present a series of syllogisms to the Empress:
Every politician is wise:
Every knave is a politician,
Therefore every knave is wise.
…
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Every philosopher is wise:
Every beast is wise,
Therefore every beast is a philosopher. (47)
The Empress interrupts to complain that such ―chopped logic … disorders my reason, and
puts my brain on the rack‖ (48). ―Your art of logic,‖ she goes on to say, ―consists only in
contradicting each other, in making sophisms, and obscuring truth, instead of clearing it‖
(48). The Empress has no patience for the falsely informing artifice, whether it be
microscope or syllogism. ―As reason is above art,‖ she asserts, ―so much is a natural,
rational discourse to be preferred before an artificial; for art is for the most part irregular
and disorders men‘s understanding more than it rectifies them, and leads them into a
labyrinth whence they‘ll never get out, and makes them dull and unfit for useful
employments‖ (48). The Empress sees no way out of this labyrinth, and so resigns herself
to being surrounded by a plethora of intellectual societies which will be of no apparent
use to her or to her kingdom. Once again she mimics Cavendish‘s real perspective on
deluding artifice: she would sooner wear a microscope than use one.
The Empress‘s lectures to the various groups of scholars who present their
findings to her provide space for Cavendish‘s own distinctive theories on several fields of
inquiry—astronomy, chemistry, mathematics, natural philosophy—but most importantly
we come to understand, through the Empress‘s impatience with what proves to be
superficial coherencies, that ―the notion of coherence itself, the idea of consistency and
regularity, seems for Cavendish to be a construct…; she seems to sense that the desire to
reduce to simplicity, to mathematical neatness, has more to do with the desire to promote
a certain image than it has do to with being accurate to some empirical truth‖ (Keller
458). Nevertheless the Empress allows the societies to continue their studies, with the
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understanding that their findings will never achieve credibility outside their own walls.
This supports Battigelli‘s assertion that ―Cavendish's real criticism lies neither in the
empiricists' tediousness nor in their lack of utility; her concern is their unwillingness to
acknowledge the inevitable interference of their own subjectivity‖ (―Between the Glass‖
34). But more importantly, here is where we begin to see Cavendish both diagnosing the
reductive impulses of intellectual culture and exploiting them in the same breath. She
diverges from her Empress when the latter, on the one hand, exposes the impossibility of
consensus, especially within societies that hypocritically value dissent more than the
coherence toward which they claim to be working, but on the other, makes room for these
societies in her kingdom, despite her dismissiveness, and without requiring them to
change their methods. The societies are apparently still valuable to her; she projects their
existence while dismissing their substance. It is finally the Empress, in other words, who
makes possible dissent-less dissent.

2. Better Company: Deterrence, Deceit and Non-Events
Through her protagonist, Cavendish engages in what Baudrillard might describe
as the substitution of the absent or pseudo-event for the real. ―If there are any historical
stakes‖ attached to events such as these, ―they remain secret, enigmatic; they are resolved
in events which do not really take place‖ (Baudrillard Illusion 15). Baudrillard‘s humble
modern example of this phenomenon is a soccer match in Madrid in 1987, played inside
an empty stadium at night, all spectators banned by the International Federation because
of their behavior during a previous game. This ―‗real‘ event occur[ed] in a vacuum,
stripped of its context and visible only from afar, televisually‖ (Transparency of Evil 79),
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says Baudrillard, and he sees in this rather modest example a metaphor for ―the events of
our future,‖ which will ―likewise unfold, in a sense, in an empty stadium … whence any
real public has been expelled because of potentially too lively passions, and whence
nothing emerges now save a television retranscription…‖ (Transparency of Evil 80). ―No
one will have directly experienced the actual course of such happenings, but everyone
will have received an image of them…. [E]verything begins to operate as though some
International Political Federation had suspended the public for an indeterminate period
and expelled it from all stadiums to ensure the objective conduct of the match‖
(Transparency of Evil 80).
Cavendish‘s Empress functions like Baudrillard‘s International Federation,
turning all of her societies into empty stadiums. Her engagement with her scholarsubjects is in fact her means of diluting their disruptive potential. Their work may go on,
but any effects of their studies are perpetually deterred. And deterrence, as Baudrillard
explains, ―is a very peculiar form of action: it is what causes something not to take place‖
(Illusion 17). The Empress establishes a series of pseudo-events, ―events which do not in
any way advance history, but rather run it backwards, back along the opposite slope,
unintelligible to our historical sense …, events which no longer have a negative
(progressive, critical or revolutionary) potency since their only negativity is in the fact of
their not taking place‖ (Illusion 17). Baudrillard concludes this comment with the single
word, ―disturbing,‖ and deems deterrence to be a ―diabolical force,‖ ―the baleful form
which presides over the nullity of our age‖ (Illusion 17). But for Cavendish, deterrence is
also liberation, and nullity promises safety from future threats of civil distress—
sanctuary, in effect, from history. Indeed, substituting the nullification of an active social
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body‘s revolutionary potency for the diabolical force of another civil war—inevitable
should such social bodies‘ potencies be allowed to manifest in a truly public space—is
for her a fair and responsible trade. Cavendish‘s world view tells her that civil strife is
always on the horizon, so that whatever enthusiasm she brings to the intellectual pursuit
of truth must come secondary to her interest in preventing the proliferation of competing
falsehoods. Ultimately this prevention, this deterrence, must assume all of Cavendish‘s
energy. Hers is a negative approach to certainty, which arrives not through weighing
options, with either passion or neutrality, but through withdrawing the stakes that make
the presence of passion or neutrality an issue. What began as an expose of the Royal
Society‘s naïve probability-establishing procedures has developed into complete
immersion in what turns out to be a perfect means of deterring dangerous debates. We see
the seductive potency of Cavendish‘s negative approach increasing in the text, as the
Empress‘s enthusiasm for deterrence swells, and she begins to anticipate the dissent that
will disorder her kingdom, quelling it before it truly exists.
An example of such anticipation occurs just after the Empress pronounces
judgment on the various intellectual societies. Her next order of business is the matter of
the conversion of her subjects from their inferior religion. This she smoothly and quickly
accomplishes, both by building churches and instituting a congregation of women with
herself as head preacher. But no sooner has the Empress converted her entire kingdom
and ―gained an extraordinary love of all her subjects throughout the world‖ than she
doubts the permanence of her success (49): ―pondering with herself the inconstant nature
of mankind, and fearing that in time they would grow weary, and desert the divine truth,
following their own fancies, and living according to their own desires, she began to be
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troubled that her labours and pains should prove of so little effect, and therefore studied
all manner of ways to prevent it‖ (49). The solution she settles on involves building two
chapels lined with one of two kinds of special stones available in the Blazing World: the
fire-stones, which when wet ―appear all in a flame,‖ and the star-stones, which ―cast a
splendorous and comfortable light‖ (50):
In the chapel which was lined with the fire-stone, the Empress preached
sermons of terror to the wicked, and told them of the punishments for their
sins, to wit, that after this life they should be tormented in an everlasting
fire. But in the other chapel lined with the star-stone, she preached
sermons of comfort to those that repented of their sins, and were troubled
at their own wickedness…. [T]he empress appeared like an angel in it; and
as that chapel was an emblem of Hell, so this was an emblem of Heaven.
And thus the Empress, by art, and her own ingenuity, did not only convert
the Blazing World to her own religion, but kept them in a constant belief,
without enforcement or blood-shed; for she knew well, that belief was a
thing not to be forced or pressed upon the people, but to be instilled into
their minds by gentle persuasions‖ (50-51).
A better word would be trickery. The text outlines not a process of persuasive
enlightenment but a crafty scam dependent on the spectacle of art much more than on
reason. William Poole suggests that ―the scientific ruse by which Cavendish's Empress
converts her country … is in keeping with Cavendish's interest in what science is for‖
(16), but this conclusion ignores the Empress‘s very clear interest, stated just pages
before, in establishing her preference for ―a natural, rational discourse‖ over artifice. The
text, in fact, has yet to grant us a clear picture of ―what science is for.‖ Here the
Empress‘s paranoia convinces her to ignore her own preferences, and it is not the last
time she will do so.
In the second part of The Blazing World the Empress again chooses artifice and
spectacle as her primary means of instituting order, this time in the world from which she
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came. Informed by the immaterial spirits that her native country is beset by war, she
resolves to return with an army of her new subjects from the Blazing World. Appearing
first before her own countrymen, in garments adorned with glistening star-stone, and
borne on the surface of the water by the fish-men, the Empress ―persuades‖ them that she
is ―an angel, or some deity, and all kneeled down before her, and worshipped her with all
submission and reverence,‖ the Empress making sure to keep ―her accoutrements‖ out of
sight (96). After destroying enemy ships and several stubborn cities by means of the firestone, she ensures that her native country is made ―the absolute monarchy of all that
world‖ (100). The ruse continues until (and presumably after) the Empress takes her
leave, appearing once more ―upon the face of the water in her imperial robes,‖
reproducing her larger-than-life majesty for all comers, effecting
a great admiration in all that were present, who believed her to be some
celestial creature, or rather an uncreated goddess, and they all had a desire
to worship her, for surely, said they, no mortal creature can have such a
splendid and transcendent beauty, nor can any have so great a power as
she has, to walk upon waters, and to destroy whatever she pleases, not
only whole nations, but a whole world. (100-101)
The last compliment is particularly unsettling, for it purposefully emphasizes not a
liberating power but a destructive one. As the Empress departs from her home we too
depart with a sneaking suspicion that in saving her world from conflict, she may have
effaced its natural varieties completely. Awe and/or fear of her godlike power must deter,
indefinitely, the possibility of dissent not only in her native country but throughout this
whole world. Eternal deterrence can only be imagined through these two means: stupor or
apocalypse. Either way, this is a world hollowed out by the event of the Empress‘s
arrival, what Baudrillard would call a meteoric event, ―of the same chaotic inconsequence
as cloud formations‖ (Illusion 19). Such pseudo-events ―have no sequel,‖ says
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Baudrillard, and even when we sense their importance ―we do not know how to draw any
consequences from them‖ (Illusion 19). ―[T]hey evade any desire to give them meaning
and elude the heavy attraction of a continuous history‖ in favor of a discontinuous one
that ―fluctuates at the same irregular rhythm as natural phenomena‖ (Illusion 19). Perhaps
this, after all, is what science is for: reinforcing Nature‘s inscrutable irregularity. From
Cavendish‘s increasingly pessimist perspective, this is all natural philosophy can hope to
accomplish. This means that even though Fletcher argues convincingly that The Blazing
World is Cavendish‘s effort ―to translate Nature‘s qualities onto a mortal woman‖ (125),
it is important to remember that at the same time as the Empress becomes larger than life,
symbolizing Nature‘s awesome illegibility, she continues to represent those who would
merely imitate Nature through distinctive and perfectly mundane procedures. Her
accoutrements may be hidden from her countrymen, but as readers we see everything. To
us, Cavendish‘s Empress is still the anxious monarch, guilty of the same pride that The
Blazing World exists in large part to condemn, enacting the very behaviors she polices so
uncompromisingly. She is so eager to establish dissent-less dissent that she betrays her
own reverence for reason and, seduced by her own goddess ruse, comes to represent all
the dangerously naïve practitioners of natural philosophy, those who manage to persuade
themselves—when they are not, like the bear-men, too busy arguing amongst
themselves—that the steady progress they advocate for the sake of understanding Nature
is not in fact synonymous with the casual annihilation of any meaningful contact with the
natural world. Because the Empress is undoubtedly an annihilator as much as a savior:
when she rescues her world she also siphons its future, and in doing so she teaches no
specific, repeatable lesson; rather, she imposes a void. The world she leaves behind is
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another empty stadium, or, to use a perhaps more appropriate metaphor, it appears as a
kind of suspended specimen—like the lark Robert Boyle once suffocated in an airpump—destroyed so it can be preserved. We would do well to consider Fletcher‘s
warning to those critics of Cavendish who suggest ―that there is something inclusive and
therefore inviting about her style…. Although it is true that she wanted to give her
readers the delight afforded by the wondrous varieties of nature‖—a delight that the
witnesses to the Empress‘ magic and majesty arguably experience—―she also wished to
touch them with the sense of unease that Boyle experienced when looking at the
convulsions of the suffocating lark‖ (137-38). Her strategy is in fact similar to Marvell‘s
in ―Upon Appleton House:‖ she more than hints at all there is to see in Nature‘s
―unregulated motion‖ (Fletcher 138), but she simultaneously insists that, for our own
good, we not look too closely. Otherwise we become like the Empress, so obsessed with
regulating the un-regulatable, with imitating Nature, that she becomes a destructive force,
blind to her own eradicating power.

3. Worst Company: Diversity, Disposal, and Annihilation
What Cavendish ultimately displays in The Blazing World is a lose-lose situation.
Not only is the unavoidable problem of dissent not recognized as a problem by some of
the most learned creatures, but those who do recognize its disruptive potential contain it
ineffectively and injudiciously. When the Empress fakes immortality for the sake of
order, she means to imitate, with due attention and reverence, the entirely un-artificial
and perfectly functional dissent-less dissent already at work in Nature: this is the paradox,
explored so enthusiastically in Poems & Fancies, which says that diversity is, through the
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spontaneous energy of the natural world, translated into harmony. But Cavendish‘s
impression of a too-flawed humanity, an impression which must ultimately include her
avatar-Empress, means that human beings are excluded from the smooth process of
disintegration and reintegration that occurs in Nature. We are in fact cut off from Nature,
condemned to an artificial reality where, by word or by deed, Nature cannot be imitated.
Lost is Cavendish‘s earlier confidence in linking the variety of Nature ―with the poetics
of the written text‖ (Chalmers 137). Language falls short, and so does the Empress,
making her mimicry of Nature an imposition and not an homage.10
Rather suddenly we understand that our protagonist has been sliding down a
depressing spiral. The high premium she places on deterring the obvious dissent she
witnesses in her scholarly societies leads her to anticipate conflict in the rest of her
empire before that conflict occurs, and her response to her own unreasonable, perhaps
even unnatural, anxiety is deceitful, disturbing and destructive—perhaps just as
destructive as the chaos that would have occurred anyway, if dissent had been allowed to
manifest fully, perhaps even more destructive, because performed with such amateurish
capriciousness. The Empress takes us further and further away from Nature, from
reason—from what she claims to value most. In both examples discussed above—
Empress as converter of the Blazing World, Empress as savior of her native world—
10

This reading diverges from Keller‘s and Catherine Gallagher‘s interpretations of the thoroughness of
Cavendish‘s skepticism. Nature ―cannot be wholly known,‖ Keller explains, because ―there simply exists
no outside vantage point from which to view and thereby to control‖ it (456). Gallagher remarks on the
regressive relationship between absolutism and subjectivity in the text: ―(1) the absolutist imagines the self
as microcosm; (2) the microcosm requires an absolute ruler, a figure of the self in the world of the self; (3)
the ruler of the microcosm, finding herself to be but a part of the microcosm she inhabits, must create yet
another microcosm in order to meet the demands of absolutism. Such a text finally imagines subjectivity as
an infinite, unfathomable regression of interiority‖ (32). I suggest instead that Cavendish‘s skepticism
stems from her belief that humanity has in fact driven itself to an ―outside vantage point,‖ has severed its
links to a rational Nature. The Blazing World is a text that moves out and away from Nature rather than
deeper into its folds.
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virtue is located not in reconciling variety but in going out of one‘s way to eliminate the
possibility of variety. These are preemptive strikes of the kind first articulated by none
other than the Duchess of Newcastle, who appears as a character in The Blazing World
when she (or rather, her soul) is summoned there to act as a scribe to the Empress. At the
end of the first part of The Blazing World, in response to the Empress‘s complaints about
the disagreements among the various intellectual societies, the Duchess urges her,
without hesitation,
to dissolve all their societies; for ‘tis better to be without their
intelligences, than to have an unquiet and disorderly government. The
truth is, said she, wheresoever is learning, there is most commonly also
controversy and quarrelling … which must needs breed factions in their
schools, which at last break out into open wars, and draw sometimes an
utter ruin upon a state or government. (88)
It is not the first time that the Duchess has declared the essential uselessness of such
collective pursuits of consensus. Shortly after her arrival in the Blazing World, the
Duchess responds to the Empress‘ desire to make a Cabala:
I would desire you to let that work alone, for it will be of no advantage
either to you or your people.… [T]he vulgar interpretation of the holy
scripture would be more instructive and more easily believed than your
mystical way of interpreting it…. Wherefore the best way … is to believe
with the generality the literal sense of the scripture, and not to make
interpretations everyone according to his own fancy, but to leave that work
for the learned, or those that have nothing else to do. (69)
Briefly but effectively, the Duchess explains why the Empress need not waste her time
creating a theological, philosophical, moral or political Cabala, and again it is the
impossibility of consensus, the belief that ―to add nonsense to infinite would breed a
confusion‖ (69), that mutes enthusiasm for the Empress‘s proposals. Initially it appears
that the Duchess‘s sole function in the Blazing World is to reject, for the sake of
maintaining the stability the Empress has temporarily established through deterrence, all
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of the Empress‘s less passive and potentially more creative ideas. But in saving the
Empress from herself, the Duchess threatens to do to her friend what her friend did to her
native world when she siphoned the life out of it. She exacerbates The Blazing World‘s
impossible, lose-lose dilemma: to ignore the fact that dissent must be contained if it is not
to breed an endless confusion is naive, but to believe that it can be contained effectively
is arrogant. The Empress and Duchess‘s discussions show that once confusion is
prevented from breeding without restriction, something else breeds instead, something
superfluously destructive rather than merely disruptive. Purposefully or not, Cavendish
hints at this glitch in her activism whenever she includes the uneasy performances of
abortive creation that occur periodically throughout her text: the construction of the
stone-lined chapels, the fraudulent establishment of the Empress‘ native country as
supreme monarchy, and, perhaps most tellingly, the attempt to find a random world for
the Duchess to conquer and then rule with as much authority as the Empress rules the
Blazing World.
The Duchess admits early in her friendship with the Empress that she ―would fain
be as you are, that is, an Empress of a world, and I shall never be at quiet until I be one‖
(70-71). Seeking guidance once more from the immaterial spirits, the women are
informed that ―every human creature can create an immaterial world fully inhabited by
immaterial creatures, and populous of immaterial subjects, such as we are, and all this
within the compass of the head or scull‖ (72). They wonder why the Duchess desires ―to
be Empress of a material world, and be troubled with the cares that attend your
government? whenas by creating a world within yourself, you may enjoy all both in
whole and in parts without control or opposition, and may make what world you please,
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and alter it when you please…‖ (73). Persuaded by the spirits, the Duchess embarks on
the strenuous activity, but the project soon takes a disconcerting turn. The Duchess
spends as much time annihilating worlds than creating them:
[F]irst she resolved to frame it according to the opinion of Thales, but she
found her self so much troubled with demons, that they would not suffer
her to take her own will, but forced her to obey their orders and
commands; which she being unwilling to do, left off from making a world
that way, and began to frame one according to Pythagoras's doctrine; but
in the Creation thereof, she was so puzzled with numbers, how to order
and compose the several parts, that she having no skill in arithmetic, was
forced also to desist from the making of that world. Then she intended to
create a World according to the opinion of Plato; but she found more
trouble and difficulty in that, then in the two former … that her patience
was not able to endure the trouble which those ideas caused her; wherefore
she annihilated also that world… (73-74).
The Duchess continues to model her world after the methods of other scholars; the
opinions of Epicurus, Aristotle, Descartes and Hobbes are found equally wanting, until,
―when the Duchess saw that no patterns would do her any good in the framing of her
world; she was resolved to make a world of her own invention,‖ a world which, ―after it
was made, appeared so curious and full of variety, so well ordered and wisely governed,
that it cannot possibly be expressed by words‖ (75).
We are asked to believe that the Duchess‘s invented world, rich with self-moving
variety, perfectly mimics the natural world, which in Cavendish‘s philosophy moves the
same way; finally a one-to-one correlation between Nature and human invention has been
asserted. But note the Duchess‘s insistence that this world ―cannot possibly be expressed
by words.‖ Its inexpressibility is apparently its biggest selling point, but the Duchess‘s
awkward insistence on silence actually distracts us from her creative success and reminds
us of the mistrust of discourse that is palpable throughout this text. Note too the clear
indications that the Duchess makes no attempt to integrate any of the various methods
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with which she experiments: she simply rejects them one after another. The varieties she
introduces only exist as reminders of their irrelevance. Once again we experience a sense
of vastness that is also monotonous, another forced march to nowhere, this time in a list
of details regarding Plato, Epicurus, Hobbes, etc. to which we are not meant to be
attentive.11 This is a hyper-deterrence of variety synonymous not with caution but with a
capricious destruction. The Duchess is an annihilator of worlds, and the annihilation she
systematically enacts becomes the most conspicuous feature of Cavendish‘s narrative,
such that any of Cavendish‘s specific and valid critiques of the methods of the various
thinkers she names are lost in the tedium of her demolition. There is no argument present,
only dismissal. And that makes the Duchess‘s Eureka moment ring as falsely as the
Empress‘s final farewell to her duped countrymen. Both women have made worlds, yet
we remember them as un-makers, hell-bent on dismantling what they wish to preserve.

4. No Company: Oblivion, Exile, and the Void
Cavendish‘s campaign to expose the true nature of Royal Society procedures, to
identify their dissent as essentially dissentless, is entirely successful, though in the midst
of her accomplishment Cavendish also exposes her own deep attraction to the same kind
of deterrence, along with the poisoned world view that is responsible for such enticement.
Her skepticism about humankind‘s potential to commune with Nature teeters on the edge
of a despairing faithlessness in public discourse, a position that convinces her that, by any
11

Gallagher presumes that ―the character Cavendish‘s world will, like the blazing world, also contain a
Margaret Cavendish who wishes to be empress of a world and decides instead to create a microcosm, etc.
ad infinitum‖ (32). Eve Keller extends this argument by pointing out that ―there is no reason to assume that
the progression does not go backwards as well—that the self that creates the Blazing World is not itself
created by some previous self…. [T]he self is endlessly generated, like the infinite, organic world it
occupies‖ (463).
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means necessary, heterogeneity must be expunged from a heterogeneous body if that
body is not to destroy itself. Hence her steady immersion in the quest for a disposable
diversity, a dissent-less dissent—which she finds, for though there is plenty of talk in the
Blazing World, all the talk is cheap. However, if the stakes seem low inside Cavendish‘s
fantasy exiles, they also reflect how high the stakes are elsewhere. We might say that
Cavendish deals in inverse proportions: the least concern the Duchess displays as she
annihilates entire worlds can alert us to the extreme concern Cavendish experiences in the
real world, where she can hardly debunk competing theories so efficiently and
effectively. It is perhaps because we sense this proportion that we react to the Duchess‘s
casual destruction of multiplicity with such unease, an unease that threatens to extend
itself to cover Cavendish‘s entire engagement with heterogeneity: is such engagement not
counterfeit? Do not all her experiments with multiplicity have pre-determined outcomes?
Is her apparently rhizomatic writing strategy not in fact reducible to the most childishly
redundant binary: Everybody is wrong but ME!
Deleuze and Guattari‘s theories on the rhizome can in fact help us here. In their
introduction to the concept, they briefly discuss the rhizomatic relationship between the
orchid and the wasp. The flower, they explain,
deterritorializes by forming an image, a tracing of a wasp; but the wasp
reterritorializes on that image. The wasp is nevertheless deterritorialized,
becoming a piece in the orchid‘s reproductive apparatus. But it
reterritorializes the orchid by transporting its pollen. Wasp and orchid, as
heterogeneous elements, form a rhizome … not imitation at all but a
capture of code … a becoming-wasp of the orchid and a becoming-orchid
of the wasp…. There is neither imitation nor resemblance, only an
exploding of two heterogeneous series on the line of flight composed by a
common rhizome … ―the aparallel evolution of two beings that have
absolutely nothing to do with each other.‖ (10)
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Deleuze and Guattari see the same aparallel evolution between book and world as they
see between wasp and orchid. Books do not reproduce the world any more than the insect
reproduces the flower. Mimicry, say the authors, is in fact ―a very bad concept, since it
relies on binary logic to describe phenomena of an entirely different nature‖ (11).
Rhizomes are not mere tracings of various observable phenomena; they are relationships
that include ruptures and reversals as much as unifications and hierarchizations. And it is
just this constant modification that guarantees the productive evolution of the rhizomatic
relationship.
However, this is just what Cavendish denies when her Duchess finally succeeds in
imagining a world that imitates perfectly Cavendish‘s natural philosophy. It is impossible
to celebrate this relationship between ―book‖ and world as rhizomatic when we
remember that its production depends on the violation of what Delueze and Guattari
identify as the rhizome‘s basic principles: connection, heterogeneity, and multiplicity.
―[A]ny point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be‖ (7, my
emphasis), explain the authors, for multiplicities have to connect with other multiplicities.
The Duchess‘s annihilative energy cannot accommodate these connections, and so cannot
accommodate Deleuze and Guattari‘s understanding of the rhizome:
It is a question of a model that is perpetually in construction or collapsing,
and of a process that is perpetually prolonging itself, breaking off and
starting up again…. We invoke one dualism only in order to challenge
another. We employ a dualism of models only in order to arrive at a
process that challenges all models. Each time, mental correctives are
necessary to undo the dualisms we had no wish to construct but through
which we pass. Arrive at the magic formula we seek—PLURALISM =
MONISM—via all the dualisms that are the enemy, an entirely necessary
enemy, the furniture we are forever rearranging. (20-21)
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Certainly Cavendish attempts a movement from pluralism to monism, but she emphasizes
elimination rather than rearrangement. Cynicism prohibits her faith in perpetually moving
models. The Blazing World betrays also her necessary lack of interest in evolution. Her
unstated goal is almost the opposite: to stop history in its hideous tracks.
Knowing her personal history, we can perhaps understand Cavendish‘s
impulses.12 But it is difficult not to feel disappointment when such a profound
imagination reduces itself to what can look like simple dualism: my world or nothing.
When Cavendish neglects all conjunctive possibilities between the multiplicities she
invokes, she ignores also the potentialities of the rhizome: it is ―alliance, uniquely
alliance‖ (25); its fabric ―is the conjunction, ‗and…and…and…‘‖ (25). In ignoring this or
any conjunction Cavendish ignores the potentialities of basic dialogue, of discourse
altogether. In fact, the my world or nothing, with me or against me dualism is too
generous a description for the position ultimately inhabited by Cavendish, who is neither
with nor against anyone, who is without company. ―In Cavendish‘s works,‖ Catherine
Gallagher explains, ―the private realm is not simply country retirement, nor is it the
sphere of the family, nor the scene of domestic productivity, nor the space of erotic
encounter. It is, rather, absolute privacy, void of other bodies and empty even of other
minds‖ (30). Gallagher points us to the frontispiece of Cavendish‘s Philosophical and
Physical Opinions, which shows her sitting alone in a library ostentatiously empty of
12

During the Civil War, Cavendish followed Queen Henrietta Maria into exile in Paris, as one of her ladies
in waiting. Her brother, a Royalist general, was executed by Parliamentary forces in 1648 after
surrendering the town of Colchester. Cavendish‘s mother and two siblings had died a year earlier: their
graves were defiled, and Cavendish‘s home vandalized, in the aftermath of the siege. Cavendish suffered
terrible grief for her family along with increasing distress over her husband‘s financial difficulties. Because
his estates had been confiscated by Parliament, Cavendish‘s husband struggled with creditors throughout
their exile in Paris and Antwerp, and though he was made a Duke after Charles II‘s restoration, he was
never invited to play a significant role in court, an oversight Cavendish found difficult to reconcile, despite
her loyalty to the royalist cause. See Gallagher for a thorough discussion of Cavendish‘s Toryism.
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books.13 Her head is her library, the legend informs us, ―her Thoughts her Books,‖ and
―her owne Flames doe her Inspire.‖ Mami Adachi notes the ―freedom of the imagination‖
such an ―inviolable space‖ could offer a female writer like Cavendish (82), but Gallagher
seems more on the mark when she calls this ―a strangely haunted and even feverish
solitude. There is a sense of alarm raised especially by the image of the flaming head.
And this is just one of numerous instances in which Cavendish seems imperiled by her
total self-referentiality‖ (30).14
In the prefatory epistle to Poems & Fancies, Cavendish confesses that she ―would
either be a world or nothing,‖ a statement that not only reveals her ambitious imagination
but also alludes to her depressing apprehension that to make a world of herself, she must
make nothing of the world. Disguised but present in this early work is Cavendish‘s later
tendency to link the fullness of a world with the emptiness of a void. The Blazing World
finally displays for us the paradoxical but undeniable likeness between these contraries,
for the worlds we encounter are busy voids, full of experimentation and conversation and
invention, but empty of progress and denied history. As in Marvell‘s poetry, we are
introduced to a complex oblivion, exile that poses as engagement after legitimate
engagement has become too upsetting or impossible to perform. The habitable oblivion
Cavendish constructs anticipates the divorce of World and Book, or ―the trouble that
happens when reality is brought into contact with models‖ and these models, thereafter,
―become reality‘s ultimate predator‖ (Rubenstien 148, 149). Such is Cavendish‘s
position: eagerness to imitate Nature leads to its removal from our sphere. ―[I]t is not that
13

See the image above, original by Pieter Van Schuppen, London, 1655. Accessed August 21, 2010
through she-philosopher.com, Gallery Cat. 10.
14
For another perspective on Cavendish‘s tendency to ―creat[e] utopian heroines who take women's
sequestration to extremes‖ (339), see Erin Lang Bonin‘s ―Margaret Cavendish's Dramatic Utopias and the
Politics of Gender.‖
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the real no longer exists but rather that its principle has faltered…‖ (Rubenstien 149).
Cavendish‘s work suggests her apprehension that the real world has lost its natural
principles, and that exchanges that take place in groups such as the Royal Society can
only fetishize processes now permanently removed from Nature.15 ―Fetishistic investment
is an extreme form of singularity and literality,‖ explains Diane Rubenstein (151), and
this is exactly what we see in the frontispiece to Philosophical and Physical Opinions and
in The Blazing World. Though the Duchess and the Empress appear to commit, fully, to
interacting with their world(s), all their interactions are in fact movements away from
Nature. This is the habit the virtual world instills, says Baudrillard: ―at the same time as
we plunge into this machinery and its superficial abysses, it is as though we viewed it as
theatre‖ (Intelligence of Evil 84). To sense the speciousness of an activity but to plunge
into it anyway is the very betrayal of the reality principle Cavendish outlines, step by
step, in The Blazing World. By the end her avatars prove no less out of touch than any
Royal Society gentleman, and dissent-less dissent—discourse without stakes—proves to
be even more damaging than the alternative, for it leaves us, quite literally, in a no-man‘s
land, where events both fail to occur and somehow prove devastating at the same time.
All roads, it seems, lead to the same empty study, the same exile into a reality deprived of
its principles. ―We witness the collapse of metaphor into the real‖ (Rubenstein 161), for
15

Baudrillard explains the movement from simulacrum to virtual reality and the fetish: ―initially, the real
object becomes sign. But in a subsequent stage the sign becomes an object again, but not now a real object;
an object much further removed from the real than the sign itself—an object off camera, outside
representation, a fetish. No longer an object to the power of the sign but an object to the power of the
object—a pure, unrepresentable, unexchangeable object, yet a non-descript one‖ (Impossible Exchange
129). Applying this to Cavendish, we can say that, initially, the real object or event is dissent, which is
taken for a sign by the Royal Society; that is, its translation into dissent-less dissent is designed to replace
real discourse with a representation of discourse. It becomes discourse without stakes. In the subsequent
stage, dissent-less dissent becomes a fetish, empty of content and antagonistic to interaction rather than
merely indifferent: this is the Empress as fake god, imposing dissent-less dissent as a thing and not a
process. Discourse becomes a sign and then a fetish.
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the Empress‘s empty studies/stadiums can no longer function as metaphors for our nonengagement in real events, not once the entire scene of principled reality has removed
itself. A metaphor without a referent, after all, is no longer a metaphor. This is what
Baudrillard means when he says that ―[t]he sign, ceasing to be a sign, becomes once
again a thing among things‖ (Intelligence of Evil 68). And this explains the Duchess‘s
complete lack of reverence for the worlds she systematically destroys: they are only
things among things, desirable, as fetishes are, but unexchangeable and non-descript.
What else would one do with them but throw them away?
We may not find a model perspective in Cavendish‘s despairingly antagonistic
attitude toward discourse and progress, but we can appreciate the indictment against
fetishistic formulas that The Blazing World ultimately demands. And we may learn a
careful vigilance against the exile that poses as engagement. Examples abound in the
media, but perhaps the closest link to Cavendish‘s fetishized world-making is the
pervasive exploitation of the political poll, ubiquitous during (not to mention before and
after) any campaign season.16 Critics of polls have commented on their pseudo-science,
their ―phony populism‖ and our inability ―to judge whether opinions polls are reflecting
something genuine‖ (Butovsky 92, 100). At their best polls can only capture an
incomplete picture, for ―just knowing how to measure something is not quite the same as
understanding what is really going on‖ (Lang 4). Pierre Bourdieu has dubbed polling
―[t]he ‗science without a scientist‘ … the equivalent of what is, in another context, the
dream of a ‗bourgeoisie without a proletariat,‘‖ but he includes the reminder that ―false
science has real political effects‖ (―Opinion Polls‖ 169, 172). Charles Briggs summarizes

16

See Diane Heith‘s ―Continuing to Campaign: Public Opinion and the White House.‖
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Bourdieu‘s position and other harsh dismissals of polling as a ―pervasive and relatively
nonintrusive way to conduct surveillance and to induce individuals to internalize the
beliefs, attitudes, ideas, fears, and desires produced for them‖ (699).17 But Briggs goes on
to suggest that it is ―misleading and unproductive to think that the power of polls emerges
from a secret pragmatics that is ‗systematically blocked from view‘ … (699). Baudrillard
agrees that ―the matter is at once less serious and more serious‖ than the threat of
manipulation from an elite or corporate conspiracy working to surreptitiously
manufacture public opinion (―The Masses‖ 579). Pollsters can hardly conceal their
methods, and most agencies openly acknowledge a margin of error for their findings,
brought about through interviewer bias, awkward or misleading questions, nonrepresentative samples, etc.18 But as Briggs meticulously explains,
[c]riticizing poll results on these grounds reproduces polling
communicability and its deep connections with democratic ideologies; to
raise basic questions regarding capital, power, and discourse would place
an individual in the realm of those who have failed to learn how polling
and democracy function—that is, of the pre-modern, ignorant, irrational
subject who threatens democratic governance…. Polling communicability
helps to render illegitimate or even unthinkable our ability to criticize one
more way that capitalism claims to enable the people to speak. (698)
Briggs looks far beyond minor procedural flaws to question the presumption that polling
data could say everything (perhaps even anything) about public opinion. Forget
condemning polls for failing to measure ―an authentic essence of the social;‖ what if
there is no authentic essence, no ―objective truth of public opinion‖ to measure?
(Baudrillard ―The Masses‖ 578). What if when ―America Speaks,‖ to borrow the Gallup

17

See also James Druckman & Lawrence Jacobs; Pierre Bourdieu, ―Public opinion does not exist;‖ B.
Ginsberg; Susan Herbst; Tom Rosenstiel.
18
What is often less transparent is the specific corporate context behind any specific poll—who is
responsible for funding. See Sarah Igo, 109-134.
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Poll‘s famous catchphrase, no one is actually talking? Baudrillard, as skeptical of opinion
polls as Cavendish is of the Royal Society, has specific answers to such questions, and
his theories are worth quoting at length:
The uncertainty which surrounds the social and political effect of opinion
polls (Do they or do they not manipulate opinion?) … will never be
completely relieved—and it is just as well! This results from the fact that
there is a compound, a mixture of two heterogeneous systems whose data
cannot be transferred from one to the other. An operational system which
is statistical, information based, and simulational is projected onto a
traditional values system, onto a system of representation, will, and
opinion. This collage, this collusion between the two, gives rise to an
indefinite and useless polemic. We should agree neither with those who
praise the beneficial use of the media, nor with those who scream about
manipulation—for the simple reason that there is no relationship between
a system of meaning and a system of simulation. Publicity and opinion
polls would be incapable, even if they so wished and claimed, of
alienating the will or the opinion of anybody whatsoever, for the reason
that they do not act in the space/time of will and of representation where
judgment is formed. For the same reason, though reversed, it is quite
impossible for them to throw any light at all on public opinion or
individual will, since they do not act in a public space, on the stage of a
public space. They are strangers to it, and indeed they wish to dismantle it.
(―The Masses‖ 579)
Baudrillard situates us in the same no-man‘s land that does Cavendish, a space in which it
is impossible to reconcile ―two heterogeneous systems:‖ one a system of meaning, the
other a system of simulation. The public revealed in an opinion poll is fundamentally
different from the public that exists ―in nature,‖ just as the natural philosophy revealed in
Royal Society experimentation is fundamentally different from the philosophy of Nature
itself. Polling agencies may present ―the ‗people‘s voice‘ as transparent and wholly
unmediated by their method of calling it into being,‖ may claim to discover ―average
Americans‘ views [simply] … by asking them‖ (Igo 117), but as careful critics like
Briggs, Baudrillard, and Cavendish demonstrate, it is impossible to detach any statement
from the circumstances of its creation (Briggs 693). The accoutrements cannot be
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concealed, not fully, and not from everyone. If there is any call to action in either
Baudrillard‘s or Cavendish‘s antagonistic hypotheses, it entails a renewed vigilance
against any and all systematic attempts to render the world so comprehensible that we
end up leaving the world behind. On the watch for these forced marches to nowhere, we
can begin to discuss how to redirect them, not into empty stadiums, studies, or specimen
jars, but into a territory of invested responders eager to assemble in unique alliance with
the accoutrements of every discourse and every discourser—our own versions, we might
imagine, of Henry the Fifth, Charles the Second, Alexander, Caesar, and ―honest
Margaret Newcastle‖ (BW 109).
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Coda
Be Bold, Be Bold … Be not too Bold

―There is no Redemption of the object,‖ says Baudrillard (Passwords 5). What,
then, might be redeeming in a project that spotlights a strategy of the object? I hope I
have sufficiently demonstrated that the previous six early modern writers discovered an
aesthetic utility in the inarticulate that is echoed in postmodern media. But beyond, or
perhaps alongside, the aesthetic potential for the rhetoric of struggle lies, I believe, the
potential for dissidence. There may be no redemption of the object, but as Baudrillard
says, ―[s]omewhere there is a ‗remainder,‘ which the subject cannot lay hold of …‖
(Passwords 5). Inside this remainder are the makings of a dissidence that ―derives
ultimately not from essential qualities in individuals (though they have qualities) but from
conflict and contradiction that the social order inevitably produces within itself, even as it
attempts to sustain itself,‖ a dissidence that ―posits a field necessarily open to continuing
contest, in which at some conjunctures the dominant will lose ground while at others the
subordinate will scarcely maintain its position‖ (Sinfield 41, 49). This loss of position is a
risk, certainly: the dissident him or herself must become a figure more interested in
identifying as an object than as a subject. But as we have seen through the operations of
Salome, Hero, Scudamore and others, with risk comes reward: disgracing subjectivity
may bring about a heightened recognition of the conditionality of language, and of
everything associated with language, in any historical period: law, politics, religion,
philosophy, identity. In the object strategy is the secret of seduction, described
beautifully, ominously, and characteristically indirectly by Baudrillard as a secret that
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reveals itself in movements—―movements whose slowness and suspense are poetic, like a
slow motion film of a fall or an explosion, because something has had, before fulfilling
itself, the time to be missed and this is, if there is such a thing, the perfection of ‗desire‘‖
(Selected Writings 163).
There are teaching moments, then, in each of these chapters (or, perhaps, teaching
movements). Inarticulate voices oblige deceleration as they invite participation: Be bold,
be bold … be not too bold. The warning Britomart encounters in the House of Busirane is
just the sort of seductively paradoxical directive that could be uttered by any of the
objects discussed in the previous pages. Charged at once to be autonomous and obedient,
Britomart‘s response is to slow down and acknowledge the inescapable-ness of the
contradiction. Then she acts. Significant is not only the success of her eventual rescue of
Amoret (Redemption!), but also the proof she supplies that it is possible to act in
uncertainty (the Remainder).
It seems to me that it is just as important to recognize the Remainder attached to
Britomart‘s action as it is to recognize the Redemption, and this can translate into a larger
recognition of the inevitability of remainders linked to even the boldest, most
straightforward performances. Why not acknowledge them, as Britomart does?
Particularly in the composition classroom, there is room to discuss and to imitate the
strategically inarticulate, space to begin acknowledging the mismatch that exists between
what many instructors profess is crucial in composition in the classroom and what
actually passes—and passes successfully—for discourse in the rest of the nation. This is
less a giving in to the rhetoric of struggle than a coming clean about how present it has
always been in the development of language and culture. ―Words are very rascals,‖ as
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Feste says, and we are all, with varying degrees of skill, corrupters of them (Twelfth
Night III.i.19-20; 34-35). Why not use the composition classroom as the place to grow
―wise enough to play the fool‖ (58)? ―This is a practice,‖ as Viola says, ―as full of labor
as a wise man‘s art‖ (63-64). It is a proposition easier to accept in literature than in life.
But as Eliot shows us Fear in a handful of dust, we may very well find that we can see
Wisdom (or Coherence, or Harmony, or Humanity itself) all the more keenly in a figure‘s
complete and utter failure to achieve it.
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